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Abstract 
 
Saudi Arabia is being challenged by increasing demands for democratic 
reform. Although many Saudi citizens desire such change, in order to maintain 
stability, dramatic and rapid reform is not considered prudent. Nor is the adoption of 
a Western model of democracy seen as a way forward. Indeed, such a shift would be 
counterproductive for most Islamic nations. A more measured approach, introducing 
reforms that build on traditional Islamic democratic ideals, would help to maintain 
stability and legitimacy for the various stakeholders involved.  
Consequently, attention has been turned to the ‘Majlis Al Shura’ or the Al-
Shura Council, an Islamic Advisory Council that ensures policies and laws follow 
the principles of Islam. Shura, developed from the Holy Quran, is an ancient practice 
that has profound significance in Arab culture and history. It provides a framework 
which ensures scholars and experts from a variety of backgrounds are consulted on 
issues related to governance. Currently, the role the members play in governance of 
the Saudi State is decided by the King, who appoints individuals to the Council 
according to their perceived suitability. 
However, the Saudi Arabian Al-Shura Council is a highly respected 
institution. Allowing citizens to elect members, rather than having the King holding 
the authority to appoint them, would not only be well received, but would create a 
more effective check on governmental power, help satisfy the demand for more 
citizen input into public affairs, and pave the way for future, more substantial reform, 
if desired by Saudi society.  
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Chapter One: General Introduction to Constitutionalism, Constitutionalisation 
and Legitimacy: Reforming Al-Shura Council Law in Saudi Arabia 
 
1.1 Introduction 
A growing demand for democracy has seemingly gripped the Middle East. 
Citizens are no longer willing to submit to government power they perceive as being 
illegitimate. These demands are growing more urgent according to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations who reports, “In the Middle East, North Africa and 
elsewhere, grass-roots demand for greater accountability, transparency and the rule 
of law is driving political changes at a breathtaking pace.”1 While legal and political 
scholars speak of constitutionalism, constitutionalisation and the ‘victory’ of liberal 
normativism, the underlying, driving force of unrest in a nation State inevitably has 
to do with the legitimacy of its source of power. Legitimacy of authority in modern 
States is bound by legal, rational rules. Authority rests “... on a belief in the legality 
of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue 
commands (legal authority).”2 Max Weber observed that legitimacy of authority in 
modern nations is based on the belief that authority is bound by legal rules, and those 
legal rules are rational.
3
 For Weber, authority is the legitimate use of power and 
legitimate rule is accepted because it is based on law.  
Rule following law is not a concept that was new to Weber. Nor was it new to 
A.V. Dicey who made the phrase “rule of law” famous in his 1885 publication An 
Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution. Indeed, Aristotle, in his 
Politics and Athenian Constitution, is known to have said, “It is better for the law to 
rule than one of the citizens.”4 Even the Guardians who would rule in Aristotle’s 
ideal State would have to abide by the law. So, the recognition that legitimacy in rule 
must come from its adherence to law has a long and rich tradition.  
 
                                                 
1
 United Nations Security Council, ‘The Rule Of Law And Transitional Justice In Conflict And Post-
Conflict Societies Report Of The Secretary-General’ (12 October  2011) 2. 
<http://www.unrol.org/files/S_2011_634EN.pdf>  accessed 29 January 2015. 
2
 Max Weber, “The Types of Legitimate Domination” in Laura Desfor Edles and Scott Appelrouth 
(eds) Sociological Theory in the Classical Era (Sage Publications 2005) 175.  
3
 ibid.  
4
 As cited in Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin Group 2010) 3.    
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When rule has legitimacy, not only individuals but States have a tendency to 
obey. Put simply, legal scholars have asked why obey and for what purpose are laws 
obeyed?
5
 That this line of inquiry has “energized the legal philosophers in their 
speculations about societies of natural persons, as opposed to States, is not so 
different as to justify the alienation of the two branches – the national and 
international – of legal philosophy.”6 Thomas M. Franck, the author of The Power of 
Legitimacy Among Nations (1990), argues that the same aspects of the legitimacy of 
power/law motivates both citizens and nations to follow rules. This recognition is 
supported in sophisticated ideas related to polis. Citizens are part of polis/community 
and this affiliation necessitates reciprocal rights and obligations upon which a social 
construct of power is built. Likewise, “Teleologically speaking, one might 
hypothesize that nations obey rules of the community of States because they thereby 
manifest their membership in that community, which in turn, validates their 
Statehood.”7 
Legitimacy is also strengthened when rule of law has traditional elements. 
With traditional authority, political authority is based on the perceived sanctity of 
customs, conventions and traditions.
8
 When citizens no longer accept the legitimacy 
of their government, unrest and uprisings will almost always occur, especially when 
the power of the State is used against its own people. As the State loses legitimacy, 
its citizens demand reforms, and if reform does not take place, then violence, chaos 
and the toppling of the State is often the end result.
9
  
A government loses legitimacy for a variety of reasons, but most often 
because its citizens have been stripped of their rights to political power. Their 
government, which is supposed to represent and support them, has become corrupt, 
and its rule has fallen out of the legitimate boundaries as previously accepted by its 
polity. In other words, these governments are no longer following a rule of law, but 
have placed themselves above or outside a rule of law previously accepted by the 
polis. When large numbers of citizens break laws, the motivations to obey no longer 
                                                 
5
 Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford University Press 1990) 5. 
6
 ibid.  
7
 ibid 8.  
8
 Weber (n 2)175.  
9
 Shaun Best, Introduction to Politics and Society (Sage Publications 2002) 10. 
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apply. Recent uprisings in the Middle East, including Tunisia, Egypt and Syria, are 
examples of what happens when a government has lost the support of its people.  
Governing authority in modern societies is being challenged by global 
constitutionalism. With regard to global constitutionalism under the normative 
school of thought, scholars assume that domestic constitutionalism is deficient and 
needs to be supplemented by global legal constitutional practices that guide the 
political reform of States. States that do not conform to international legal precedents 
and standards are increasingly likely to be identified as illegitimate because they are 
in violation of those normative standards.  
While most of the States in the Arabian Gulf region are relatively stable, the 
various regimes, including that of Saudi Arabia, are aware that reforms are 
necessary. However, Saudi Arabia has accomplished what most, more modern, 
governments in the Middle East have not—long-term legitimacy. Saudi Arabia’s 
success is due to a variety of factors, including a traditional political culture that 
accepts the legitimate authority of the King; wealth and its wide distribution from oil 
revenues; and the ability of the monarchy to balance the need for modernisation with 
the need to maintain traditional customs and policies.  The monarchy has also been 
successful in maintaining mutually beneficial alliances with wealthy and influential 
tribal leaders and most importantly, its alliance with religious leaders has been 
sustained over many decades, which is critical due to the strong Islamic values held 
by most Saudi Arabian citizens.  
Although Saudi Arabia has been able to protect its authority, it is confronting 
political, economic, social, and diplomatic challenges shaped by a new millennium. 
Additionally, information technologies, globalisation, and the inability of 
governments to control information and social networking, has allowed outside 
influences to make an impact on the region’s various societies. Many of the Gulf 
States have participated and signed international treaties, agreeing to abide by 
international law. However, conservative Muslim States like Saudi Arabia remain 
hesitant to become signatories to international treaties, claiming that Shar’ia law 
supersedes secular laws even at the international level.
10
 For example, Saudi Arabia 
                                                 
10
 Abdulhamid A. Al-Hargan, ‘Saudi Arabia and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 1966: a stalemate situation’ (2005) 9 (4) International Journal of Human Rights 491. 
  
4 
 
refused to sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 
1966, among others, because it claimed the ICCPR is not compatible with some 
aspects of Shar’ia law, and since Shar’ia is the supreme law of the land, it cannot 
ratify the treaty without violating Shar’ia.11 The failure to ratify several international 
treaties related to human rights and discrimination has provided more evidence for 
human rights organisations to accuse the country of evading responsibility for its 
human rights violations. The Saudi State has been accused of using Shar’ia as an 
excuse to avoid recognition and implementation of international human rights law.
12
 
Yet, some Muslim States have actually worked within the frame of Shar’ia to redress 
human rights issues and have passed new legislation and human rights legal 
protection. Research has shown that Shar’ia has a relatively minimal influence on 
human rights violations in Muslim countries;
13
 cultural practices and customs are the 
main causes of the violations, especially in relation to women and children who find 
themselves in heavy-handed patriarchal social environments. Indeed, although 
Muslim nations have the common denominator of Shar’ia as their source of law, 
Shar’ia does not necessarily determine whether or not the country will comply with 
international law.
14
 
Although there are both external and internal pressures to comply with human 
rights standards, each Muslim State will respond to demands from citizens in its own 
way. The nature of that reform will be shaped by the State’s history, culture and 
circumstances. If constitutionalism is truly a force for change in the Middle East, as 
is claimed by many, certain fundamentals are required to drive that change. 
Constitutionalism is rooted in the ‘Rule of Law,’ with government being legally 
limited in its powers. A government’s continuing legitimacy will depend on whether 
or not it is observing these limitations. Constitutionalisation, then, has the primary 
characteristic of imposing legal restraints on government, resulting in a balance 
between the power of the State and the power of the people.  
One of the defining questions of the modern constitutional debate is whether 
constitutional law needs to be modified or even replaced by constitutionalism that 
                                                 
11
 Al-Hargan (n 10) 491.  
12
 Nisrine Abiad, Shar’ia, Muslim States and International Human Rights Treaty Obligations (British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law 2008) xv. 
13
 ibid xvi.  
14
 ibid xi. 
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extends beyond the State.  The blurring of national borders has presented a challenge 
to the traditional concept that constitutions fall within the realm of the nation, not 
beyond. Additionally, nation States that have no formal manifestation of the ideals of 
constitutionalism are being pressured by the global community to constitutionalise.  
In an attempt to respond to the need for more democracy in the governance of 
Saudi Arabia, attention has been turned to the ‘Majlis Al Shura’ or the Al-Shura 
Council.  The Al-Shura Council is an Islamic Advisory Council, which ensures 
policies and laws follow the principles of Islamic legislation. The Al-Shura Council 
comprises various consultants who propose laws, interpret Al-Shar’ia law and make 
decisions about the applicability of certain policies and practices proposed. Shura 
refers to the framework developed from the Holy Quran which is used to build a 
political system where scholars and others consult on issues related to Shar’ia law. 
The Shura framework, however, only provides general, universal principles; the 
details of how they are applied are left open to interpretation by the various nations 
affected. This allows a great degree of flexibility, which makes Shura a progressive 
political system that can respond to the nation’s interests during any era. Allowing 
the Shura to be open and unspecified is considered an advantage because it can be 
adapted to the needs of the citizens at a given time. 
The attention given to the Al-Shura Council through this research and other 
studies is partly due to the profound significance that Shura has in Arab culture and 
history. The Shura method of public consultation is associated with the ancient Arab 
tradition of the Open Majlis or ‘Council.’ Shura guarantees that governance under 
Islam is guided by the consultation of others.  
The Saudi Arabian form of Shura manifested itself in the creation of the Al-
Shura Council in 1924
15
. Originally, members of the Council were elected. Today, 
the representatives of the Al-Shura Council are appointed by the King, who decides 
on their suitability according to the needs of the government.  Because the 
representatives are appointed by the King, the Al-Shura Council, as a governing 
mechanism, is not really separated from the King’s authority. Still, citizens are not 
demanding a separation of power. Rather, they seek more democracy through citizen 
                                                 
15
 Nasser M. Al-Asaaf (tr), The Shura Council in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (The Information 
Department of the Shura Council 2004) 4. 
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participation by being able to elect who becomes a member of Al-Shura. The election 
of members to the Council will help to guarantee that the broad interests of all 
citizens are addressed more evenly because the people will choose who they believe 
will best represent their needs.  
1.2 Significance of the Research 
There is increasing pressure from the global community for constitutionalism 
to be a normative force in States that are considered undemocratic, and for them to 
constitutionalise at least part of their governing process. The normative forces for 
political reform are especially salient in relation to human rights issues. Nation states 
that are perceived to be violating the rights of their citizens are under scrutiny from 
the international community. As pressure increases for political reforms in Saudi 
Arabia, both externally and internally, this research is an evaluation of the kind of 
reforms that could be made in order to constitutionalise the governance in a way that 
satisfies various stakeholders. The research emphasises the Saudi Arabian Al-Shura 
Council as the primary government structure for possible reform.  
The election of members to the Al-Shura Council would be a first step 
leading to a significant and positive change for both the current ruling body and for 
citizens who are seeking more public participation and a balance in Saudi Arabian 
governance. Electing members to the Al-Shura Council will, in itself, constitute a 
fundamental change, which in a conservative State, represents a significant step 
towards reform. Constitutionalising the Al-Shura Council would pave the way for 
continued constitutionalisation to further balance the power between the State and its 
people. Many constitutional scholars claim that Islam and democracy are not 
compatible. However, defining Islam and democracy as more or less incompatible 
fails to recognise, and thereby fails to support, the true nature of Islamic governance 
and the potential of Islamic societies to constitutionalise according to the relevancy 
and legitimacy required to sustain them. Additionally, one has to wonder, if the 
legitimacy of the State can remain intact in the long-term if relatively strong 
measures of constitutionalisation are not implemented. 
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1.3 Research Challenges 
This research is guided by a normative approach to constitutional law which 
holds the view that constitutionalism is a legal or moral framework that guides the 
progression of reform of legal and political practices of the State which represent a 
commitment to constitutional standards.
16
 Ultimately, then, law and politics are 
interdependent. Each frames the other where laws are the result of a political process, 
and political process is determined by laws. Scott states that, “The two phenomena 
are therefore inseparable; in a certain sense, all law is politics and all politics is 
law.”17 In other words, laws created in any society will be shaped by the political 
nature of the society and its governance. Consequently, in considering the power of 
modern constitutionalism and its impact on Saudi Arabia, there needs to be an 
analysis of both the legal and political forces at play. 
1.4 Research Objectives 
Saudi Arabia has taken small and incremental steps toward reform to meet 
the growing demands, both external and internal in origin, for more democratic 
practices in its governance. The objective of this research is to analyse the current 
status of said reforms and pressures for further reform and to recommend the most 
appropriate way to constitutionalise aspects of the government to meet the needs of 
various stakeholder groups in the country, while simultaneously allowing the current 
regime to maintain stability and legitimacy. In other words, I will try to identify the 
most appropriate processes of constitutionalisation that are necessary for Saudi 
Arabia to maintain its stability yet provide enough change that citizen participation in 
governance can occur. Saudi Arabia is at a point where if certain specific reforms are 
made, the monarchy can maintain its legitimacy and thus maintain the stability of the 
State.  
                                                 
16
 Rosanna Deplano, ‘Fragmentation and Constitutionalisation of International Law: A Teleological 
Inquiry’ (Ph.D. thesis, Brunel Law School 2012) 1. 
17
 Paul Scott, ‘Political Constitutions and Political Constitutionalism’ (2013) 14 (12) German Law 
Journal 1257.  
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1.5 Research Questions 
1) What are the political, cultural, historical, social and economic forces that 
are making constitutionalism and constitutionalisation normative trends for 
guiding legal and political reform at the State level and beyond?  
2) What is the Islamic perspective regarding constitutionalism? 
3) To maintain legitimacy in governance, what democratic reforms are the 
most appropriate for Saudi Arabia’s legal and/or political system to 
implement at this time?   
1.6 Methodology 
The research will adopt a qualitative research methodology and content 
analysis; therefore, analytical methods are applied throughout. They will be used to 
analyse various bodies of literature, regulations, policies, laws, and juristic opinions 
related to power, legitimacy, international law, constitutionalism and Islamic 
constitutionalism; Shar’ia and its relation to international law; constitutionalisation 
and the structure of governance in Saudi Arabia. In considering a process of reform 
in Saudi Arabia, this study will focus on the Al-Shura Council in Saudi Arabia in 
order to identify gaps between the original intent of Shura and its current practice in 
the country, so that constitutional reforms that will best suit the nature and needs of 
the citizens can be recommended.  
1.7 Organisation of Research 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter One introduces the general 
topic, “Constitutionalism, Constitutionalisation and Legitimacy:  Reforming Al-
Shura Council Law in Saudi Arabia.” Chapter One also includes a discussion on the 
significance of the research, research challenges, research objectives, research 
questions, and the methodology used to conduct the research.  
Chapter Two reviews the political and legal scholarly discourse on 
Constitutionalism and trends of Constitutionalisation at both the domestic and 
international levels. Then issues of legitimacy of power and issues of international 
governance are addressed. The discourse on international constitutionalisation leads to 
the consideration of human rights and international law because the concern over 
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human rights has become the common ground to develop international law and 
conventions that are meant to subordinate national laws related to human rights. Gross 
violations of human rights have been one of the driving forces to bring universal 
normative processes to bear on perpetrators and to prevent further violations from 
taking place. International constitutionalism is related to the concepts of legitimacy of 
power and the normative principles developed to address how the world responds to 
actions taken at the State level.  
Chapter Three extends concepts of constitutionalism and legitimacy of State 
power from an Islamic perspective. Issues of Islam’s compatibility with democracy are 
explored in this chapter. For example, what traditional Islamic practices are inherently 
democratic, if any?  
Chapter Four focuses more specifically on the nature of Shura and its 
relationship to democracy and maintaining legitimacy in Islamic nations.  
Chapter Five explores the current political climate and issues of legitimacy and 
power in the Arabian Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, which are causing increased 
demands for reform.  
            Chapter Six is a presentation on the governing structures of Saudi Arabia, 
highlighting executive and legislative authority. The development of Saudi Arabian 
law is discussed, along with the nature of its judicial system. This chapter also explores 
Saudi Arabia’s legal and constitutional practices regarding human rights, as this is a 
continuing area of contention between Saudi Arabia and the global community.  
Chapter Seven explores the history and evolution of Majlis Al-Shura in Saudi 
Arabia, emphasising its importance to Saudi society. Although Shura has already been 
discussed extensively, each State has framed Shura differently, so this chapter focuses 
on its history in Saudi Arabia.   
Chapter Eight investigates achieving further constitutional reform in Saudi 
Arabia. What are the needs? What are the barriers?  
Chapter Nine makes the specific recommendations of how that 
constitutionalisation should be implemented.  
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Chapter Two: Constitutionalism, Constitutionalisation, Legitimacy  
and International Governance 
 
2.1 Introduction  
As the power of international institutions increases and economic dependence 
between nations becomes more intertwined, ideals of constitutionalism and 
constitutionalisation have become prominent in the sphere of public discourse. Now 
is an era where terms, such as, global dynamics, global economies and global 
governance characterise an interconnected world.
18
 National independence is being 
re-defined, and the sovereignty of nation-States has become blurred. Various terms 
are used to describe the diminishing of State authority, such as, a hollowing-out, 
disaggregation, or de-centring of the State;
19
 but regardless of the term used, it would 
appear that State sovereignty has been reduced by the legal, economic, and political 
activities carried out by international entities. In addition, normative processes have 
emerged to try to exert control over nation-States that have crossed the lines of what 
is considered legitimate behaviour.  
As well as an apparent common consensus that the power of the State has 
declined, there is also agreement that the “transfer… of functions to specialized 
regulators, along with the development of new types of public/private interactions” 
has grown significantly.
20
 For example, transnational trade by privately-owned 
multinational corporations is widespread.
21
  
In response, transnational regulatory networks have been developed to 
manage these globalised transactions. There are three different types of transnational 
networks: networks of national agents formed within the established context of 
international organisations; networks of national agents, created under a formal 
agreement by heads of State; and networks of national regulators that have developed 
without any formal type of framework and whose members make policies and 
                                                 
18
 Christian Joerges and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds) Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade 
Governance and Social Regulation (Hart Publishing 2 0 0 6 )  3. 
19
 Sol Picciotto, ‘Constitutionalizing Multilevel Governance?’ (2008) 6 (3-4) Comparative Political 
Studies 459.  
20
ibid 460.   
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 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Global government networks, global information agencies, and 
disaggregated democracy’ (2001) Harvard Law School Working Paper 4, 8. 
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decisions at the international level.
22
 This third type is often formed by business 
leaders, experts, State officials and so forth, who share information, coordinate 
policies and address common issues, but are not closely regulated by the policies of 
their respective governments. The activities of these networks are rarely visible, and 
they are so distant from the general population to be made accountable under the 
usual processes of representative democracy.
23
 Consequently, growing numbers of 
legal and constitutional scholars, jurists, politicians, and professionals are 
increasingly demanding the establishment of general norms of accountability due to 
the immense impact these organisations can have on the lives of ordinary people.
24
  
Ideals of constitutionalism have influenced the nature of government since 
the 18th century. However, constitutionalisation as a topic for debate by legal 
scholars is a relatively new phenomenon, especially in terms of international 
relations. As demands continue to spread for a globalised body of law that reaches 
beyond the State, contemporary circumstances will no longer tolerate complacency 
toward the subject of international law and relations.
25
   
In 1990, Thomas Franck was concerned at the lack of interest on the part of 
legal philosophers/scholars on the subject of international constitutionalism. 
However, since then, legal scholars have turned much more attention to the issues of 
global governance, perhaps out of necessity. With interdependencies becoming more 
complex, the actions taken by one nation often impacts other nations, at least on a 
regional level if not a global one. So, global-level policies are increasingly being 
viewed as an appropriate response.  
Constitutionalisation has, then, become a source of debate due to the 
increased governance occurring through arrangements that are not well managed at 
the nation-State level.
26
 As international agencies and their power over nations 
increase, it follows that concern regarding the legitimacy of this power is also 
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 Slaughter  (n 21) 4. 
23
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26
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<http://www.juspoliticum.com/IMG/mp3/loughlin_IMV_constitutionalisation.mp3> accessed 10 
January 2013.  
 
  
12 
 
increasing. International organisations like the World Trade Organisation create 
policies that have a profound impact on the lives of ordinary citizens. Consequently, 
growing numbers of public actors/agents are calling for these supranational 
organisations to be constitutionalised – in other words, subjected to the processes of 
constitutional procedures and norms, such as accountability, equal representation and 
legitimate use of power.
27
 In fact the issue of international constitutionalisation has 
been identified as an important legal and practical challenge.
28
 
One of the defining questions of modern constitutional debate is whether 
constitutional law needs to be modified, or even replaced, by a constitutionalism that 
extends beyond the State.
29
 The blurring of national borders has presented a 
challenge to the traditional concept that a constitution falls within the realm of the 
nation, not beyond it. Additionally, nation States that lack any formal manifestation 
of the ideals of constitutionalism are being pressured to constitutionalise by a variety 
of stakeholders.  
In recent years, contemporary concern with the interpretation of rights has 
caused some to celebrate the “final triumph of liberal normativism”,30 which is the 
assumption that legal constitutional constraints will be imposed on political bodies, 
and that the rules for this imposition have been mutually agreed upon, overriding 
other forms of political arrangement. However, not everyone would agree with this 
statement.
31
 Many issues are still open to debate within the context of 
constitutionalism, constitutionalisation and the philosophies that drive them. The idea 
that liberal normativism has triumphed across nations, cultures and even within 
scholarly groups is premature and perhaps not even desirable.  
                                                 
27
 Gavin Anderson, ‘Beyond Constitutionalism Beyond the State’ (2012) 39 (3) Journal of Law and 
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 Anderson (n27) 360. 
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 ibid 361. 
31
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Working Paper 4; Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel Trachtman, ‘Ruling the world? Constitutionalism, 
International Law and Global Governance’ (10 December, 2009) Talk! European Journal of 
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2.2 Constitutionalism: Variations on a Theme 
Attempts to clarify the meaning of constitutionalism often begin with 
definitions of a constitution, which, simply put, consists of written documents that 
share certain formal characteristics.  For one thing, a constitution has precedence 
over ordinary law, and mandates specific procedures for amendments to protect 
constitutional laws from modifications which are poorly conceived or driven by 
trends.
32
 Parpworth points out that constitution might have a different meaning 
depending on the context in which it is used.
33
 In general, though, Parpworth defines 
constitution as a body of rules that regulate a system of governance. It establishes the 
institutions and bodies and the powers each uses, and determines how different parts 
of government interact with the other. Constitution is concerned with the relations 
between citizens and their government.
34
 A constitution, therefore, provides 
procedural functions to institutionalise the legal norms of a polity. From a very broad 
and loose, perspective, constitutionalism refers to the use of constitutions. Although 
there are some nation States in the modern world such as the UK and Israel that do 
not have a formal written constitution, most follow a rule of law and might even refer 
to themselves as constitutionalists. However, most constitutionalists have something 
much more specific in mind. The purpose of a constitution is almost always to reduce 
dangers that can be posed by the State:  
All constitutional government is by definition limited 
government. . . Constitutionalism has one essential quality: it is a 
legal limitation on government; it is the antithesis of arbitrary 
rule; its opposite is despotic government, the government of will 
instead of law."
35
 This understanding of constitutionalism 
highlights three essential features: (1) the supremacy principle, 
(2) the limited government principle, and (3) the entrenchment 
principle.
36
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With its origins in the 17th and 18th centuries,
37
 constitutionalism is a 
political movement or trend that contains the underlying values that subjugate 
political powers to laws, thus creating a government dictated by those laws, not by 
men. Ideologically speaking, constitutionalism embodies the values and 
philosophical perspectives that shape the institutional provisions in a specific 
constitution.
38
 Modern constitutionalism, for the most part, has added the broader 
values of human rights that go beyond the traditional rules and procedures of 
government.
39
 Professor Louis Henkin stated, “Ours is the age of rights. Human 
rights is the idea of our time, the only political-moral idea that has received universal 
acceptance.”40 Antonio Moreira Maués (2012) found that in response to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 18 countries all underwent 
structural changes in their constitutional systems
41
 Contemporary constitutional 
discourse, therefore, examines the formal and substantive elements that mandate 
equality for all people under the rule of law.
42
  
A growing concern for human rights that protect equal treatment under 
established law is evident through such modern developments as the International 
Human Rights treaties, the UN Charter, and the increasing number of 
international courts that focus on protecting human rights in general.
43
 It has 
been predicted that, as seen in Europe, international constitutional law is likely to 
evolve out of common concepts of constitutionalism, especially those related to 
issues of human and social rights.
44
 However, there is disagreement about 
constitutionalising human rights because of uncertainty as to the extent of the welfare 
obligations of a democratic nation:
45
 “Not everyone seems to agree that social rights 
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will be regarded as principles capable of constituting the political space but rather 
will be regarded as political claims.”46 
The development of a constitution and constitutionalism are interdependent. 
A constitution is formed based on the views that a society has associated with 
constitutionalism, bearing in mind that there is no single universal ideology 
embraced by constitutionalism. Citizens do not view constitutions simply as a set of 
legal and political instructions; they are also seen as, “… [a society’s] moral 
commitment and identity… our constitutions are said to encapsulate fundamental 
values of the polity, and this, in turn, is said to be a reflection of our collective 
identity as a people, as a nation, as a State, as a Community, as a Union.”47 
Disagreement about the nature of constitutionalism is unsurprising. Even 
though institutions of democracy have gained growing support, there is uncertainty 
about which type of institutional framework of democracy would serve the needs and 
interests of all citizens, and what type of democratic institution would solve the 
problems that are an inherent part of political participation.
48
 Additionally, there is 
still resistance from those who see democracy as a threat to their valued beliefs or 
established privileges.
49
 
Modern perceptions of constitutionalism are complicated by differentiations 
between liberal constitutionalism and constitutional liberalism, among other issues. 
While liberal constitutionalism provides safeguards of individual liberty and private 
autonomy, constitutional liberalism emphasises the freedom of individuals to choose 
the type of political/constitutional environment they prefer.
50
 Liberal 
constitutionalism emphasises negative rights, meaning that outside forces are 
restrained from interfering with individual freedoms, and where a system of laws is 
created to protect this private domain.  
Constitutional liberalism, on the other hand, is more about procedure; it 
emphasises the way that a system of laws becomes legitimate. Constitutional 
liberalism does not prescribe specific standards of rights; rather it is a procedure 
                                                 
46
 Wesson (n 45) 221. 
47
 Weiler and Wind (n 38) 17.  
48
 Viktor Vanberg, ‘Liberal Constitutionalism, constitutional liberalism and democracy’ (2011) 22 
Constitutional Political Economics (Springer) 1. 
49
 ibid 2. 
50
 ibid.  
  
16 
 
where the source of legitimacy for the rules of a particular society come from its 
citizens.
51
 This view of constitutional liberalism, much like private individuals 
entering contracts voluntarily within a framework of contract law, requires that 
individuals are able to freely enter into a system of government and its function. In 
other words, citizens are free to develop rules under which they can live by voluntary 
agreement.
52
 Liberal constitutionalism is concerned with substantive law and 
constitutional liberalism is concerned with procedural law. 
Jurgen Habermas states that liberal democracy requires the rule of law to 
function, so that self-determination of the populace can be achieved, and indeed, 
without the structure of such law, liberty cannot be assured. 
53
 Self-determination, 
where the state is a reflection of the unrestricted will of the people, is a fundamental 
principle of constitutional liberal democracy. Habermas argues:  
… the political autonomy of citizens is embodied in the 
self-organization of a community that freely makes its own laws. 
If the normative justification of constitutional democracy is to be 
consistent, then it seems one must rank the two principles, human 
rights and popular sovereignty. To be legitimate, laws, including 
basic rights, must either agree with human rights (however these 
in turn are legitimated) or issue from democratic will-formation.
54
 
 
Liberal ideology in law emphasises individualistic values, interests, and 
negative rights against the State.
55
 However, this is not the only philosophical 
perspective that is used to discuss constitutionalism. At times, the ideologies that 
underlie the use of terms and concepts are not even recognised. For example, social 
liberalism is another driver of constitutionalism, yet it has an underlying ideology 
that is very different from traditional concepts, even though the differentiation is not 
always acknowledged. Unlike traditional classical liberalism that promotes 
individual liberty and the limitation of political power, today’s debates about 
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constitutionalism also contain heavy emphasis on human rights and include 
substantive principles.
56
 Consequently, rather than simply promoting negative rights, 
positive rights (social liberalism) are emphasised, with an additional requirement to 
provide certain social benefits.  
It can be assumed that social liberalism advocates rights to housing, 
education and health care, and that these rights should be constitutionalised. If this is 
the assumption and one is committed to these rights, then the person is obliged to 
advocate that social rights are constitutionalised without challenge, even though they 
are viewed as positive rights.
57
 Within this frame, constitutionalism has become 
value-laden, emphasising positive rights.
58
  
Many modern scholars work from either of the two assumptions, where 
constitutionalism implies either a liberal approach where a government prioritises 
individual negative freedoms or social liberalism where positive rights are also 
emphasised.  
Duly noting the various interpretations related to constitutional discourse, the 
most common definition of constitutionalism is that it is a mechanism to limit 
government in order to serve the needs of the people and where governmental 
authority is rooted in popular consent.
59
 But this definition is a specifically American 
view. Consequently, broader interpretations are sought. Stanley Katz, for example, 
began redefining his admittedly American perspective after founding a project in 
1987 to study constitutionalism both within and outside the United States. To 
broaden the context, constitutionalism was defined as a manifestation of liberal 
individualism, according to the Enlightenment (classical liberalism) view.
60
  
Underlying the classical liberal viewpoint is the assumption that there are 
discoverable standards that can be used to evaluate whether or not a policy impinges 
upon human dignity. This version exemplifies classical Western notions of 
constitutionalism because, at its core, it emphasises human worth and dignity. The 
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Western view supports the notion that in order to protect the value of citizens, they 
must be able to participate in the political process, and their government must be 
constrained by substantial boundaries as to what it can do, even when it is acting on 
behalf of the popular will.
61
  
The classical liberal view of constitutionalism is also represented as a social 
contract between the State and civil society. This contract sets forth the purpose of 
government, its form and the power given to each section, and the limitations placed 
on this power.
62
 In a liberal constitutional system, there is no unilateral power that 
can repeal or modify constitutional law. This is the difference between constitutional 
law which is mostly immune from change, and ordinary law which can be modified 
by a national legislature.
63
 Using a liberal view of constitutionalism, any discussion 
of constitutionalism includes, first and foremost, constitutionalism as a manifestation 
of liberalism.
64
  
In this liberal system, the power of the government is regulated by the 
constitution which preserves the sovereignty of the people; this sovereignty is the 
only one recognised by the constitution, which is the supreme legal power.
65
 
Individual liberalism is based on the presumption that people are ruled by self-
interest, and that ordinary men as well as rulers need to be ruled, and both groups 
need to be limited by laws.
66
 
The liberal Western perspective on constitutionalism is, however, only one 
approach; there are many others. For example, although more visible in the 1980s, 
socialists declared that they too were constitutionalists. Today, developing countries 
also propose their own versions of constitutionalism, concerned with the creation, 
distribution, effects and reproduction of power, regardless of whether or not that 
power is exercised by the State or some other organised entity.
67
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Constitutionalisation in this regard is the body of laws created to apply to 
organised power.
68
 As a result, emphasis has been on constitutions, not 
constitutionalism.
69
 In other words, many developing countries have been going 
through a process of constitutionalisation but have not yet managed to embrace some 
of the basic mandates (limits of power, protection of individual rights, and political 
participation of citizens) of constitutionalism per se. The existence of a constitution 
does not guarantee democracy.
70
 
This emphasis on the process of constitutionalisation is seen in many new 
democracies who struggle to find a government framework that advances the needs 
of society in a way that adheres to the basic principles of constitutionalism. These 
societies are still striving to find a balance between constitutional authority and those 
who are supposed to benefit from that authority’s use of power.71 
Over the past decade constitutionalism has been framed in a variety of 
ways,
72
 and the models created to differentiate between perspectives have continued 
to develop as well. For example, some models are very formalistic and rely on 
examining the structural factors of constitutions; they also rely on liberal 
individualism for their normative implications. This view of constitutionalism is 
absolutist in nature.
73
 Other models rely on studying constitutionalism as an ongoing 
process which finds its basis in social realities; Katz asserts constitutionalism is an 
active political process. It is not static in its distribution of power, rights, and duties.  
In essence, constitutional legitimacy is, in most circumstances, defined by the 
existing political and social realities and not by formal legal criteria.
74
 When 
recognising constitutionalism as a process informed by the context of circumstances, 
a realist, functionalist view of constitutionalism emerges. This pivots around a 
political practice, which merges with democracy in aspiring to achieve equilibrium 
between the power of the State, the rights of individuals and their combined rights as 
a whole. In so doing, it uses, as its source, the origins of the cultural and historical 
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contexts, which defines the nature of the population’s consciousness.75 The realist, 
functionalist approach argues that if and when constitutionalism develops in a 
society, its form relies on the specific cultural/political/historical reality of that 
particular society, there are few absolutes, and the outcomes are not predictable.  
Other scholars use a ‘tripartite’ approach, dividing constitutional scholarship 
into three – the normative, the functionalist, and the pluralist schools.76 These 
schools agree that international constitutionalism is situated between law and 
politics. The normative school embraces an inherent deficiency in national 
constitutionalism, and seeks to supplement State authority at the international level. 
Consequently, the normative perspective conceives international constitutionalism as 
a framework guided by legal and moral concepts that extend beyond the State to 
become constitutional standards.
77
  
The functionalist school emphasises the process of constitutionalisation in 
order to establish constitutional norms for the development of international law.
78
  
The pluralistic school is a combination of the normative and functionalist 
schools in which “…. Some take a critical approach to universalist assumptions and 
theorise constitutional change as contextualised, contingent and constitutive, but 
others attempt to reconcile the new constitutional forms with more traditional 
universal constitutional ideals.”79 
Of all the definitions of constitutionalism presented, the realist, functionalist 
perspective seems the most inclusive, not necessarily emphasising classical 
liberalism (where negative freedoms are guaranteed) or social liberalism (where 
positive rights and freedoms are guaranteed). Instead, the emphasis is that various 
social realities will require variations on the themes of constitutionalism, with no 
expectation of absolute outcomes based on preconceived notions of constitutionalism 
in other contexts.  
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2.3 Constitutionalisation 
The concept of constitutionalism can be compared to the ‘Rule of Law’, that 
advocates the limitation of governmental power and its adherence to these constraints 
in order to maintain authority.
80
 Rule of law is a fundamental doctrine of 
constitution.
81
 Like constitution,  rule of law has different meanings in different 
contexts.
82
 In contrast constitutionalisation, technically speaking, is the process of 
making a group or nation subject to a constitution.
83
 Constitutionalism and 
constitutionalisation are often used interchangeably, with vague results.
84
 However, 
it is appropriate to regard constitutionalisation as an ongoing process that is intended 
to limit governmental authority and increase citizen participation in the political 
process.
85
 In recent years, the definition of constitutionalisation has been broadened 
to include various levels of authority and could be described as a series of practices 
which are influencing government decision-making at all levels, from local to 
international. 
86
 
Constitutionalisation has emerged over the last few decades while national 
and supranational entities like the European Union have been undergoing 
constitutional reform. The term ‘constitutionalisation’ was first used by Stein to 
describe the processes he observed unfolding in Europe: “Tucked away in the 
fairyland Duchy of Luxembourg and blessed, until recently, with benign neglect by 
the powers that be and the mass media, the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities has fashioned a constitutional framework for a federal-type structure in 
Europe.”87 
While constitutionalism denotes the underlying values and beliefs related to 
the functions of government, constitutionalisation is the process that a governmental 
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entity undergoes to meet the requirements espoused by constitutionalism.
88
 
Constitutionalisation is a way to set forth the basic norms and decision-making 
processes of a society in an institutionalised format.  
The term ‘constitutionalisation’ is also used to refer to the process of 
constitutionalising international organisations or systems. For example, international 
trade law, as undertaken by the appellate body of the World Trade Organisation, 
appears to have gone through a process of constitutionalisation because a set of 
constitutional-type norms and structures have been created through the judicial 
decision-making.
89
  
Through the process of constitutionalisation, a map of authority is developed 
and implemented that shapes the political order and establishes the political 
institutions of a nation or even the world. In other words, a blueprint for the way 
public power will be used is created through the constitutionalisation process.
90
 
When a government’s responsibility to its people has been clearly outlined, 
constitutional law emerges.
91
 In organising and regulating political activity, 
constitutionalisation provides the way through which power will be allocated within 
a particular system.  
Since the beginning of the constitutional process in the European Union, 
nearly every constitutional revision has included an increased function of the 
judiciary. This trend is considered a significant development in the political arena and 
perhaps one of the most significant trends in contemporary government.
92
 
Constitutional authority is supreme over other legal and political domains. 
However, the very nature of constitutional supremacy is one of the complicating 
issues of the process of constitutionalisation at the supranational level. For example, 
in 2005, the Court of First Instance of the European Union made two significant 
decisions in the cases of Yusuf and Kadi; the decisions tested the legality of the 
United Nations Security Council’s actions related to the cases, and triggered an 
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ongoing debate about international law in general. The main issue was whether or 
not the United Nations Charter held supremacy over other international institutions, 
including the European Union itself. According to many legal scholars the issue was 
not resolved satisfactorily.
93
 However, the aftermath of decisions related to Yusuf 
and Kadi:  
… represent a microcosm of some of the most 
fundamental debates in international law today. Those debates 
have to do with the specialization that takes place in international 
law, a process referred to as fragmentation: international human 
rights law has become a more or less self-contained system, as 
has international trade law.
94
  
 
The exact nature of the supremacy (constitutional authority) of these systems 
has yet to be fully defined. What is clear about the current trends of 
constitutionalisation is that such authority obliges the regulatory system to protect 
human rights and limit State power. So, although constitutionalism may be different 
based on social traditions and values through the process of constitutionalisation, the 
resulting constitution is usually meant to limit political power in general in order to 
protect the rights and liberties of citizens. Both regulatory and constitutive functions 
are established in order to create political stability and order. The relationship of the 
State and its citizens is clarified and regulated through the process of 
constitutionalisation. Therefore a normative definition holds that constitutions should 
include three fundamental principles – rights, the separation of power, and 
representative democracy.
95
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A more inclusive definition of normative constitutionalisation is that it 
includes all of the processes where the identified and agreed-upon fundamental 
rights, separation of power and principles are applied to a legal framework.
96
  
Constitutionalisation also creates control over illegal activities and is an 
organising principle of the function of governing. Non-compliance is subject to some 
form of legal processing. The process ensures recognition of the public interest of an 
entire polity, rather than emphasising individual interests.
97
 Laws are an attempt to 
require compliance with the stated social and cultural norms,
98
 and punishment is 
meant to act as a deterrent.  
Lawyers and legal scholars “yearn to be prescriptive”;99 consequently, the 
constitution that emerges from the constitutionalisation process is normative, but it is 
also symbolic. A constitution is meant to create both loyalty and identity among the 
citizens involved.
100
 The nation’s constitution embodies the ideological values that 
are held by the majority of citizens, and from which, ideally, they derive national 
pride and trust in the system. While many constitutions are similar, there are also 
important differences based on the model of constitutionalism used. Some are 
frameworks of government, setting forth the basic political relationships; others are 
simultaneously more instrumental and rigid, being detailed State codes that allocate 
responsibility and procedures, “mirroring an established political order and even 
seeking to constitutionalize social complexity.”101  
2.4 Human Rights and the Rule of International Law 
2.4.1. Rule of Law among Nations  
Although international law is considered a separate branch of legal study, it 
has similar principles and goals as that of national law and observance of the rule of 
law is considered as important if not more so.
102
 The requirement to obey 
international law is seen in the British Ministerial Code which requires all Ministers 
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to comply with laws, including international law and obligations of international 
treaties.
103
  
The United Nations considers international rule of law initiatives to be 
essential for international peace and security.
104
 One of the current goals of the UN is 
to help countries establish a rule of law that ensures accountability and helps to build 
confidence by reinforcing norms, promoting justice and security and promoting 
equality among disparate groups. According to the Secretary-General, the United 
Nations “is increasingly focused on emerging threats to the rule of law, such as 
organized crime and illicit trafficking, and the root causes of conflict, including 
economic and social justice issues.”105 The call for the UN to promote the rule of law 
among nations was first published in 2004 and reports have been submitted in the 
years since (such as that in 2011), to determine the progress being made. The United 
Nations has made a commitment to reinforce the rule of law in any of its initiatives, 
especially in areas of human rights. Representative of the growing need for 
legitimacy and an international rule of law, the United Nations states that to ensure 
its legitimacy, the Security Council needs to observe the basic rule of law 
principles.
106
 Increasingly, rule of law is being called for in international relations, as 
the lack of such is a threat to international security, and often results in the gross 
violation of human rights. The reliance on the rule of law is obviously preferable in 
international relations as compared to the arbitrary use of power. Professor William 
Bishop argues that this law “can and should be used as an instrumentality for the 
coopertaive furtherance of social aims, in such fashion as to preserve and promote 
the values of freedom and human dignity for individuals.”107  
The United Nations is a manifestation of the desire of nations to cooperate at 
the international level. Its members are part of the international community and are 
motivated by the same need to obey as citizens are obligated to their particular polity. 
In other words, they are obligated to obey the laws of the community of States.  
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2.4.2 Erga Omnes 
For certain constitutional scholars, both international constitutionalism and 
constitutionalisation have a core ethical base in the concept of erga omnes, or 
‘obligations owed towards all’.108 In international law, this concept refers to 
established obligations that States as members of an international community are 
expected to honour.
109
 In the same way that individuals are motivated to obey 
because of their status as a citizen in a specific polis, nations are motivated to obey 
because of their status in the international community of States. These obligations are 
mostly related to the protection of human rights such as the outlawing of acts of 
aggression, genocide, and the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the 
individual, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination. 
Eric Posner distinguishes between ordinary norms and erga omnes norms. He 
explains this difference with the example that if a State takes an action that violates 
an ordinary norm and the state is injured, then the State has a legal claim against the 
violating State. However, if the first State violates an erga omnes norm, then all 
States have legal claims against the violating State and are entitled to take measures 
against it.
110
 This understanding of erga omnes gained significance in the ruling of 
the Barcelona Traction case heard before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 
1971, where the ICJ identified a set of international obligations called erga omnes, 
which  are said to be owed by all States to the international community. The intent of 
erga omnes is to promote the basic values and common interests of all, such as 
prohibiting aggression and genocide, and the right to be protected from slavery and 
other heinous crimes against humanity.
111
 Ever since the Barcelona Traction case, the 
concept of erga omnes has grown in significance in international law.
112
 
For over 45 years, attempts were made by the United Nations to codify the 
conduct (erga omnes) of States and their obligations to the global community. 
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Eventually, erga omnes was addressed more effectively in the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, where distinctions are made between breaches of 
bilateral obligations, including obligations toward the international community in 
general.
113
 According to Article 2 of the United Nations Articles of Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, a State has committed a wrongful act if an 
action or omission: is (a) attributable to the State under international law; and (b) 
constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.
114
 If a State commits 
an act that does not conform to the international obligations required of it, it is in 
breach of that international obligation. According to Article 30 of the Articles on 
Responsibilities, if a State breaches its obligations by committing a wrongful act, it is 
obliged, “(a) to cease that act, if it is continuing; (b) to offer appropriate assurances 
and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require.”115 The State is also 
responsible for reparations of harm done during the breach. The Articles differentiate 
from an ordinary breach and a more serious breach as outlined in Chapter III 
(“Serious Breaches Of Obligations Under Peremptory Norms Of General 
International Law”) of the Articles, beginning with Article 40 which describes a 
serious breach as, “A breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or 
systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfil the obligation.”116 
The codification of erga omnes, such as is found in the ILC draft article of 
2001, is seen as a necessary step toward a new global order based on international 
law:  
…erga omnes norms exist alongside jus cogens norms, 
and constitute a category of norms in their own right….they are a 
new element in the hierarchy of international law and thereby 
attest to the ongoing process of constitutionalisation of 
international law. The existence of erga omnes norms articulates 
basic interests and needs as well as fundamental values of the 
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international community as a whole; in short, the public 
interest.
117
 
 
The primary emphasis of erga omnes and the protection of fundamental 
human rights are part of normative constitutionalism. While normative 
constitutionalism includes the key principles of global constitutionalism; limits of 
power; institutionalisation of power; setting of standards, and the protection of 
human rights; it also emphasises the need to shift the protection of human rights from 
being a political process towards being a legal process. Caution is required though. 
Not all erga omnes rise to the level of jus cogens where no abrogation of any kind is 
allowed. Nevertheless, the argument for normative constitutionalism rests on the 
belief that an international legal order sets superior norms over the systems.
118
 The 
passage of the UN’s Articles of Responsibility is a manifestation of this faith.119  
The claim for the argument of the superiority of international law is that it has 
undergone a paradigm shift from law that is made through consent, to a law that has 
been shaped largely by specific, shared global values.
120
 Different legal and 
constitutional authors might describe those values in different ways, but they all 
include fundamental norms that address public interests and the needs of the 
international community.
121
 Consequently, developing constitutional doctrine is now 
seen more as a continuing process and is not finite. This recognition is an important 
feature of the formation of the jurisprudential constitution which influences the 
concept of the constitutional freedoms of a person. Constitutional case law (and not 
the formal amendment procedure) assumes the task of adjusting constitutional norms 
to changing political and social contexts and of developing those norms beyond the 
originally intended scope.
122
  
There are two elements of normative reality with these recognitions—the 
creation of constitution and the constitutional jurisprudence that goes with it. Human 
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rights rulings, then, have gained more authority from a “newly identified social 
source of law.”123 
An example of the new authority was seen in the International Court of 
Justice’s judgement in the case concerning East Timor, Portugal vs. Australia (June 
1995). In the case, the ruling stated, that Portugal’s claim that it had the right of self-
determination, has “an erga omnes character,” and so “is irreproachable.” The court 
went on to say that, “The principle of self-determination of peoples has been 
recognized by the United Nations Charter and in the jurisprudence of the Court; it is 
one of the essential principles of contemporary international law.” However, the 
Court decided it could not rule on the lawfulness of the situation because “its 
judgment would imply an evaluation of the lawfulness of the conduct of another 
State which is not a party to the case.” The ruling did state, however, that the 
territory of East Timor remains a non-self governing territory and its people have the 
right to self-determination. The dissenting opinion claimed that because East Timor 
had been annexed, its right to self-determination was eroded.
124
 
The increasingly influential moral imperatives that have pushed the progress 
of protecting and facilitating human and civil rights are seen in the principles of 
equality and non-discrimination, as voiced in the preamble to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The Preamble states, “the recognition of the 
inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family.”125 Many human rights treaties, at both the regional and international levels, 
embrace the principles present in the UDHR. Through the development of such 
agreements at many levels, the question has been raised as to whether international 
legal norms of equality exist (international jus cogens). A classic dissenting opinion, 
rendered by Tanaka in South West Africa regarding the practice of apartheid in South 
Africa, influenced later development on principles of human rights and equality. 
Tanaka argued that a legal norm of equality did exist and, therefore, South Africa 
was in violation of international law. Tanaka argued that jus cogens should be 
introduced in international law, in part because the protection has received 
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recognition under three main sources of international law-- (1) international 
conventions, (2) international custom, and (3) the general principles of law. In his 
dissenting opinion on the case of Southwest Africa, Tanaka claimed that in the 
consideration of human rights, the legal system needed to be less rigid and not so 
bound by specific laws. There are human rights norms to be followed. Tanaka wrote 
in his dissent: 
Each member of a human society-whether domestic or 
international -is interested in the realization of social justice and 
humanitarian ideas. The State which belongs as a member to an 
international organization incorporating such ideas must 
necessarily be interested. So far as the interest in this case affects 
the rights and obligations of a State, it may be called a legal 
interest. The State may become the subject or holder of a legal 
interest regarding social justice and humanitarian matters, but this 
interest includes its profound concern with the attitude of other 
States, particularly member States belonging to the same treaty or 
organization. In short, each State may possess a legal interest in 
the observance of the obligations by other States.
126
 
 
With such notable discourse, a consequence is that international judicial 
power has been expanded primarily in the area of human and civil rights. This 
expansion has also resulted in the establishment of more authoritative judiciaries and 
supreme courts. Just as national democracy implies the presence of a judiciary that is 
separated from a society’s politics as an impartial arbiter of political or legal 
disputes,
127
 a similar judicial component is necessary for multi-layered federalist 
countries such as the United States, Germany, or Canada. The same component is 
also necessary in the developing supra-national polities such as the European 
Union.
128
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Constitutionalisation is seen as a characteristic that develops in relation to 
international law.
129
 More and more often, international obligations have come from 
legal decisions made through international organisations such as the United Nations, 
international treaties, or international courts. As the power of international 
organisations increases, so should guarantees that these powers will not be abused; 
this is the core of global constitutionalisation.
130
  
The protection of basic human rights has been the primary dynamic to 
establish international agreements binding parties to follow certain established 
accepted moral standards of conduct related to the treatment of human beings. As 
long ago as 1948, the United Nations established the United Nations General 
Assembly, which then adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a 
common “standard of achievement” for all UN members. Obviously, human rights 
standards have not always been followed in the decades since. Consequently, the UN 
has drafted a series of international human rights treaties and other instruments to 
establish legal forms related to human rights to create a body of international human 
rights. In 1966, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (and its First Optional Protocol) and 
The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which, combined with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights are now known as the International Bill of 
Human Rights. Additionally, most regions and States have developed their own laws 
and/or mechanisms of protection of human rights. Nevertheless, international treaties 
and customary law are the foundation of international human rights law; although, 
there are other instruments that have been adopted, such as declarations, guidelines 
and principles. All contribute to the implementation of human rights standards. There 
seems to be agreement among most nations that developing the rule of law at both 
national and international levels is essential for the protection of human rights.
131
  
Combining the different human rights instruments together was meant to 
reaffirm the commitment made at the international level for all States who participate 
to honour the principle that "All peoples have the right of self-determination" and 
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"By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development.”132 When sovereign States become 
parties to these types of international treaties, they knowingly assume the obligations 
and duties under international law to respect, to protect and to fulfil human rights. 
This means they must not interfere or limit the enjoyment of human rights. The State 
is obligated to protect individuals from human rights abuses, and take actions to 
facilitate that all people under its domain live with the promise of having their basic 
human rights ensured.
133
  
Fortunately, in the last ten years, as the world has witnessed genocide and 
gross violations of human rights during times of regional crisis, there has been more 
willingness to bring the power of international law to bear down on those State actors 
found guilty of human rights violations. Various legal institutions have been created 
to enforce international treaties related to human rights, including the European and 
American Conventions/Commissions on Human Rights. These organisations are 
meant to ensure that any State that is a signatory of a human rights treaty abides by 
the treaty or faces consequences. These actions have led  human rights to become a 
growing body of international law.
134
 As important as the treaties and declarations 
are in the acceptance of universal human rights guarantees, legally, these documents 
are not binding. To establish an international legal framework to protect human 
rights, then, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights were created.
135
 
Articles 18 and 19 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, review and make recommendations about actions to take when human rights 
have become a concern. For example, Articles 18 and 19 establish that the Economic 
and Social Council may make arrangements with the specialised agencies to ask for 
reports to be submitted to the Council for its study and general recommendation or, 
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as appropriate, for information on the reports concerning human rights submitted by 
States in accordance.
136
 
To build a substantial legal framework for enforcement of international 
human rights law, there have been ten core treaties and associated monitoring bodies 
created since 1965. For example, in association with the International Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, The Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) was created. It is a body of 
independent experts that monitors implementation of the Convention by State parties. 
According to the United Nations, all the State parties are required to send the 
Committee a report on how these rights are being implemented by them. The States 
must report one year after ratifying the Convention and then every two years. The 
Committee then evaluates these reports and addresses its concerns and 
recommendations to the State party in the form of “concluding observations”.137 In 
addition, the Committee performs its monitoring with three main functions: an early-
warning procedure, the examination of inter-State complaints and the examination 
of individual complaints. The early warning procedure is meant to prevent existing 
situations from escalating into conflicts. If needed, procedures are initiated to 
respond to problems that require immediate attention to prevent or reduce the 
number of serious violations of the Convention.
138
 The core treaties and their 
associated monitoring body are the basis of the international legal framework (See 
Appendix I). 
Additionally, for each treaty a committee of experts is formed to monitor 
implementation of the treaty provisions by participating States. The party States, 
submit a report to the committee on a regular basis to show the ways they have 
complied with the Treaty’s articles of law. Some of the treaties are supplemented by 
optional protocols dealing with specific concerns (See Appendix I).
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2.5 Global Constitutionalisation and Legitimacy of Power 
2.5.1 Legitimacy 
An authoritative institution that is considered to be legitimate is seen as 
having the right to rule, which is a normative perspective. Rule would be the 
promulgation of law and the attempts to secure compliance, with punitive 
consequences for noncompliance.
140
 From a normative perspective, then, political 
legitimacy is understood as the justification for authority and follows the view of 
Locke and natural law. The basic assumption is that all individuals are equal and free 
in a natural state.  However, for there to be stability and order in a society, a system 
of governance needs to be formed. In a state of equality, a social contract is created 
which assigns political authority to a civil State, and citizens agree to obey and 
follow the laws set in place.
141
 Under the concept of the rule of law, “The laws of the 
land should apply equally to all, save to the extent that objective differences justify 
differentiation.”142  
The legitimacy of the authority depends then on the consent of those who are 
governed by it. Those who have consented are thus bound by the laws created by the 
authority of the State.  From this perspective, whether an actual political regime is 
legitimate turns on whether it respects the constraints of the natural law. When a 
political authority oversteps the boundaries of the natural law, it ceases to be 
legitimate and, therefore, there is no longer an obligation to obey its commands. For 
Locke—unlike Hobbes—political authority is thus not absolute. In fact, absolute 
political authority is necessarily illegitimate because it suspends the natural law.
143
  
Legitimacy is sometimes connected to the use of coercive power.  Rawls 
considered under what conditions citizens could use coercive power over other 
citizens in a way that fulfils a social contract. His solution was that the use of 
political power is only legitimate when it follows a written constitution. He said “… 
political power is legitimate only when it is exercised in accordance with a 
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constitution (written or unwritten) the essentials of which all citizens, as reasonable 
and rational, can endorse in the light of their common human reason.”144  
Contemporary political, philosophical discourse questions whether 
democracy is a requisite for the acquisition of political legitimacy.
145
 A polity may 
accept authority based on other values and principles other than just those found in 
democratic philosophy. Regardless, when a society begins to demand a process of 
constitutionalisation, it is generally due to some dissatisfaction that exists in the 
relationship between authority and its citizens. Governmental legitimacy often 
resides within this relationship. In constitutional democracies, authority and its 
legitimacy is derived from public consent. Such consent is dependent upon the ability 
of the system to inspire and retain the belief of the public that its political institutions 
are those that best serve the society.
146
 Some scholars argue, however, that this view 
is simplistic in that constitutional authority is rooted to the inadequacy of pure 
democracy. So there needs to be a way to improve democratic practice by 
subordinating democratic choice to a superior or original law; “A constitution is thus 
commonly understood to be both the means to better democracy and above 
democracy.
147
  
Constitutional authority and legitimacy are not by any means permanent. In 
fact, constitutional authority can be seen as being inherently frail.
148
 Time and 
circumstances often throw the legitimacy of the constitutionalised structure into 
question. Consequently, the soundness of modern constitutionalism has been 
questioned and to a certain extent weakened, which may partly explain the current 
renewal of the topic of constitutionalisation in general.
149
  
Although constitutional authority and legitimacy are not absolute, in most 
constitutionalising democracies, there are three different aspects needed to achieve 
democratic legitimacy. They are: 
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Formal legitimacy - found in the institutional authority to initiate 
it. 
 
Popular legitimacy - which contains a belief component, but is 
not just related to citizens' pro or con attitudes. Popular 
legitimacy depends on the extent that people have true 
opportunities to have an influence on reform. 
 
Deliberative legitimacy -- the extent that the deliberative process 
of citizens offering reasons to each other in mutual justification 
plays some role, such as an influence over the process of drafting 
of the constitution or parts of a constitution.  
 
Deliberative legitimacy is usually measured by the quality of 
deliberation: that is, either by qualities such as the freedom, 
openness or publicity of the deliberative process, or by the quality 
of the reasons or outcomes, as measured by some independent 
standard. While the latter, more epistemic standard is preferred in 
some forms of inquiry, it is unlikely that a constitutional proposal 
can be settled by appeal to some procedure-independent 
standard.
150
 
 
Perhaps because of the amount of scholarship on global constitutionalisation, 
there are cautionary tones in scholarly discussions related to constitutionalisation. It 
can be a new beginning, the politicisation of law, but, “it can also limit government 
power by a juridification of politics. The ambiguity of the term constitution is 
notorious.”151 There is a certain incoherence in the public discourse on 
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constitutionalisation. At the core of this inquiry into constitutionalisation, there “still 
lies the paradox of the relation between constituent power and constitutional form, 
politics and law.”152  
In spite of the various terms used to describe the modern State as hollowed 
out and de-centred, most nation States are not necessarily in decline,
153
 although 
many have been undergoing significant transformation. Also, despite external 
pressures for democratic reform, the urge to go through a process of 
constitutionalisation seems to be related to legitimacy. For example, one argument 
put forward is that all societies require legitimacy in order to survive. Citizens must 
have a reason to accept the social order within which they find themselves.
154
 They 
must see the social order as legitimate.  
For the most part, legitimacy in contemporary societies is not gained by the 
passive acceptance of power and authority as a natural given. The norms that 
underlie political power have to be worthy of obedience and acceptance. Jurgen 
Habermas argued that all societies must have legitimacy to continue and survive. The 
social order must be both normative and functional. According to Habermas, 
“Legitimacy can only mean that citizens by and large accept, on the basis of rational 
considerations, that norms underwriting the use of political power are worthy of 
being obeyed.”155 In order for such a condition of acceptance to be realised, 
Habermas also argued that consensus on the validity of norms would have to be 
reached by way of open deliberations.  
For the majority of a population to accept norms of domination in an age of 
information technology, the communications of the authoritative power need to be 
completely transformed.
156
 For example, for norms to be perceived as valid, people 
must have access to consensus through public and rational discourse. If free and open 
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public discourse is available, the assumption is that a consensus exists about the 
validity of those norms, and that they serve the general interests of all involved.
157
  
By contrast, if public discourse is denied, censored or limited, dissatisfaction 
is likely to be the result. With enough suppression of this type of communication, 
legitimacy is often lost, and dissatisfaction among citizens can rise to the levels of 
the violent overthrow of the current power regime, as was seen in the recent events 
of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’.  
2.5.2 Constitutional Legitimacy – A Moral Concept 
For the most part, if something is lawful, then it is usually considered 
legitimate, although a law can exist that is legal, but this does not make it morally 
acceptable. A law can even be widely accepted, but this too does not mean the law is 
morally legitimate. For example, Fugitive Slave Laws were considered legitimate 
and legal in the United States in the 1800s, but no one would accept their moral 
legitimacy today.  A regime or a decision which is deemed legal may be well 
supported, but may be illegitimate and unjustified under moral considerations. 
158
 A 
rule governed by law seems to be the most common thread in all constitutionalised 
nations. In the often prevalent normative perspective, however, Wojciech asserts that 
in order to be accepted as legitimate, those laws have to be administered correctly 
and methodically. Democracy must also create laws which adhere to specific 
fundamental principles, such as human dignity, equality and liberty.
159
  
In other words, just because a rule is bound by laws, even a constitution, does 
not necessarily make it democratic in nature. This view of democracy is not that it is 
just procedural, but the democracy contains the ‘right’ values.160 H.L.A. Hart 
eloquently states in his Concept of the Law, “however great the aura of majesty or 
authority which the official system may have, its demands must in the end be 
submitted to a moral scrutiny.”161 Consequently, from this normative perspective, 
democratic practices must perpetuate the right kind of moral value; practices that 
deviate from said substantive values are perceived as illegitimate and would thus 
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undermine the legitimacy of the State that is deviating from practicing said values. 
This is especially true for any State that is participating in international agreements 
and/or treaties. Deviating from the rule of law established by such treaties would not 
only be seen as violating the international agreement and its moral standards, it 
would bear the weight of the international community to question the legitimacy of 
the sovereign rule.  
2.5.3 Normative Democracy 
2.5.3.1 Cosmopolitan Democracy 
For the most part, the most normative tradition related to international law 
and relations is known as cosmopolitanism, an idea first introduced by Immanuel 
Kant. Kant believed the most important task for human beings was to create a 
universal society where all people were embraced and all shared the same morality. 
Kant believed that our highest purpose is to develop human capacities to their 
utmost. The only way to attain these high capacities is through society that provides 
freedom to individuals. Kant wrote,  
Nature demands that humankind should itself achieve this 
goal like all its other destined goals. Thus a society in which 
freedom under external laws is associated in the highest degree 
with irresistible power, i.e., a perfectly just civic constitution, is 
the highest problem Nature assigns to the human race.
162
  
 
A perfectly just civic constitution would be a manifestation of cosmopolitan 
democracy. In recent years, scholars have revisited cosmopolitanism due to such 
events as the collapse of the Cold War and the economic and cultural processes 
brought on by globalisation. Most scholars agree, “international law today will need 
to have broader democratic and egalitarian concerns than did Kant himself.” 
Following Kant’s lead is John Rawls, who focuses on human rights and the rule of 
law in his Law of the Peoples and Jurgen Habermas, who has offered a proposal for 
global justice. Habermas claims that the need for a global rule of law necessitates an 
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examination both of the ways in which democracies have been affected by 
globalisation and the possibility of creating global institutionalised democratic 
governance.
163
 Habermas was concerned about the problems to democracy that could 
be caused by the forces of globalisation. Therefore, a more all-encompassing model 
of democracy would be required – cosmopolitan democracy. Cosmopolitan 
democracy is a set of procedures on a global scale that creates common economic 
and social policy for equal world citizens ("world domestic policy").
164
 Habermas 
believed that in order to function and survive, societies must have legitimacy. 
Ultimately, citizens must have reasons to accept their social order as valid. 
Legitimacy is attained when citizens have given rational consideration to the norms 
established in the way political power will be used.  In order to obey laws, the law 
has to be seen as worthy of acceptance. For rational consensus to occur democratic 
processes are required, as it is a process where consensus can occur. However, the 
process has to be based on certain conditions:  
Namely, citizens must normally be prepared to deliberate 
in the public sphere on the basis of an orientation toward the 
common good (i.e., toward generalizable as opposed to private 
interests) and administrative capacities must be in place to 
transform the results of discourse in the public sphere into 
political power capable of effectively shaping society.
165
  
 
When domestic laws are passed and imposed on citizens, certain questions 
arise, such as the justification of law, its legitimacy, and the obligation of citizens to 
comply with it.
166
  
Based on the concerns of universal erga omnes, modern philosophers and 
legal scholars have been addressing the moral obligation of those in a position to act 
when it comes to issues that are global in nature, including world hunger, disease, 
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distributive justice and environmental concerns. 
167
 The discourse has led to a 
growing embrace of the concept that all people, no matter their political affiliations, 
are part of a global community, a global community which has a moral obligation to 
the entire world’s people. Cosmopolitanism is compatible with a system where the 
main political actors are still nation States, but with qualification. One qualification 
is what constitutes appropriate relations among national actors? For example, what 
criteria are used to recognise a political entity as legitimate? Also, what is required 
when States do not meet the legitimacy criteria? These are the problems and 
challenges of international legitimacy. 
168
  
Political cosmopolitanism also supports the idea that nation States should be 
replaced by global institutions, especially in terms of certain policy areas, like world 
trade and global climate concerns on world security.  This raises the question of what 
conditions and criteria such global institutions will be expected to meet to achieve 
international legitimacy.
169
 
Unsurprisingly, there are strong critics of a political cosmopolitanism that 
promotes a redesigned world governance system. One criticism is that it would be 
impossible to change the current world system to a global world order or an 
international federation of States. Such critics believe that such a vision poses too 
many difficulties and risks to make it worth pursuing.
170
 Another criticism is that to 
have States somehow relinquish their sovereignty is a violation against the autonomy 
of States and is contrary to the principles of democratic self-determination of 
citizens. Additionally, the critics claim that it would not only be inappropriate but 
futile to try to subject States to normative limits to their use of power.
171
  
Even supporters of cosmopolitanism admit the world is not quite ready for 
global constitutionalisation because global governance is still evolving. So, there is 
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not full agreement yet as to goals and standards of justice to be set, which are subject 
to change. As of yet, then, “we do not claim to discover timeless necessary and 
sufficient conditions for legitimacy. Instead, we offer a principled proposal for how 
the legitimacy of these institutions ought to be assessed – for the time being.”172 
2.5.3.2 Legitimacy and Deliberative Democracy 
Citizens obey laws because they have accepted that the role of the State is to 
act for the social good. However, both Rawls and Habermas argue that in order for 
legitimacy and justice (social good) to actually be attained, public deliberation is also 
required. Rawls was more concerned about justice than legitimacy. For him, “Justice 
is achieved when people unanimously and voluntarily consent, in fair circumstances, 
to bind themselves to the application of certain principles of a political order, which 
are then bound in a constitution.”173 In addition, Rawls argues that if justice is to be 
achieved, there needs to be a reasonable consensus on religious, philosophical and 
moral doctrines that will regulate society. Habermas asserts that, if the procedures 
used are legitimate, then consensus can be reached. Consequently, legitimacy can 
only be achieved if all those who are involved are given equal opportunity to engage 
in unlimited discussion on procedures.
174
  
Later scholars who promoted deliberative democracy, following the lead of 
Rawls and Habermas, took into consideration more of the complexities of modern 
plural societies. Scholars like James Bohman, Dennis Thompson and Amy Guttman, 
recognised that realistically, deliberative democracy is challenged by cultural 
pluralism and social inequalities where certain groups are excluded from public 
deliberation. For these “second generation” deliberative democrats, complete 
consensus was not realistic; however, decisions can still be seen as legitimate if they 
are made by a majority of participants, and agreements can be reached through 
compromise under deliberative conditions.
175
 Ultimately, the way that the will of the 
people is expressed depends on the type of institutional mechanism chosen by the 
nation, and as early debates reveal, there are a variety of mechanisms to choose from. 
Most scholars would agree, however, that the will of the people is both deliberative 
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and representative, where there are various options given, based on solid evidence 
and information with decisions representing the broad spectrum of stakeholders 
involved.
176
 Bohman argues that in considering constitutionalism beyond the nation 
State, there are three required conditions to be present in order for the institutions to 
be accepted as legitimate. These are - formal, deliberative, and popular conditions.  
The purpose of a deliberative process is to create democratic reform so as to be 
accepted as legitimate.
177
 
2.5.4. International Rule of Law and Cultural Relativism. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is perceived by many as having 
set universal standards regarding the ideals of human rights for all people. However, 
this idea of universality has not gone without controversy and challenge. Views that 
human rights can be established as universal standards will beg the question on 
whether principles and concepts of human rights are always the same for all cultures. 
Yet, by their very nature, “universal” human rights instruments are based on the 
assumption that they reflect universally accepted norms of behaviour.  
The Global Policy Forum (2015) reports that the debate related to human 
rights and Universalism vs. Cultural Relativism has been taking place in legal 
scholarship for decades, but it has become more intense with the development of 
contemporary international law. Universalism is the view that human rights are the 
same for all peoples and all cultures so should apply to every human being and all 
nations. Cultural Relativists, in contrast, argue that concepts of human rights are 
shaped by culture and so are culturally dependent. Consequently, from this 
perspective, no moral principles can be prescribed to all cultures.
178
 
Twenty years after the Universal Declaration was created, the Arab States 
challenged it by creating the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI) 
in 2008, which was developed within the framework of the League of Arab States.
179
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These same States argued that the Arab Charter was necessary because concepts of 
human rights are merely products of Western imperialism. Because of this view, the 
Arab States say they are not bound by the Universal Declaration. Muslims believe 
that Islam has already set forth human rights’ requirements, and Islam is more 
legitimate than policies created by men. So, the Arab Charter makes clear that the 
Umma (Islamic community) must uphold the dignity of all people as part of its 
sacred obligation. The CDHRI States that fundamental rights and freedom are 
integral to Islam and: 
…no one shall have the right as a matter of principle to 
abolish them either in whole or in part or to violate or ignore 
them in as much as they are binding divine commands, which are 
contained in the Revealed Books of Allah and which were sent 
through the last of His Prophets to complete the preceding divine 
messages and that safeguarding those fundamental rights and 
freedoms is an act of worship whereas the neglect or violation 
thereof is an abominable sin, and that the safeguarding of those 
fundamental rights and freedom is an individual responsibility of 
every person and a collective responsibility of the entire 
Ummah.
180
 
 
For some scholars, the wider acceptance of the Arab Charter on Human 
Rights signals “the reconciliation and compromise between the proponents of 
cultural relativism and universalism.”181 
Nevertheless, some scholars argue that this apparent dichotomy between 
Islam and the West regarding human rights is overly simplistic. While it is true that 
Western constructs of rights are not always accepted in Asian societies, the 
dichotomous view leads to the assumption that human rights somehow belongs to the 
West. This is nonsensical, especially in viewing the great spiritual legacy left by 
Asian societies in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam. For example, The Quran, 
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addresses equality, freedom of religion, and the right to property, as did other 
philosophical and legal sources throughout Asia.  
Although these sources did not necessarily use the term, human rights, they 
were based on concepts that are considered fundamental to today’s human rights 
principles, for example, justice and humanity.
182
 In fact, the idea that universal 
human rights are a Western tradition ignores the historical conflict in Western 
principles between the standards of human rights law and the sovereignty of nations. 
This conflict was seen clearly in 1919 when the Japanese asked that a universal 
human rights clause be added to the League of Nations Covenant. Lord Robert Cecil, 
the British Delegate, argued against it saying, “It would mean encroaching upon the 
sovereignty of States members of the League... [opening] the door to serious 
controversy and to interference in the domestic affairs of States....”183 The human-
rights clause was rejected.   
After World War II, however, with the world witnessing a State committing 
genocide against its own people, the sovereignty of nations was reduced, and outrage 
began to motivate nations of the world to accept that an international code of conduct 
or rule of law was necessary in order to maintain peace and stability. So, “In this 
context, little by little, a renewed natural-law doctrine began to gain currency: the 
idea that respect for human rights(along with the maintenance of peace) ought to 
constitute the point of no return for the new world community that would emerge.”184 
The previous resistance to universal standards or laws that could be imposed on 
nations by an external order began to fade as Western notions of State sovereignty, 
although still strong, began to accept that occasionally, the sovereignty of a nation to 
do whatever it chooses is ultimately not conducive to world security. In addition, the 
strength of the ideal of State sovereignty is more of a Western concept than an 
Eastern or Asian one.
185
 
Critics of universal standards argue that the universalistic nature of some 
human rights documents is a reflection of the attempt of the West to homogenise 
culture, which threatens cultural diversity. Again, this perception that to establish 
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universal human rights is an ‘us-against-them’ dichotomy is not realistic in the view 
of some. For example, Bielefeldt (2000) argues, that human rights are an issue of 
debate in both the West and Islam. However, “there is no such thing as a Western or 
an Islamic conception of human rights. Historical analysis shows that human rights 
have always been a political issue, not the natural result of any ‘organic’ 
development based on the genes of a particular culture.
186
 It is reasonable to admit 
that Islamic scholars may suspect Western nations of hegemony in their stance on 
human rights, a stance fed in recent years by Huntington, who claims that human 
rights and democracy belong to the West. He persuades and is convinced that 
universalising human rights will fail, and the only way non-Western nations can 
realise human rights is to adopt Western values.
187
 Of course, non-Western scholars 
see these declarations as just more evidence of Western arrogance.  
There is a way to end this divisive and artificial dichotomy. Dividing human 
rights into who owns them, the West or Islam, is antithetical to developing universal 
rights. In addition as Bielefeldt argues, “The language of human rights would thus 
simply be turned into a rhetorical weapon for intercultural competition…What is 
needed…is a critical defense of universal human rights in a way that gives room for 
different cultural and religious interpretations and, at the same time, avoids the 
pitfalls of cultural essentialism.”188  Michael Polacek calls for flexibility in the 
application of human rights law without ignoring the need to set binding procedural 
requirements for States to provide such basic rights as due process and fair trials. So 
while universal laws are needed, there needs to be flexibility to accommodate 
competing principles and interests. Treaties which do not contain a wide range of 
reservations will become weakened without strong, collective consent. 
189
 In trying to 
accommodate this need for flexibility, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
introduced the ability for nations to submit reservations in their acceptance of 
international human rights treaties.  
There is a fine balance to be found in this hotly debated issue. Flexibility is 
good in that it allows most countries to embrace international Covenants. However, 
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flexibility can also compromise the very purpose and nature of an international 
agreement that binds all parties to uphold human rights requirements. For example, if 
a country can too easily submit a reservation to an aspect of a treaty it does not want 
to follow, how legitimate is the agreement in protecting the human rights of all 
people?  
2.5.5 International Constitutionalisation, Practical Solutions 
Apparently, discussions concerning international constitutionalism have a 
long way to go before any practical solutions can be developed for how such 
governance would function. For example, one critical aspect is that while many 
international lawyers speak of constitutionalisation, they speak in abstract terms and 
not many work out what this means in real life.
190
 A lot of energy is spent arguing 
the normative case for a better and more just world, with demands for global justice 
coming to the fore, but legal scholars rarely transform their theories into concrete 
solutions.
191
  Based on current discussions, it would be easy to assume that 
constitutionalisation already exists, but although a process of constitutionalisation is 
taking place, it is happening sporadically, so the discussion is framed in an area 
between normative and descriptive. On the one hand, legal scholars discuss the way 
international constitutionalisation should be taking place, and on the other, they also 
describe what is actually happening. At this point, constitutionalisation may be 
viewed as more of a heuristic device, a guide to the constitutionalisation of various 
institutions.  
Some scholars have rather strong opposing views about the claims that 
international constitutionalisation must occur. For instance, one theory is that the 
current trend of international constitutionalisation is eroding Statehood.
192
 Nor 
should it necessarily be seen as a positive trend since it challenges the already-
established processes of domestic constitutionalisation.
193
  
Additionally, challenges have been made regarding claims that the nation 
State has been neutered. This vision of the disempowered State seems somewhat 
                                                 
190
 Klabbers, Peters and Ulfstein (n 93) 3. 
191
 ibid 4. 
192
 Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds) The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (Oxford University 
Press 2010) xv. 
193 Thomas Kleinlein, ‘On Holism, Pluralism, and Democracy: Approaches to Constitutionalism 
beyond the State’ (2010) 21 (4) European Journal of International Law 1076.   
  
48 
 
ironic when on-going hegemony by major players such as the United States is 
observed. There is obvious controversy over the nature of State power in 
contemporary political science, although the discourse has perhaps been overshadowed 
by exaggerated claims of the decline of the State which have been made in many 
books and articles.
194
 An important theme in these discussions was the loss of control 
of national economies and national boundaries, among other things. Scholars focused 
on international constitutionalism and the State’s loss of power, even while many 
States were exerting their enormous influence, as Barrow describes, as the “principal 
agents of globalization as well as the guarantors of the political and material 
conditions necessary for global capital accumulation.”195 In other words, as the 
industrialised nations were globalising trade and developing the conditions, in their 
favour, for the accumulation of wealth among them, scholars argued about the 
declining power of the State.   
Nevertheless, it is clear that States are being affected by international 
organisations, and that State leaders must still respond to pressures, both domestic 
and national, related to their legitimacy.
196
 States are responding by restructuring and 
realigning their power relations. One view is that scholars are jumping to conclusions 
and have made the error of describing this transformation as a decline of the nation-
State.
197
  
As constitutional principles are increasingly being recognised at the 
international level, the development of a global law is clearly visible.
198
 Whatever 
the case, because there is communication of law on a global scale, “the assumption 
of a global law system does not appear to be beyond reason.”199   
Yet the claim that a global law has emerged has been challenged.  For 
example, even though there have been attempts to improve coordination between 
international governments, some critics argue that a formal process of 
                                                 
194
 Clyde W. Barrow, ‘The Return of the State: Globalization, State Theory and the New Imperialism’ 
(2005) 27 (2) New Political Science 123. 
195
  ibid. 
196
  ibid 124. 
197
  ibid. 
198
 Clemens Mattheis, ‘The System Theory of Niklas Luhmann and the Constitutionalisation of the 
World Society’ (2012) 4 (2) Journal of International Law (Goettingen) 639. 
199
 ibid 640.  
  
49 
 
constitutionalising international organisations is unlikely.
200
 The State has not lost its 
power to the point where international organisations can unequivocally change the 
nature of the State. Claims of on-going or widely accepted efforts at international 
constitutionalisation are thus premature,
201
 and according to Peters, “The 
constitutionalist reading of international law might raise dangerously high 
expectations.”202 In fact it is argued that using the term ‘constitution’ at the 
international level is (or might be) inaccurate. Even the actual terms used in the 
debate taking place on constitutionalism are labelled by some as being misleading 
and in error. That is because the vocabulary being used makes it impossible to escape 
the underlying philosophical assumptions that are a part of that language.  
The challenge to constitutionalism and its advocates were questioned as long 
ago as the late 1700s in the works of the Scottish philosopher David Hume, who 
argued that constitutionalism was often discussed with a utopian mentality, instead of 
being grounded in real life. To exemplify his argument, he pointed to the popular 
democratic ideal that government originates from consent.
203
 Ideally, a pure 
democracy would derive from consent, according to constitutional philosophers of 
the time; however, there is no government in existence, then or now, that operates 
fully from consent alone: “The question for Hume is why speculative rationalism 
leads its proponents to political understandings that so patently ignore the limits of 
human experience.”204  
Correspondingly, the validity of such constructs as international governance 
and constitutionalism are also being challenged in the modern discourse; “Social 
legitimacy is being artificially constructed through the use of constitutional language. 
Thus, the constitutionalist reconstruction might fraudulently create the illusion of 
legitimacy of global governance.”205 According to Ann Peters, the problem with all 
of the constitutional language, is that it could give global governance a legitimacy 
not yet fully earned or realised. In the constitutionalism discourse an obvious 
incongruity is to be seen; nevertheless, this incongruity requires close attention in 
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relation to international constitutionalism’s potential and/or pitfalls. Regardless of 
whether international constitutionalisation is viewed as a supplement to the 
inadequacy of national activities, or as a way to enhance the global rule of law, such 
developments encourage motivation to reconsider the merits of constitutionalism.
206
  
Constitutionalism is not new, and its impact as a model for the legitimisation 
of power has been felt at State level for over 200 years.  Even those rulers who do 
not want to be subordinated by legal norms feel obliged to act or profess to do so 
within the constitutional framework.
207
 Constitutionalism is obviously a powerful 
and normative worldview, and it seems likely that it will continue to emerge with 
similar power at the international level. 
While it is a complex new world for international law, this should be 
regarded as an opportunity rather than a problem.
208
 Judges must read each other’s 
rulings, have respect for each other’s judicial work, and try to preserve unity: “This 
is as good as it gets in an international legal order characterised by in-built overlaps 
of judicial voices which should, however, aim at harmony instead of cacophony.”209 
Consequently, even though there is a danger that constitutionalism is likely to be 
misunderstood as a mechanism that offers immediate legitimacy, international 
lawyers are, for the most part, wise enough not to see constitutionalism and 
constitutionalisation as a ready-made answer.
210
 Instead, it is a perspective which 
may help to illuminate pertinent questions of fairness, justice, and effectiveness.
211
  
By being projected onto the world, the constitutionalisation of the global 
order is being enthusiastically conceptualised using normative ideals.
212
 However, 
more questions are being asked than answered at this point. For example, some of the 
questions asked of constitutional scholars are: 
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Does it simply suggest a global expansion of constitutional 
democracy as we know it?  Does the new era of constitutionalism 
herald a paradigm shift in thinking constitutionalism?  These are 
the central concerns not only to policy makers but also to political 
scientists and legal scholars in the talks of global 
constitutionalism.
213
 
 
Further concerns related to the international constitutionalism discourse are 
said to be caused by the variety of hidden assumptions that underlie the debates.
214
 
For example, it is assumed that when ideas about constitutionalisation are applied to 
the international arena, this is a conceptual leap, or a transformation in legal thinking 
of such magnitude to match that of the development of modern constitutionalism 
itself.
215
  If this assumption is accepted, then another assumption is made which is 
that the new challenges created by globalisation require a compelling response. Here 
again, however, much depends upon the choice made from the range of theoretical 
frameworks offered.
216
  
Constitutionalism and constitutionalisation have their ‘dark side’, and 
scholars are warned to listen carefully to the rhetoric of constitutional discourse and 
its militaristic overtones, since people will fight, and even die, for their constitutional 
rights. 
This cautionary tone extends to the new powers being bestowed on 
international courts. The limitations imposed on the political branches of government 
simultaneously seem to accompany “a huge dose of judicial self-empowerment and 
no small measure of sanctimonious moralizing”;217 yet when it comes to human 
rights, even very different constitutional documents are quite similar.
 
The 
constitutional ethos has a tone of moral superiority, not only regarding the creators of 
the constitution, but also towards those who interpret it.
218
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Obviously, there will be challenges with the process of constitutionalising 
international law. For example, how will translation work? How can domestic 
constitutional thinking be exercised within, or adapted to the international arena?
219
 
An international legal system will have a different structure and function from State 
systems, although it will still be subject to democratic standards and the protection of 
human rights; however, domestic models cannot simply be transplanted. The 
fundamental structural elements include the legal order that is collectively formed by 
the international community and which will provide the framework for the 
establishment of an international system of shared values.
220
 Additionally, while 
formal rules will certainly be established, studies must also include details of how the 
system will work in practice: “It is important to examine the extent to which 
problems have arisen and the means already available, such as the doctrines of res 
judicata, lis pendens, and reliance on precedence between different courts and 
tribunals.”221  
Nor should reform set unrealistic models or goals. An international legal 
system should not always supersede nation States, even when dealing with 
international issues. International jurisdiction may not always be the first choice, 
even when it seems apparent that an international response is required. Indeed, 
“States protect their sovereignty, sometimes with good reason. Thus, sovereignty 
should be respected in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, in the sense that 
there should be good reasons for choosing international rather than national decision-
making.”222 Constitutionalisation is an attempt to subordinate the actions of 
governments to constitutional structures, and includes an international legal system. 
By the end of the process, there is likely to be a world constitution that could be 
compared to national constitutions, although, “International constitutionalism has to 
be regarded more as a pluralistic structure. But this structure does not need to be 
regarded as a fragmented element, but as a networking model or a complex form of 
‘interface-management’ with common constitutional principles.”223 
                                                 
219
 Ulfstein (n129) 1. 
220
 De Wet (n113) 287. 
221
 Ulfstein (n129) 2. 
222
 ibid. 
223
 Mattheis (n 198) 627. 
  
53 
 
Obviously, an international constitutional system would exist under the rule 
of law, so there would need to be formal standards assigned to ensure legitimate 
governance. In addition, although there will be rigidity supporting the rule of law, 
this has to be offset by values that promote the well-being of the political 
community.
224
 A framework must be built that is associated with the on-going 
process of constitutionalisation, and is not restricted and preoccupied with 
envisioning and attaining a final good, representing a completed constitutional 
system.
225
 The term ‘constitution’, when applied to supra-national structures, needs 
to have both formal and material elements that are differentiated. It must also 
emphasise the functions of the constitution, which involve,  
the creation of institutions and the determination of 
values… since the transfer of State powers to the supranational 
organs has shifted the functions of a State constitution to the 
multinational level, there is a parallelism of the functions of the 
constitution of the Member States within the supranational 
order.
226
 
 
There is uncertainty about the constraints that might be imposed by 
constitutional law reducing the effectiveness of an international legal system in 
response to such global issues as climate change or poverty. However, 
constitutionalisation is not a process whose main purpose is to limit international 
power, but rather a means to increase the effectiveness of international law by 
working towards a greater legitimacy of global legal processes and requirements.
227
 
At present, the context of the constitution is used to represent a system where various 
national governments come together to form a core value system that will be 
common to all, and set up as a decentralised legal structure. Such a system dictates 
the outer limits of the exercise of public power. 
228
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              International organisations and regulatory networks are obviously gaining 
more responsibility at the international level. The impact of their work is not just 
restricted to international concerns, since they also shape and/or influence domestic 
policies. In both ways they have carved out space which was hitherto the domain of a 
national constitution. In so doing, it can be argued – if one accepts the widespread 
belief that power, by way of a constitution, should be regulated, legitimised, and 
democratised – they should also be subject to the same constitutional criteria. 
2. 6 Conclusion 
The forces of constitutionalism and constitutionalisation are an attempt to 
address a changing global order. Through the forces of globalisation and information 
technologies, no nation lives in a void; no nation is an “island entire of itself.”229 But 
if these governments remain oppressive, they risk losing their legitimacy. 
Additionally, there has been a significant increase in the growth of non-State or 
supra-State entities. What kind of influence will these entities have on the future of 
the nation State? Institutionalisation “carries with it authority and legitimacy”,230 and 
as such may improve domestic institutions and enhance global stability and 
international relationships. Alternatively, they may be in conflict with domestic 
entities and undermine them. It is quite likely that both outcomes will be manifested 
in the coming years.  
The role of international governments is fluid and transitional. It seems clear 
that we should accept that institutions are simultaneously causes and effects; that is, 
institutions are both the objects of State choice and consequential. States choose and 
design institutions. Once constructed, institutions will constrain and shape behaviour, 
even as they are constantly challenged and reformed by their member States.
231
 
As citizens of the world begin to embrace the concept of constitutionalised 
international authority, hegemony and arrogance must not be allowed to overshadow 
the benefits that such protection could bring. Each nation State must be respected and 
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valued as long as it does not violate the security or liberty of other nations. Yet there 
needs to be a legitimate authority that is strong enough to bring collective action 
against a nation that violates the rights of other States. However, one of the major 
issues of this current trend concerns the circumstances when that same international 
authority would have the right to take action against a State that is seen as a threat to 
others. And additionally, does that international authority have a right to intervene in 
the way a nation treats its own citizens? This is not a new concern, nor has 
international constitutionalisation offered an answer. Yet these issues seem to be at 
the very heart of current world issues and threats.  
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Chapter Three: Constitutionalism and Legitimacy – An Islamic Perspective 
 
3.1 Introduction 
When evaluating contemporary Islamic governance and its relationship to 
legitimacy, a strong trend has been established whereby the people are no longer 
willing to accept governance from ruling parties that they believe have lost 
legitimacy. This response was most apparent in Egypt between 2011 and 2013 where 
by then, two administrations had fallen in less than two years, taken down for failing 
to fulfil widespread demands for more democracy. 
By the middle of the twentieth century, discourse related to constitutionalism 
emphasised the consensus required, in that constitutions were primarily expressions 
of the internal social, political, and economic choices of a unique political 
community-a nation State. In other words, self-determination became a central 
concept in contemporary constitutional discourse. A key activity of political 
scientists was investigating the authenticity of the polity and whether the State itself 
was legitimate. Under the norms being established, the result could be governance 
that met legal requirements legitimising the use of power by a State, but not 
necessarily the moral requirements on which to build a civil society based on 
individual freedoms and rights. Consequently, it was recognised that not all 
constitutions are morally legitimate;
232
 Just because a governmental body has 
developed a constitution does not mean that it is automatically legitimate. Rather, 
legitimate constitutions require certain universal characteristics. The characteristics 
of legitimacy included banning the arbitrary use of State power and setting 
limitations on the policy choices made by government, so both procedural and 
substantive characteristics are articulated in support of a higher law. Those universal 
characteristics have influenced a growing consensus related to international 
governance.
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In the last decade of the 20
th
 century, a new constitutionalism, “global secular 
transnational constitutionalism”234 grew to address the needs of supranational 
organisations and relationships. Krisch argues that this push towards international 
constitutionalism is due to the belief that it has the potential to create justice and 
order. Constitutionalism could establish authority by the use of clear legal norms, 
designed to protect the various actors and States. Without it, cooperation between 
nations would be weakened.
235
  
A higher law, one that transcends individual States, is rooted in both natural 
and moral law. Backer describes how by the end of the twentieth century, 
“Constitutionalism…was tied to the construction of a collective—an international 
society of States – with the object of universalising standards of behaviour and of 
preserving the power relationships within and among States from threats.”236 Late 
twentieth century constitutionalism represented an attempt to systematise, 
institutionalise, and implement as international higher law, a long-held view in 
Western legal and political circles of the basis for establishing a hierarchy of States 
by reference to their civilisation.
237
 The objective is to both impose a deeper and 
substantive meaning of rule of law of constitutionalism on States and to find a 
mechanism for developing those substantive principles of domestic constitutionalism 
that might express transnational universal principles of rights and justice rather than 
merely those of majorities within a particular State. This, it was thought, would 
provide a meta-norm for limiting the power of States and avoiding arbitrary or 
immoral conduct by subjecting nations to international development and overview.
238
  
Under this system all States participate in the construction of universal 
normative constitutional standards, but none control it entirely (though some have a 
greater authority in the process—a nod to power), and all are technically subject to 
its strictures as international law (or as a means of legitimating modern constitutional 
structures). The legitimacy of promoting global secular transnational 
constitutionalism has not gone unchallenged, however. The strongest opponents 
seem to be those who believe a Universalist religion should be the basis of normative 
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constitution making.
239
 In fact, the resurgence of religion in public life challenged the 
Nietzschean declaration that God is dead. Some feel that this resurgence is a 
response to the “otherwise hegemonic institutions of the market and the modern 
State.”240 The article ‘Theocratic Constitutionalism: An Introduction to a New Global 
Legal Ordering’, published in the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 
investigates the possibility that Islam could produce a set of characteristics that could 
be used to create a legitimate Islamic constitutionalism. Islam was chosen because it 
has the most developed theocratic transnational constitutionalism.
241
 
3.2 The Development of Islamic Jurisprudence  
Simply put, the Islamic State is a nation ruled by Islamic law. However 
simple this may seem, implementing an Islamic State has been met with challenges. 
This is because of the difficulty that arises when the nation State, in modern terms, 
holds all legal authority, which in Muslim societies, does not follow traditional 
methods of governance.
242
 In contrast to the nation State holding the authority to 
develop legal rulings, classical Islamic law emerged outside the exclusive preserve of 
the State.  The authority to make legal rulings was given to those esteemed 
individuals who had developed expertise in Islamic studies and their knowledge of 
the Quran. The authority of these jurists was outside of State authority and power, 
yet considered as legitimate, if not more so, than State rulings.
243
 One of the most 
important aspects of the development of Islamic jurisprudence is that it defies 
codification. This is because of the inherent nature of Islamic law, which is seen as 
not only a set of rulings determined by religious scholar jurists, but as a continuous 
process
244
 that does not become set and rigid, but is always subject to ijma 
(consensus of religious authority), qiyas (deductive analogy) and ijtihad 
(independent reasoning).
245
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An Islamic perspective of public law views the human being as an 
independent, under no obligation to follow someone else’s rule, with some notable 
exceptions - rules determined by: 1) religious scholars (ulama),  2) 
messengers/prophets of God, and 3) political rulers (a’imma and wulat).246 The 
obligation to obey ulama is due to the scholars’ special knowledge and religious 
expertise; the obligation to obey political rulers is due to their legal relationship with 
citizens. Challenges to the obligation to obey political rulers can occur if the ruler has 
violated certain established principles. Consequently, the view of public law in 
Islam, “… consists of precisely those rules which attempt to answer the question of 
when commands of rulers are rightful, and therefore must be obeyed, and when they 
are wrongful, and can be, all things being equal, ignored.”247  
Early jurists often strongly disagreed, so rulings and opinions were 
categorised according to the nature of the ruling and the legal centre for which the 
jurists were aligned. For example, the works of Abu Yusuf, Shafii and Malik, but 
Malik in particular, are associated with the jurists of Medina. When a consensus took 
place on an issue from more than one of these legal centres, then confirmation was 
more binding and precedent set.
248
 Reaching consensus was often rigorous and 
taxing, so an emphasis upon ijtihad was promoted, relying heavily on the techniques 
of analogy and deduction: “Arguments about the application and the interpretation of 
the Shar’ia and Siyar nevertheless materialised, and over a period of time, led to the 
creation of various schools of thought.”249 In the Sunni tradition, these schools are 
the: Maliki, Hanafi, Shafi’i and Hanbali schools of law. The Shia tradition uses the 
Jaffari school for the most part.
250
  
3.3 Islamic and Western Jurisprudence  
In the West, administration of justice is to design the judicial system so that 
individual rights and freedom are guaranteed. The rights of the individual are 
paramount.
251
 However, in Islam, administration of justice it is to design a judicial 
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system to maintain a balance between social justice in social life and legal justice in 
the law courts. The rights of the society in general are paramount.
252
 In either system, 
justice is either civil or criminal. Both systems impose punishment to attempt to 
eradicate and prevent crime, instill fear of being caught committing a crime, and to 
reform criminals. In both the West and Islam, the main purpose of the legal system is 
to administer/dispense justice and restore rights.
253
  
In the West, the secondary duties of the Courts are to declare rights and 
determine facts; interpret and apply laws; to identify wrongful conduct by the State 
or its agencies, and to discharge any other duties that are assigned to the Courts. In 
Islam, the secondary duties are to resolve disputes; interpret and explain the laws; to 
settle family disputes and to perform administrative functions relating to the 
Courts.
254
In the West, protection of alleged criminals is provided; no such protection 
is provided in Islam.
255
  
From an Islamic perspective, Islamic jurisprudence is more stable with a 
continuity of values
256
 because the laws in the West are determined by humans and 
can be subject to change; the laws in Islam come from divine revelation and are not 
subject to change, although flexibility in application is allowed. The stability of 
Islamic jurisprudence, from an Islamic perspective is due to its source as compared 
to the Western system:  
The values that must be upheld and defended by law and 
society in Islam are not always validated on rationalist grounds 
alone. Notwithstanding the fact that human reason always played 
an important role in the development of Shari'ah through the 
medium of ijtihad, the Shari’ah itself is primarily founded in 
divine revelation.
257
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Nevertheless, both systems of jurisprudence have power based on concepts of 
the supremacy of the Rule of Law. For Westerners, the first milestone was the 
Magna Carta; for Muslims it was the words of the Prophet, especially when he 
established the first Islamic State in Medina in 637 where he issued the Medina 
Constitution.
258
  Mohammed is seen as much more than a Prophet by Muslims. He is 
seen as Head of State, as Military Commander and Messenger of God: “He was 
entrusted with a mandate from God to guide his people (ummah) in their life, so that 
he is not only an executive of God’s orders but also a legislator (al-shari`).”259   
Although Western jurisprudence is not given divine origins in the same ways 
as Islamic jurisprudence, there is a sacredness in the roots of Western Rule of Law 
that is quite as powerful as religious faith in some ways. The creation of the Magna 
Carta in 1217 changed the Western world. From thereon, the important principle of 
the freedom of the individual from the tyranny of the State led to the 
constitutionalisation of many modern governments, especially the United States.
260
 It 
is the Magna Carta, which is “widely recognized to be a pillar of liberty, major 
source of the modern concept of executive accountability, and foundation of the rule 
of law in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Commonwealth 
countries.”261 Perhaps the most revered aspects of the Magna Carta were found in 
Chapter 39 which declared: 
No free man shall be seized or imprisoned or stripped of 
his rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his 
standing in any other way, nor will we proceed with force against 
him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgment of his 
equals or by the law of the land.
262
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At their core, both systems of jurisprudence follow the same basic principle, 
that guarantees are enshrined by the law, rather than the State.
263
 
3.4 Islamic Schools of Law 
The most liberal and flexible school of law is the Hanafi School.  In the 
Hanafi tradition there is emphasis placed on qiyas (deductive analogy) as a method 
of forming legal judgments.
264
 Qiyas was used so much so, that Hanifa’s followers 
were called Ahl-al-Rai or ‘People of Opinion’ compared to Ahl-al-Sunna or ‘People 
of the Tradition’. The Hanifa School is credited with creating a major portion of the 
principles of Siyar.  The Hanafi School is predominant in Central and Western Asia, 
which includes Afghanistan to Turkey, Lower Egypt (Cairo and the Delta) and the 
Indian Sub-Continent.
265
  
The Maliki School was established in Medina by Malik ibn Anas (d. 
795/179). Maliki scholars view juristic preferences (istihsan) and public interest (al-
masalih al-mursala) as the key sources for juridical decisions. The Al-Shafi'i School 
of Thought  falls between the Maaliki and Hanafi Madh'habs in that it uses methods 
of both Maliki and Hanafi, i.e., “less in the way of Qiyas (Analogy) and Raa'y 
(personal opinion). It excels in the technique of Istin'baat (deductive reasoning) for 
reaching a Fiqh verdict.”266 The Maliki School has followings in both North Africa 
and Upper Egypt.
267
 The Shafi School was established by Muhammad ibn Idris al-
Shafi (d. 820/204). Al-Shafi came from southwest Palestine (Gaza), and was a 
student of Malik in Medina. Al-Shafi travelled with Malik who was teaching and 
practicing law in Baghdad, and al-Shafi finally settled in Egypt. Al-Shafi preferred 
the prophetic Hadith over the other traditions in studying Islamic law.
268
  
The Hanabali School was founded by Ahmad Hanbal (d. 855/241) who was 
working on the Quranic texts at the same time as Al-Shafi. Hanbal was much more 
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conservative, however.
269
 He is regarded as a ‘traditionalist and theologian’, and his 
involvement with law was a technical by-product of his religious studies.
270
 
Consequently, his strong beliefs regarding the Quran and Hadith motivated him and 
his followers to adopt a rigid interpretation of the Shar’ia. He was independent and 
resisted theological approaches. This resulted in his imprisonment and “persecution 
by the ruling Caliph. While primarily a theologian, his teachings were largely based 
around religiously ordained Hadith, and only rarely articulated in strict legal 
jargon.”271  
The Shia sect developed one major school of law - Jaffari, which is named 
after its founder, Jafar al-Sadiq, the sixth Imam.
272
 While believing in the two 
principal sources, the Shias believe that law can only be translated by Imams, the 
religious leaders of prayer in the community, while Sunni law can be translated by 
Islamic scholars also, not just community religious leaders.  
 
Fig 1: Schools of Islamic Jurisprudence 
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As the Muslim Empire reached its peak, locations of power had become 
fragmented and decentralised, leading to a further separation in the way the different 
schools of law evolved.  By the mid 1400s, the Ottoman Turks had spread their 
empire with the capture of Constantinople (1453), and then spread across the Middle 
East and North Africa establishing a new Caliphate in 1517. By medieval times, the 
influence of Islam shaped the Ottoman dynasty of the Eastern Mediterranean, Asia 
Minor and South Eastern Europe; the dynasty also included the Mughal emporium of 
India and the Safavids dynasty of Iran.
273
 Each of these Empires operated under 
different ideological approaches. For example, the Safavids followed a Shia faith 
and, as described by Rehmen and Ahmedov, the Mughals of India, “adopted a more 
benign and assimilationist approach. Thus the developmental processes of Islam with 
varied political, economical and ideological influences also produced divergent 
viewpoints on legal approaches towards the Shar’ia.”274 Ideological differences were 
not the only factors that caused variations. The political elite of these various 
societies were unwilling to accept any laws or rulings that did not support their 
personal agendas. Consequently, the development of Islamic law has a rich and 
diverse tradition that has left Islamic law open to further interpretation still being 
conducted today. The methods of interpretation which have developed over time 
have allowed jurists a good deal of flexibility and the ability to expand or critique 
further.  
Whatever the school of law, Islamic jurists share an important quality, known 
as wahy, which means to bear witness to the authority of divine revelation as being 
above any man-made legislation no matter how rational. Unlike Western sources of 
law, where rationality, custom, precedent, morality and religion are the basic sources, 
religion and morality are the two dominant sources in Islamic law.
275
 Defining law 
comes from God’s authority:  
A defining law is a speech or communication from the 
Law Giver addressed to the Mukallaf which consists of a demand 
or an option. A demand may either be binding which leaves the 
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Mukallaf (human receiving the law) with no choice but to 
conform, or it may not be so binding.
276
  
 
Depending on the circumstances, defining law becomes more or less 
compulsory. If a law is considered definitive, then a Muslim is obligated to follow 
such a law or be guilty of being a transgressor. The obligation might be imposed on 
individuals or the collective.
277
  
The concept of a defining law being compulsory is not limited to Islamic 
jurisprudence, of course. It is the source of the defining law that is in question. In 
Islam, the Law Giver/Allah has determined definitive law. However,  Western 
jurisprudence speaks of the Supremacy of Law where “no one is above the law”,278 
or as Dr. Thomas Fuller once said, “Be you never so high, the Law is above you.”279 
With the Magna Carta and the development of the Rule of Law, even the King of a 
land became subject to the law, which completely transformed the nature of Western 
government. 
3.5 Islam and Democracy 
In a democracy, the power comes from below, from the consent of the 
governed rather than from a divine authority. In secularised societies, political rights 
are no longer based on religious beliefs, and the connection to spiritual authority is 
cut.  However, this severance raised a great challenge to political authority because it 
was no longer sanctioned by religion. Past revolutions destroy traditional authority 
and new political orders develop.
280
 But could they be sustained? Arendt identified 
the loss of religious sanctions as the greatest challenge to modern political 
authority.
281
 Revolution destroys traditional authorities built on religious legitimacy 
and promises a totally new political order. Yet, what would guarantee that this new 
political order would endure? This guarantee is not one that new governance 
structures take lightly. Gunes and Tezcur claim that governments no doubt 
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“desperately seek sacredness that is bestowed by transcendental norms and goals for 
purposes of political stability.”282 Arendt argues that the act of constitution-making 
that sets the parameters of political life is the way to guarantee successful political 
stability, with America being a good example of how stability is created by a written 
constitution that is designed to resist change, but flexible enough to address the needs 
of the polity.
283
 Indeed, the power and legitimacy of the democratic legislative bodies 
remains intact on the condition that the authority of the constitution and the Supreme 
Court remains sacrosanct and unchallenged. 
284
 
When considering the possibility of democracy in Muslim nations, most 
Westerners recognise that Muslims rely on their faith to establish the principles of 
social order.
285
 But this is hard to accept in a country like the United States that is 
quite vehement in the need to separate church and State, with the failure to do so, 
seen as enabling intolerant rule. Islamic scholars claim Islam is inherently 
democratic. For example, several Islamic scholars claim that a separation of powers 
occurs naturally in Islamic governance by way of basic Islamic principles instead of 
by constitutional design. How would this natural separation occur if not by 
constitutional mandate? Islamic scholars point out that the natural separation 
manifests itself because rulers and religious scholars occupy separate realms of 
authority, each wielding a lot of power.  The rulers and scholars check and balance 
each other and help to create a stable political environment.  
The two groups of authorities create two separate methods of law-making, 
siyasah, which is ruler-made law and fiqh, which is scholar-made law. Neither 
system has absolute authority over the other, and each recognises the legitimate 
function and role of the other in the system. Throughout history and in modern 
decades, fiqh scholars vigorously maintain their freedom to perform ijithad in order 
to articulate fiqh doctrine without interference from external forces. Fiqh scholars, 
though, appreciate the need for order and security in the society, so they accept the 
importance of having a centralised government to maintain law. Siyasah, then, which 
literally means administration, creates a public good, so is considered a legitimate 
aspect of God’s law, Shar’ia. The Quran supports rulers who use siyasah to maintain 
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security, safety and justice for the people. Siyasah does not derive from divine texts 
in the way fiqh does; rulers create siyasah for governing needs.  
3.5.1 Siyasah and Public Good  
Most Western people misunderstand the nature of an Islamic State, believing 
that Islam requires religious leaders to rule, and only fiqh law is legitimate. However, 
siyasah rule is considered quite legitimate if it serves the public good. The 
requirement for religious rule has never been the case in Muslim history.
286
 Muslim 
rulers created siyasah law, but not fiqh. Siyasah law, “emerged not from scholarly 
interpretation of scripture, but ruler determination of what was necessary for social 
order. And it was siyasah that was imposed uniformly upon the population. Fiqh was 
enforced through the filters of the several schools of law and litigant identity.”287  
Rulers were aware, however, that they could not usurp the authority of the 
religious scholars without risking loss of legitimacy.  The scholars are held in high 
esteem in Islamic nations, and if rulers took actions which were strongly opposed by 
the scholars, the rulers risked intense social resistance. Conversely, the fiqh scholars 
had no army and were themselves kept in check by rulers.  
The State is not a religious institution, but an administration that ensures the 
security and well-being of Muslims and applies the Law of Islam, while also having 
to abide by the same law. The balance created by the classical Islamic system of 
governance is one of the reasons that the system has succeeded for so long. 
In considering the compatibility of the principles of Islam with democracy, 
many scholars point out that when Abu Bakr was chosen as the first caliph, the 
choice had to be approved by the community. Bakr acknowledged he received his 
mandate from the people who asked him to implement, The Quran and Sunna. For 
some scholars like Rahman, this is a clear indication that the Islamic State elicits 
approval from the Islamic community, and this, therefore, is proof that the system is 
by nature democratic. Additionally, because Islam is egalitarian in nature, its 
governments must be based on popular will and some form of representation. Islamic 
scholar and historian Fazlur Rahman Malik, points out that in modern times, most 
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Muslim countries are struggling to modernise, and would be classified even today as 
developing countries. Rahman argued that in countries that are underdeveloped, a 
strong government is needed that is capable of centralised planning and control of 
economic development. There is no harm in having strong men guide the country, 
provided that in the process, there is a genuine commitment to the cultivation of 
democracy.
288
 
Although Islamic scholars may argue otherwise, the making of a constitution 
in the Islamic world is mostly a European concept: 
Although there are certain elements in the Islamic 
tradition which can be perceived as early expressions of an 
autochthonous approach to constitutionalism in Islam and have 
indeed been interpreted in this manner, they owe their 
prominence in contemporary debate more to recent attempts to 
reinterpret the Islamic tradition in light of the requirements of 
constitutionalism than to any rigid historical analysis.
289
  
 
Additionally, it has been generally accepted that attempts at democracy in the 
Arab world have been met mostly with failure, with the outcome of democratisation 
in the Arab world described as “exceptionally bleak.”290 These failures have led to 
unchecked authoritarianism in many Arab countries which is paving the way to a 
deep crisis in the fabric of Arab/Muslim societies. Indeed, a root cause of political 
and economic instability is the unchallenged wielding of State power. This coupled 
with the regime’s uncontrolled use of the rule of law has made the Arab world more 
vulnerable to the threat of political chaos.
291
  Egyptian scholar, Miral Fahmy stated, 
"although I dreamed of democracy in my youth, I now see that our country is 
regressing politically."
292
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Theoretically, Islamic democracy has great potential. The actual practice of 
Islamic democracy has not been encouraging, however. When rulers like Ja’far 
Numayri in Sudan and Zia al-Haqq in Pakistan initiated  Shar’ia and an Islamic 
political system in the 1980s, there were less than positive consequences. For 
example, a military coup in Sudan resulted in the seizure of power by a group of 
military and civilian Islamists in 1989. The promise to create an Islamic democracy 
clearly failed in view of the regime’s scandalous human rights record, in terms of its 
treatment of Muslim opposition groups and non-Muslim minorities.
293
  
One of the ongoing concerns related to Muslim countries is their record 
related to human rights issues, which seems to be at odds with the basic values of 
Islam itself. Accordingly, in considering democracy in the Muslim world, one cannot 
separate religion from politics. Islam is a religion and a system of laws that relates to 
the society as well as to individual morality; “Islam plays a critical role in shaping 
political culture; no Middle Eastern Muslim country is able to escape completely 
from its overarching reach. Indeed, this intersection of culture and politics may be 
more pervasive than in other [non-Islamic] contexts.”294 Some scholars incorrectly 
argue that Islam, then, inevitably leads to totalitarianism.
295
 However, any one of the 
governments that have lost legitimacy because of an abuse of power in recent years 
(Egypt, Syria) are not really following the true spirit of Islamic governance, but 
instead use coercion and fear to control its population rather than Shura or 
egalitarianism.  
3.6 Islamic Constitutionalism 
Islamic constitutionalism, shaped by Western ideals, began to emerge in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with the introduction and acceptance of 
Western constitutionalism in the Muslim world.
296
 The emphasis on 
constitutionalism came in waves to the Muslim World, when it would undergo 
reformulation. The first phase of Islamic constitutionalism began with the modernist 
thinking of Muslim reformists in the late 1800s. In this first phase, Islam was a 
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limitation imposed on government and legislation, not the basis of the constitution 
itself. In the second phase, Islam came to be considered as the basis of the 
constitution and the State.  Arjomand describes the third and current phase of Islamic 
constitutionalism, in which there is a return to the idea of limited government – “this 
time as the rule of law according to a constitution that is not based on but is inclusive 
of the principles of Islam as the established religion.”297 Shar’ia as the basis of an 
Islamic constitutional system has not been a constant.  
Islamic law is viewed as a product of God’s revelation as expressed through 
scripture and traditions established by the Prophet, not human interpretation. 
Additionally, it follows, then that Islamic tradition is perceived as an “expression and 
source of God’s divinely revealed law.”298 The law became seen as a perfect 
blueprint for human society. Because the law had already been perfected, by the
 
tenth 
century, most Sunni jurists accepted that the guidelines for life had already been 
established, and ijithad was no longer necessary. Traditions became standardised and 
sanctified. The benefits were a stronger sense of unity, certainty and identity among 
the various local cultures and different religious practices.  Sanctification has had its 
costs, however. For example, the dynamism, diversity and creativity that helped 
develop Islam were lost, along with human input into the formation of tradition and 
law.  The result is that “later generations preserved and transmitted a more static, 
romanticized sense of Islamic history.”299  
Consequently, many of the practices found in modern Islamic nations are 
viewed as sanctified under Islam, even those that may not be a reflection of Islam’s 
true intent. This recognition has caused many contemporary neotraditionalists to 
want to return to ijithad and reinterpret the fundamental sources of Islam to meet 
modern needs and conditions.
300
  
In addition, many current Islamic scholars believe Islam set the stage for a 
democratic society, so there is no need to shape Islamic nations into a Western mould 
in order to become more democratic. No, what is required is a revival of early 
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Islamic practices that are inherently democratic, including Shura and the basic 
separation of law and power.  
In contrast, conservatives, while advocating a return to Islam, argue that there 
is no need for ijithad because Islam is a system that has already been fully 
articulated, and it is still valid today and for all time. It is not the law that should be 
changed; past traditions just need to be reemphasised (taqlid), and society needs to 
conform to God’s will.301 In fact, many reforms made in the 1970s and 1980s were a 
restoration of traditional law. When real change did take place, it was gradual and in 
areas not covered by traditional law.
302
 Neotraditionalists do not advocate a return to 
Islam without the right to reinterpret (ijithad) and rework them to meet current needs. 
They believe that modern Islamic societies adopted non-Islamic practices. Their 
purpose is to revitalise umma (community) through Islam’s revealed sources. They 
are more flexible than conservative scholars and more likely to become political 
activists.  
Islamic constitutionalism was first introduced in the writings of Islamic 
modernists, such as Khayr al-Din Pasha in Tunisia and Namik Kemal in Turkey.  
Constitutionalisation took place when these two modernists helped draft the Tunisian 
Constitution of 1861 and the Ottoman Constitution of 1876. Al-Din Pasha and 
Kemalin were viewed as reformers, and they argued that “representative, 
constitutional government captured the spirit of Islam”.303 In 1872, another reformist, 
Ahmad ibn Abi Diy, argued that Islamic history was constitutionalist in nature 
because Shar’ia imposed a limitation upon autocratic monarchy. He stated that 
monarchy limited by law (k¯anun), “was indeed the normative form of government 
in Islam after the pristine caliphate.”304 In the early twentieth century those Muslim 
scholars who supported constitutionalism continued to assert that Islam is a natural 
basis for a constitutional system.  
One pamphleteer asserted that constitutional government had been founded 
by the Prophet Mohammed and was first demanded from the rulers of Europe by the 
returning crusaders who discovered it to be the secret of Muslim success; a leading 
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journalist claimed it as the pristine form of government in Islam that had 
subsequently been forgotten by Muslims.
305
  
The early Constitutionalism manifested itself in the Ottoman Fundamental 
Law in 1876. At that time a Council of ministers was formed, and the highest 
religious official of the empire, the Shaykh al-Islam, was the Supreme Council Head. 
The judiciary power consisted of the religious or Shar’ia and civil or State law 
systems. However, the Sultan dismantled the Fundamental Law in 1878. The next 
major push for constitutionalism came in 1906 with the Constitutional Revolution in 
Iran. Because of the revolution, the major issues of the place of Islam in a modern 
constitutional system became a focus of debate.  
The drive for secularisation as influenced by Western constitutionalism, 
overrode a Shar’ia-based constitution during this time. Nevertheless, the idea of 
Shar’ia constitutionalism became more clearly defined and developed. As a result of 
these developments, Islamic constitutionalism identified Shar’ia as a legitimate 
limitation on government and legislation.
306
  
The second phase of Islamic constitutionalism took place after the creation of 
Pakistan in 1947 and continues to the present; after India was divided, the citizens of 
the new nation of Pakistan wanted to set up a constitutional State.  Even though 
Pakistan’s founder favoured a secular State, fundamentalists, led by Mawlana 
Abulala Mawdudi wanted the new State to be based on Islam: 
This ideological State was to be distinct from other 
postcolonial new States of the era because the struggle to liberate 
Muslim territories from foreign imperial rule had no basis in 
Islam. What Islam required was not a war of national liberation 
but the establishment of the sovereignty of Allah through 
jih¯ad.
307
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Mawdudi called his approach, “theo-democracy” and characterised it as “the 
very antithesis of secular Western democracy.”308 It rejected national sovereignty or 
sovereignty of the people, and replaced it with “the sovereignty of God.”309 In this 
type of system, the ruler had to not only be answerable to God but to the caliphs that 
represented the body of Islam.
310
 In 1956, Pakistan became the first Islamic Republic 
in history. In 1985 President Muhammad Zia ul-Haq led the movement to create a 
restored Constitution. In that document, sovereignty was declared not just of God, 
but also the people of Pakistan and the State. Arjomand describes how at the time, no 
one challenged this elite interpretation, but instead, it was considered a “perfect 
compromise (because it satisfied everyone by declaring that sovereignty resided not 
only in God but also in the people of Pakistan and in the State of Pakistan) which 
seemed reasonable.”311  
Within a few years, the sovereignty issue was challenged by Islamic 
fundamentalists. In fact, the re-declaration of God’s sovereign rule in governance is 
the cornerstone for the construction of an ideological constitution to be based on the 
Quran and the Islamic Shar’ia. This declaration triggered a movement of ideological 
constitution-creation, with Shar’ia at its core.312 Although not quite the same as 
classical Islam which viewed the function of government as creating a secure and 
just order so people could live a life of faith, the new order saw government as an 
executive of Shar’ia.313  
In 1955, Syria was the first Muslim State to constitutionalise Shar’ia as its 
main source of legislation. Syria started this trend. In 1962, the Kuwaiti Constitution, 
although modelled after the Ottoman Constitution of 1876, added Shar’ia as its main 
source of legislation in its Article 2: “The religion of the State is Islam, and the 
Islamic Shar’ia shall be a main source of legislation.”314 In 1971, Egypt followed 
when it included in its Article 2: “Islam is the religion of the State and Arabic its 
official language. Principles of Islamic law (Shar’ia) are the principal source of 
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legislation.”315 Interestingly, Article 3 of the Egyptian Constitution states: 
“Sovereignty is for the people alone and they are the source of authority. The people 
shall exercise and protect this sovereignty, and safeguard national unity in the 
manner specified in the Constitution.”316 As this type of constitutionalisation spread, 
by 2000, 24 Muslim nations had declared Shar’ia to be either the main source of 
legislation or a source of legislation.  The new millennium witnessed 12 northern 
States in Nigeria declaring Shar’ia the State law.  
The turning of Shar’ia from a source of legislation into a slogan was the 
consequence of the spread of politicised Islamic fundamentalism generally referred 
to as political Islam or Islamism. It was built on the myth of the Islamic State whose 
primary function is the execution of the Shar’ia—whatever the meaning of 
execution, with respect to a law without codes that Weber called a jurists’ law that 
includes rules for acts of worship, ritual, diet, and cleanliness.
317
  
By the 1980s, a new trend was developing which Arjomand refers to as 
“postideological Islamic constitutionalism”.318 Among these New Islamists was an 
embrace of political pluralism, and a multiparty system, a system of democracy, as 
being the form of government which was most fitting for Islamic society.
319
 This was 
an abandonment of the idealised Islamic State where the State executed the laws of 
God. Shar’ia would be more of a reference point (marja) rather than the foundation 
of all legislation.  By the 1990s, Muslim scholars like Fahmi Huwaydi discussed the 
compatibility of democracy and Islam.
320
  
With the events of the new millennium intensifying the conflict between 
Islamic groups and Western nations, the idea of Islamic constitutionalism once again 
gained the attention of the Western public, who were attempting to understand the 
political dynamics of modern Islamic societies. The most common view that 
developed was the premise that Islamic society will inevitably clash with democratic 
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society.
321
 The evidence used was to cite differences developed over centuries that 
would not change any time soon. Samuel Huntington argued these cultural 
differences are of greater significance than those of political ideologies and systems. 
Although such differences do not always lead to conflict and aggression, they have, 
as history shows, caused long-term disharmony and violence between different 
societies.
322
 Add to Huntington’s argument the premise derived from the democratic 
peace theory that democratic nations do not go to war with each other, the logical 
conclusion seems to be, therefore, that to reduce potential war, Islamic nations need 
to become democratic.
323
 At the heart of political discourse on this issue is whether 
democracy is even possible in an Islamic State.  Some scholars like Huntington 
declare that the only possible outcome of Islam and the West is a major clash. 
However: 
more mutual respect between differing societies could be 
generated if Western culture recognised the potential of Islam to 
offer human dignity and justice in a nation based on Islamic 
principles. The government of Saudi Arabia has set the stage for 
an Islamic-based nation. In pursuit of this, it is slowly, but, surely 
undertaking reforms to realise more fully the true meaning of 
Islamic governance, where all citizens are treated equally. Saudi 
Arabia is accomplishing something that is of great importance to 
other Islamic nations. Its transformation holds out the possibility 
of having a tremendous constraining influence on elements of 
international terrorism, often emerging from groups that have 
been oppressed.
324
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A central concern in these discussions emphasises the issue of the separation 
of powers and the rule of law. Traditionally, the separation of powers in a Muslim 
society came from the separation of the ruler’s siyasah power and the authority of 
fiqh scholars. But this classic separation of power mostly disappeared during the era 
of colonialism which introduced the nation-State model of government, giving the 
State complete authority,
325
while simultaneously ignoring religious authority because 
the lack of separation between church and State is seen as being antithetical to 
democratic principles.  
Islamic governance is viewed as undemocratic and unconstitutional in the 
minds of Western scholars, because they do not detect any separation of powers
 
in 
that system. They believe that religious authority has no place in a democracy:  
the separation of powers, combined with judicial 
protection of individual rights, forms the matrix of 
constitutionalism. Both of them are inseparable and indispensable 
for the functioning of a constitutional system that meets the 
standards of contemporary international law.
326
 
 
Although some liberal concepts about constitutional monarchies were being 
promoted in parts of the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century, it would be 
only with the departure of colonial powers that a new era of constitutionalism would 
even be possible in the Middle East. As independence was claimed and nationalism 
grew, Pan-Arabism spread, the establishment of Islam as the officially sanctioned 
religion of the State was developed, so a sense of national identity could be 
strengthened among mostly Muslim populations. Islam became a critical component 
in establishing political loyalties and in breaking out of the restrictions imposed by 
dynastic or tribal solidarity.
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By the 1940s, with the failure of most Middle Eastern States to gain any 
cohesive national identity, Islamic constitutionalism began to take hold. As described 
previously, with the creation of the State of Pakistan in 1947, the fundamentalist 
movement there called for an Islamic Constitution rather than a secularised State.  In 
such an Islamic State, the sovereignty of God would be recognised and not the 
sovereignty of the people.
328
  
Pakistan was the first State to create a Resolution, the Objectives Resolution 
of 1949 that recognised Almighty God as the ultimate authority which would be 
delegated as a sacred trust from the limits placed on the State of Pakistan. The 
resolution committed the State to adhere to Islam and its principles of democracy, 
freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice. Pakistani citizens, both Muslim and 
non-Muslim would be able to live their lives with opportunities and protection of 
rights as set forth in the Holy Quran and the Sunna. Although this first Resolution is 
described as mostly symbolic, in 1956 Article 198 set forth stronger requirements 
that all laws must conform to the injunctions of Islam.
329
 It was intended that a 
National Assembly would be formed that would monitor and review any and all laws 
to ensure they followed Islamic requirements.
330
 At that time a National Assembly 
was formed, but within a year, the administration dismissed the Assembly. Maulvi 
Tamizuddin, President of the Assembly, challenged the dissolution, in the Sindh 
Chief Court, where the ruling resulted in his favour. However, the government 
appealed to a supreme court, where they won their appeal.
331
  
A common question related to Islamic constitutionalism is whether it is the 
same as other democracies where the primary elements are those that protect the 
rights of individuals and groups and their ability to participate in the political process 
of a representative government. If it is different, are all citizens considered equal 
with the same freedoms of free speech and religion found in other democracies? 
Traditional Islam rejects democracy because Islam is perceived as a complete system 
which contains all of the rights, privileges, and protections that societies 
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need,
332
while democracy is vulnerable to the frailties of a man-made system. This 
system of Islam is further supported by Men of Knowledge, the ulama’, who are 
trusted to provide interpretation and proper application of divine sources as 
manifested in the Hadith and Sunna of Mohammed.
333
 Consequently, since most 
Muslims see Islam as both a religion and a State, creating a written constitution was 
seen as unnecessary—the Holy Quran is the constitution.  
Islam acknowledges that a ruling body is necessary to maintain social order, 
and chaos is avoided because Muslims are required to obey authority for the sake of 
public good. However, ultimate authority is only legitimate if the ruling body follows 
Islamic law. The natural outcome of this is that the faithful remain cooperative and 
loyal to government, on the basis that it operates according to the Shar’ia or the 
fundamental law of Islam.
334
 
Not all Islamic States followed the same path. There is no one form of a 
Muslim nation: “The Muslim world is not ideologically monolithic. It presents a 
broad spectrum of perspectives ranging from the extremes of those who deny a 
connection between Islam and democracy to those who argue that Islam requires a 
democratic system.”335 Consequently, while a nation might have a written 
constitution and laws might be developed, other nations required there to be a 
regulating body to ensure that those laws adhere to Islamic principles. Because of the 
diverse histories of the way that constitutional systems emerged in the Islamic world, 
there are different ways the separation of powers has been addressed.  
Since the middle of the twentieth century, monarchies were no longer the 
dominant form of government. There are only three remaining absolute monarchies 
in the Islamic world: The Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar and the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia.
336
 Even the absolute monarchies have introduced ‘quasi-constitutional’ 
documents.
337
 Some countries, like Iran, see Islam as the constraining force on 
government, and when taken to the extreme as in Iran, this means that the clerical 
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establishment must take the responsibility of State governance:
338
 The concept has 
been challenged even in Iran, though. The Sunni see constitutionalism as relating 
more to the relationship between ruler and citizens; most “recent interpretations of 
Sunni constitutionalism, as expounded in the contemporary writings of the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood, tend to stress the character of the constitution as a social pact 
between the ruler and the ruled.”339 
In the traditional concept of social contract, as presented by Hobbes, Locke, 
and Rousseau, the critical notion is that of consent:340 “Although contemporary 
social contract theorists still sometimes employ the language of consent, the core 
idea of contemporary social contract theory is agreement. Social contract views 
work from the intuitive idea of agreement.” 341In the Islamic version, the ruled are 
expected to show allegiance to the rulers, and in return, the government performs 
critical functions, including maintaining stability, defending Islam and maintaining 
Shar’ia. If the ruler strays from Shar’ia, the citizens have the right of 
impeachment.
342
 Importantly, this type of social contract also heralds the function of 
Shar’ia as placing limitations on constitutional government. This type of social 
contract also allows governments of various forms to develop, as long as they 
comply with Islamic principles in their law and policies. The basic principles 
required are Shura (consultation), bayah (pledge of allegiance), ijma (general 
consensus), public welfare (maslahah) and justice. A government that upholds these 
principles is able to repel (fitnah), which is chaos and turmoil. 
343
 These principles, 
according to Islamic scholars, are not unlike democratic government in that 
democracy is also based upon a set of key principles with the innate worth of citizens 
at its heart, as well as a government chosen by the people, the rule of law and 
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equality for all. Like democracy, Islam contains a set of principles that require the 
same type of moral obligations, both legally and morally. The main difference is that 
in Islam, the people are not able to establish a legal order of their own accord. The 
Shar’ia is the foundation of the Islamic judicial system, and that cannot be undone by 
a group of people.  
So while some scholars like Huntington and Kedouri, among others, argue 
that Islam and democracy are incompatible, many Muslim scholars challenge that 
view and point to Islamic interpretations that are expressions of support for 
democracy, including some by leading Islamist theorists.
344
 Finally, they insist that 
openness, tolerance, and progressive innovation are well represented among 
traditions associated with the religion, and thus entirely compatible with Islam.
345
 
They argue that it is not Islam that has accounted for the failure of democracy in the 
Arab world, rather historical circumstances and economics are much more to 
blame.
346
 
3.6.1 The Islamic Social Contract -Umma (Community) 
The Western idea of social contract is a pact between the ruler and the ruled, 
whereby the ruled offer loyalty and obedience in return for the ruler providing what 
people need to live their lives with liberty, prosperity and freedom from being 
harmed by others.  
In Islamic tradition, a social contract was formed when the Islamic 
community was founded by the Prophet in Medina (hijra). Interestingly, the forming 
of the Islamic community (umma) is considered so important to Muslims that the 
Islamic calendar starts, not at Mohammed’s birth, but the year of the hijra. It was 
believed that community was as significant as any individual for the establishment of 
God’s will on earth.347 Many scholars, such as Kamali, see umma as the source of all 
political power.  
The normative approach, adopted by Muslim jurists, maintains that the locus 
of all political authority is the community of believers who elect the caliph and obey 
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him provided that the latter does not violate the Shar’ia. According to this approach 
neither the caliph, nor the people who elect him, possess unlimited sovereignty and 
the caliph exercises a limited authority that partakes in the nature of trust (amanah). 
Islam provides for a system of government accountable to the people. This 
accountability can be measured based on a well-defined set of criteria.
348
 
The question is whether this rule stemmed from his divine office as Prophet 
or from deliberate choice of believers, who viewed him as best qualified.
349
 Modern 
Islamic scholars choose the second view.  So, the Islamic social contract is that God 
ordained the Prophet and when people commit themselves to Allah by following the 
teachings and authority of his Prophet, they will receive the benefits of security and 
prosperity in this life. After the death of the Prophet, the social contract was carried 
on. This second contract was formed by a process of selection of one of the believers 
by the others. This caliph assumed the function of the Prophet in administering 
existing law, but could not enforce new law.
350
 
Both Islam and Western politics share the concept of a social contract/political pact 
(‘aqd siy¯asi) between the community and the ruler.351 Islam, through Allah, 
guarantees human rights, and human rights are guaranteed by man in the West. In 
addition, the idea of consensus (ijm¯a’) in Islamic jurisprudence352 is described by 
the Prophet’s role in forming a social contract, which was to: express the message 
and convince people to believe it. Muslims hold differing views on the Prophet’s 
role, although universally, all accept his actual rule. For instance, did his role go 
beyond proselytizing and incorporate political leadership? In other words, did his 
rule stem from his divine office as Prophet or did believers make a deliberate choice 
in choosing him to be the most qualified?
 353
  
Early Islamic systems were not democratic, however. Although Shura is 
embedded in Arab practice, and is basically democratic in nature, it was not 
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considered to be obligatory.
354
 Shura did not constrain the powers of the caliph.
355
 
Additionally, the basic source of the separation of powers, the authority of the ulama 
(religious scholars)  being relatively equal to State authority, was seriously eroded 
when the State took centre stage as the seat of power in Muslim States. With the 
emergence of modern law has come the growth of a new class of civil lawyers and 
judges, whilst the knowledge and skills of the ulama have become restricted to the 
family courts. 
356
  
Most modern ulama still believe they alone have the necessary religious 
training and so should be the primary authorities of law.  Iranian society took this 
one step further and accepted the Ayatollah, a most respected Alam, as head of the 
government.  Other religious leaders believe that national parliaments should rely on 
a Council or committee of ulama to advise them and the society on matters of law.
357
   
Most Islamic nations today reject the single-party, autocratic State, and there 
is a new reading of Islam that is coming to dominate contemporary political 
discourse in the Muslim world. Of course, Islamic government is still obligated to 
implement Shar’ia, and Shar’ia encourages the participation of citizens, while the 
Quran upholds Shura. It is known that the Prophet himself used Shura as a regular 
part of his leadership. Kamali maintains that this makes Shura “a part of the 
normative precedent.”358 
One of the pitfalls of Islamic governance is when there are no institutions 
created to prevent the tyranny of the religious majority. Additionally, only when 
judicial review that is sanctioned by a written constitution, and not subject to controls 
imposed by a military elite and which includes open access to citizens, can the 
protection of individual and minority rights be offered.
359
 Many scholars today, 
including Samuel Huntington, argue that Islam and democracy are incompatible. At 
the same time, religion has almost disappeared from Western public political life and 
is seen more as a matter for personal life. Although it may seem that the reduction of 
religion in the public political realm was a universal trend, secularising politics was 
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on the whole a modern European and Western Christianity development. The United 
States is one of the loudest proponents of the separation of Church and State.  When 
Alexis De Tocqueville studied American democracy in 1831, he “understood that the 
American separation of church and State took government out of the business of 
coercing conformity, but it did not take religion out of public life. Religion remained 
one of the most important of institutions in American civil society.”360 Tocqueville’s 
observations are still relevant today, more than a century after the publication of his 
treatise on American democracy.
361
 
Most Muslims today rely on their religion to provide answers regarding 
jurisprudence and their personal lives. In order to accept the legitimacy of current 
governments, they expect that the principles of Islam will be the basis of governance.  
The need to secularise the government is not meaningful in an Islamic context. Why 
would humans think they could improve governance that is designed by Allah as 
expressed through his Messenger? This concept is mostly misunderstood by most 
Western scholars: 
When we in the Western world, nurtured in the Western 
tradition, use the words "Islam" and “Islamic," we tend to make a 
natural error and assume that religion means the same for 
Muslims as it has meant in the Western world, even in medieval 
times; that is to say, a section or compartment of life reserved for 
certain matters.... That was not so in the Islamic world. It was 
never so in the past and the attempt in modern times to make it so 
may perhaps be seen, in the longer perspective of history, as an 
unnatural aberration….362 
 
Nevertheless, scholars continue to speculate that without the separation of the 
sacred and profane, democracy cannot be attained in the Islamic world. This attitude 
continues even with the recognition of the major role religion plays in American 
politics.  
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Caution needs to be taken when trying to describe an Islamic form of 
governance. There is no one Islamic model that defines how governance should be 
specifically structured. Some argue for a monolithic institution that has coercive 
power.
363
 However, more moderate and conservative Islamist views argue against 
allowing a ruler to have too much power:
364
 “By concentrating power in a ruler’s 
hands, such recipes only increase the likelihood that Islam's high ideals will be 
subordinated to vulgar intrigues. Time and time again, we see unscrupulous despots 
wrap themselves in the mantle of Muslim piety."
365
 Not coincidentally, the Islam 
they promote is typically neofundamentalist, hostile to pluralism, justice, and civil 
decency
366
 and therefore, against the basic principles of Islam which strive for justice 
and equality. A common theme in the 1980s and 1990s discourse related to Islam and 
Democracy was the failure of democracy in Islam, “The relationship between 
democracy and Islam has emerged to the forefront of international debate. Since the 
decline and fall of communism worldwide, both democracy and Islam, especially in 
its militant form, have experienced an international resurgence and a renewed 
vitality….”367 The question being asked rather urgently is whether Islam poses a 
threat to Western values and democratic governance.
368
   Samuel Huntington 
answered with a resounding yes! However, such claims are basically flawed because 
it is based on the false premise that there is a unified, consistent Islam that has 
emerged or “that there is one true, traditionally established, ‘Islamic’ answer to the 
question, and that this timeless ‘Islam’ rules social and political practice. There is no 
such answer and no such ‘Islam.’369 
The rise of Islamicism is not so surprising considering the failure of 
contemporary Islamic governance that gave rise to revolutionary actions like the 
Arab Spring. Revolutions occur when the current system is no longer satisfactory: 
“When order, identity, and resources collapse, believers flock back to their religion 
and seek in it not just a means of salvation in the afterlife, in its normal personal role, 
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but also an answer to unsatisfactory conditions in the earthly life.”370 Mustapha 
Kamal Pasha argues that modern illegitimate Islamic States and a growing 
disconnect between already fractured political Muslim communities, is providing an 
“opening to capture key institutions in civil society or to create alternative avenues of 
communal identity, participation, and civic action. Prospects for building a liberal 
democratic order hinge mainly on a resolution of the internal dialectic within these 
separate communities.”371 
The Muslim Reformation of the twentieth century rejected religious bullying 
and encouraged a new understanding of the Quran gained with the perspective of 
modern realities. By doing this, many modern Muslim scholars believe they have 
found new meanings: “… the charge of this new reading is to recover and amplify 
Islam's democratic endowments, so as to provide the ethical resources for Muslims in 
a plural, mobile, and participatory world.”372 
3.6.2 Shura – Consultation and Deliberation in Islam 
In Arabic the root of the word Shura means to extract honey from the small 
hollow in the rock in which it is deposited by wild bees or to gather it from its hives 
and other places. In its more technical sense it is also defined as a collective 
endeavour for seeking an objective truth.
373
 The term Al-Shura is a noun, meaning 
‘consultation’, and in the verb form, shaor, it means to consult or to ask for advice.374 
Those who are involved in leadership, according to the Quran, have an obligation to 
involve others if the decisions to be made are related to common interests. The 
Islamic concept of Shura is where an accessible leader consults with learned and 
experienced citizens on matters of public concern.
375
  
Shura has always been a critical instrument of government from an Islamic 
perspective. In fact, the lack of Shura has been used as a source of shame when 
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critics accused despotic governments of being unjust. The ideal of Shura “was 
employed by groups that resisted power frequently using the concept of shura to 
embarrass or shame despotic rulers.”376 Shortly after the death of the Prophet, Shura 
was seen as a symbol of legitimacy in politics. According to Islamic tradition since 
the time of the Prophet, then, the concept of Shura directly opposed autocratic rule 
and oppression.
377
 Some of the controversy related to Shura was whether it was 
legally binding. Some Islamic jurists argued that Shura is binding, so the ruler has to 
follow any decisions arising from it. The majority of jurists concluded, however, that 
the decisions made by Al-Shura are advisory only, not binding. With this perspective, 
the balance of power between separate Islamic institutions, the executive and 
judiciary, is not the same as a separation of powers in a modern democracy; the 
balance of power is not between government institutions, but between the 
government as a whole and the non-governmental forces of scholarly academia. 
Neither of these held absolute power and each acknowledged the existence and the 
role of the other in the system.
378
 Nevertheless, Islamic tradition does differentiate 
between laws created by Islamic scholars and by government officials.  
3.6.3 Islamic Separation of Powers: Fiqh and Siyasah  
It is commonly accepted that constitutionalism, along with the concept of the 
separation of powers, was not found in the Muslim world until the impact of 
European countries in the area after World War I. This assumption has been thrown 
into question. For example, there is evidence that in the earliest stages of the creation 
of an Islamic State, basic forms of the separation of powers were developed when the 
fundamental distinction between ruler-made law (siyasah) and scholar-crafted law 
(fiqh) manifested.
379
 
Although the differentiation between siyasah and fiqh are considered a classic 
form of Islamic governance, this does not mean that Islamic societies evolved in 
consistent form. For example, Modern Islamic States adopted various ways in which 
national law is shaped by Islamic law. In some nations, Islam is recognised as the 
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State religion but with limited effects, such as in Algeria, Jordan and Yemen.
380
 The 
Algerian Constitution, for example, does not even mention Islamic law, but a few 
legal systems, such as in Saudi Arabia and Iran, are based primarily on religious law. 
Some nations, like Egypt and Pakistan, afford much more deference to Islamic law; 
however, while it is part of substantive law, it is not the dominant source of 
legislation, being applied mostly when dealing with personal issues.
381
  
Besides the actual role Islamic law plays in different Islamic nations, there is 
a vast diversity in the way in which Islamic law is interpreted and applied in Muslim 
societies.
382
 Consequently, in many Islamic States, religious law plays no role at all 
or a very minor one. Saudi Arabia, then, took a much different approach to Islamic 
Constitutionalism than many other Islamic States. Saudi Arabia rejected a Western 
style Constitution, and instead held the conviction that the constitution of an Islamic 
State is the Holy Quran itself and the Sunna of the Prophet. It was not until the 
second Gulf War that the Saudi rulers felt pressured to constrain its autocratic rule, 
and consequently, created the Basic Law of Governance, 1992.
383
  
Shar’ia is God’s law. There are two tangible sources of information about 
God’s law—the Quran and the lived example of the Prophet Mohammed. In reality, 
though, the Quran and the life of Mohammed do not answer every legal question that 
comes forward, so Muslim scholars devote a good portion of their lives to 
interpreting the two sources to form new legal rules that are needed for application to 
new situations. These laws are called fiqh which means understanding: 
The use of the term fiqh and not Shar’iah for these 
rules is significant and reflects a fundamental epistemological 
premise of Islamic jurisprudence. Muslim fiqh scholars undertook 
their work of interpreting divine texts with conscious awareness 
of their own human fallibility.
384
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This process of legal interpretation is a human activity, and conclusions 
cannot be claimed with complete certainty, only probabilities. The authority of fiqh 
came in part from the sincerity of the process of interpretation (ijtihad) of the 
scholars, not necessarily the correctness of the results. In other words, conclusions 
drawn by the scholars were considered legitimate if the legal reasoning came from 
sincere ijtihad. As more and more scholars engaged in ijtihad, “a healthy and 
unavoidable Islamic legal pluralism emerged, both in interpretative methodologies 
and specific bodies of doctrine.”385 The resulting diversity evolved into several 
schools of law, each attaining equal legitimacy and authority for Muslims who want 
to live by Shar’ia. So, while Muslims believe there is only one law of God, Shar’ia, 
there are many different versions of fiqh that reveal the Law to humans. Still, while 
Shar’ia is not fallible because it is God’s law, fiqh certainly is, being the product of 
human interpretation.  
Ijtihad is only able to be performed by fiqh scholars, without interference 
from rulers. However, it is recognised by fiqh scholars that in order to maintain order 
in the society, rules and regulations might be needed and only institutions that held 
legitimate power (caliph, sultan or king) over the people could develop such rules. 
These ruler-made laws are known as siyasah, which means administration. Siyasah is 
considered legitimate under Shar’ia because these laws are intended for the public 
good (maslahah). The rules that create order are so important for the service of the 
public good, that fiqh scholars believe siyasah must be respected and obeyed. 
Maslahah, the public good, is extremely important; it is thought this is likely why 
many classical fiqh scholars are generally deferential to rulers. Many contemporary 
Muslim advocates of democracy find the historic deference of the fiqh scholars to be 
frustrating, particularly their reluctance to challenge none but the most extreme 
siyasah laws.
386
 
As a consequence of the two sources of law in an Islamic system - fiqh and 
siyasah, the division of power in an Islamic State is not a theocratic distribution of 
power. Those in physical power (king, sultan, caliph) are different from those who 
develop religious law and in most Muslim nations religious scholars do not hold 
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temporal power. Rulers appoint fiqh scholars as judges, but usually they respect fiqh 
diversity by appointing judges from the various schools of law.
387
   
The realms of fiqh and siyasah form a check and balance system. Fiqh 
scholars garnered a significant amount of respect from the people, and rulers were 
conscious that to take action without the approval of the scholars could cause 
significant social opposition.
388
 Consequently, the Islamic judiciary was separated 
from the executive even as early as the time of the third Caliph (AH 23 (643/644), 
and it had the power to strike down a Caliph’s orders if they were in conflict with the 
Shar’ia. All were equally subject to law. Justice was based on an adversary system 
where the involved parties were heard and evidence examined. All decisions were 
recorded so they could be reviewed in a system that had a hierarchy of courts and 
appeals came from a lower court to a higher court with an ultimate appeal to the 
Caliph.
389
  
Additionally, fiqh scholars would not be able to overly undermine the 
authority of the government because they did not command an army.
390
 Noah 
Feldman claims that this balance ensured the success of the traditional Islamic 
system of governance for so long. 
391
 Some Islamic historians like Feldman, the 
author of The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State argue that it was the loss of this 
classic separation of powers between fiqh and siyasah that led to the downfall of the 
Ottoman Empire.
392
 As the fiqh scholars lost their role and authority as lawmakers, 
this left a void in an effective way to balance the power of the rulers and gained the 
Sultan additional powers.
393
 Shar’ia itself is a balance against State power: 
The Islamic State is distinguishable from the Western 
nation-State by the fact that sovereignty in the latter admits no 
formal restraints. The nation-State claims to possess unrestricted 
power to legislate. Since the Islamic State is not vested with 
unlimited sovereignty, it lacks the authority to enact law that 
subjugates the citizen to the exercise of arbitrary power, or a law 
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that may be repugnant to the Shar’iah. Likewise since the 
Shar’iah exists independently of the will of the State, the citizen 
of the Islamic State is enabled thereby to judge the legality and 
propriety of government by a set of well-established principles 
enunciated in the Qur’an and Sunna.394  
 
Additionally, it has been more common than not for ulama not to accept the 
legitimacy of those in a position of rule. In fact, there has been a traditional tension 
between rulers, ulama and Islamic jurists because of the independence of Shar’ia 
scholars and leaders. This anti-government position was possible precisely because 
of the independence of Shar’ia which has acted as a protective code for the rights of 
people that even the most ruthless ruler could not cross.
395
 Moreover, usul al-fiqh, 
the process of developing evidence to authenticate Islamic law does not require 
governmental approval, but is an independent process carried out by Islamic scholars 
and jurists.
396
  
The classic division of fiqh-siyasah is a separation of powers that has the 
potential to inform modern Islamic constitutionalism—some scholars call it the 
“Sha’ria check.”397 This Shar’ia check has manifested itself in some Muslim-
majority countries when a branch of government is given the authority to perform a 
Shar’ia check on the laws of the country. Such a branch would be given the authority 
to strike down any legislation that is not consistent with Shar’ia.398  
The classic Shar’ia style of the separation of powers is not the same as the 
modern concept of the division of powers. The modern version is a separation of 
State powers from each other, while the classic Shar’ia style is a balance of power 
between State and non-State institutions. Colonialism ended this traditional 
separation of powers in the Islamic State because colonialism injected the nation-
State model of government where the State holds all the authority.  Fiqh scholars are 
still in operation, but they do not have an alliance with the State which is balanced 
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and interdependent.
399
 Unfortunately, even Muslims are unclear about the difference 
between fiqh and Shar’ia, so there is a possibility that a popular majority could 
legislate their own version of fiqh laws
400
 claiming they are Shar’ia and mandated by 
Islam and therefore not requiring public debate. The role of the fiqh scholar in 
Muslim societies, who offered a credible non-governmental check on State power, 
lost recognition.
401
 According to Islamic scholar Asifa Quaraishi, without the power 
of the fiqh, the Shar’ia authority given to government, risks the establishment of an 
Islamic theocracy: 
Ironically, this phenomenon is new in Muslim history, 
created by the effort to recognise a role for Shariah within 
modern constitutional norms. But it is decidedly different from 
the classical separation of fiqh and siyasah powers, and it risks 
rejection by global constitutional norms which tend to presume 
no public role for religious law. The challenge for Islamic 
constitutionalism in the modern era will be to find effective 
solutions to this problem, exploring creative divisions of legal 
and political authority that will resonate with both the democratic 
and Islamic affinities of Muslims today. Variations on the 
classical fiqh-siyasah separation of powers may be a useful 
direction of inquiry.
402
 
 
3.7 Is Democracy in Islam A False Promise?  
Firstly, there is no one type of Islamic State.  Several variations have been 
implemented over time and geographic space.  Consequently, there is widespread 
diversity in contemporary Islamic governance. For example: Saudi Arabia is 
governed by a conservative monarchy; Iran is a clergy-run State; Sudan and 
Pakistan’s Islamic governance are militarily imposed, and; there is the recently failed 
Muslim Brotherhood’s attempt at creating an Islamic State in Egypt. One issue binds 
them all together. In the last decade or two, all of these States have faced the 
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challenges of reform, and the major theme continues to be the relationship between 
Islam and politics and the governance of the State.  
403
  
Secondly, and unsurprisingly, given the diversity among contemporary 
Muslim scholars, the range of the debate on Islam and its compatibility with 
democracy ranges from those who argue that there is no link between Islam and 
democracy to those who claim that Islam is in need of a democratic government.
404
  
These diverse voices include ultraconservatives and extremists who argue that Islam 
has its own mechanisms to create a just society and assert that democratic 
conventions are not necessary. Others argue that democracy can only be realised if 
there is a separation between church and State, with religion being a matter of the 
private domain.  
It is possible to categorise these diverse range of views into three distinct 
groups in Islamic thought that have polarised the progress of reform in the Muslim 
world. The first group is labelled as the rejectionists who reject completely any type 
of Western democratic activities in Islamic governance. The second, known as the 
secularists, would like to see a Western, secularised governance. The third group, 
reformists, believes that through a process of reform, democracy can be achieved 
using traditional Islamic concepts, which include such features, as: 
 shura (consultation between the ruler and ruled) 
 ijma (community consensus) 
 maslaha (public interest) and; 
 ijtihad (using human reason to reinterpret the Quran to meet 
the changing needs of society).  
Parray states that, “these mechanisms can be used to support parliamentary 
forms of government with systems of checks and balances among the executive, 
legislative and judiciary branches.”405 
But what is the individual’s role and responsibility in relation to citizenship 
within the belief system defined within Islam? According to a genuine conviction 
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and belief, Islam teaches that God alone is the One who is All-knowing, All-
powerful and must be obeyed unconditionally. 
406
 
Human beings are seen as having 
relative knowledge and no absolute power. They are all seen as being equal and 
enjoy the dignity granted to them by God since their creation. Each is accountable in 
this life and in the life to come for his or her deeds.
 407
 That all people are granted 
this freedom and liberty through their belief in God is a given in Islam. 
Every matter, even the faith itself, should rely on one’s conviction about what 
is right and what is wrong without any coercion or intimidation. As the Quran says, 
“No coercion is [allowed] in matters of faith.” 408 Based on these beliefs, no human 
being can decide, arbitrarily and independently, a matter that concerns others as 
opposed to himself or herself alone, nor indeed claim, if he or she has done so, 
immunity from accountability. The Quran therefore enshrines the need for Shura – 
the engagement of an individual with others to reach a decision on a matter that 
concerns them all,
409
 subsequent to and a condition of Islamic faith in God. It 
represents a positive response to His message. It is noteworthy, that such a personal 
responsibility within Islam comes next to the commitment in making prayers to Him: 
“… and those, who respond to [the call of] their Lord, and keep up the prayers, and 
whose rule in a matter [of common concern] comes out of consultation among 
themselves...”410 
 
The initiative of involving others in making a decision of common 
interest has to come from those who are responsible for leadership and making such 
decisions. That said, those people being consulted have an equal responsibility to 
offer, in return, their nasiha (advice) to the leadership in a way which is suitable, 
since giving advice is an obligation of every individual towards leaders and the 
public. It is “a’imat al-Muslimin wa ‘ammatihim”411 (joining the doing of what is 
right and good and forbidding the doing of what is wrong and evil), according to a 
tradition of the Prophet reported by Muslims – that is the responsibility of the State 
authorities as well as the people. 
412
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3.8 Conclusion 
Muslim scholars are being encouraged to become engaged in the 
consideration of democracy in the Muslim World. This scholarly activity is urgent 
because of current political trends, which include, on the one hand, a declaration that 
the Cold War and Communism have ended, and that Western liberalism has brought 
the “end of history.”413 On the other hand, there is widespread concern about the 
resurgence of religion and the rise internationally of fundamentalism and disquiet 
about a future marked by a “clash of civilizations.”414 It is a sobering time for 
intellectuals, particularly those representing the Muslim umma, for they need to 
address themselves to the issues that are being debated in the academic world as well 
as in its corridors of power, and to try to rethink the strategy of Islam and the Muslim 
umma based on  these challenges.  
However, Muslims are not the only ones that are being called upon to revisit 
and address the meaning of Islam and its relation to modern democracy. Karen 
Armstrong, who wrote the foreword to Esposito’s book, argues that democratic 
reform in the Muslim world is not just an urgent regional issue but a global one. She 
writes that this book helps us to recognise that the future of Islam does not just 
depend on whether or not a few reformers achieve success, but that the US and 
Europe are major players in the process. She argues, that if short-sighted Western 
policies are not reviewed and amended, they will continue to affect the region in a 
negative way. This will in turn weaken the will for reform and strengthen the resolve 
of extremists. 
415
 Consequently, she hopes that readers of the book will gain a more 
balanced and nuanced view of the Muslim World.
416
 
As stated earlier in this chapter, Islam manifests itself in different forms of 
governance in today’s Muslim nations. Yet, such differences should be of no 
surprise, considering that democracy too, is a multifaceted philosophy. Muslims 
possess a moral and ideological identity and a culture and history which differs from 
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that of the West. It is therefore, unacceptable and flawed to assert that Western style 
democracy is suitable and indeed ideal for all nations. 
417
 
Insisting on the adoption of a Western model of democracy, is not only 
Eurocentric, but raises the historical spectre, yet again, of political colonialism. No 
wonder then, that many Muslims perceive the insistence, at the very least, is a short-
sighted and/or insultingly uninformed view of some Western scholars who appear to 
flatly reject the principles of Islam and its ability to promote a just society based on 
liberty and freedom.  
An Islamic political order is based on the concept of Tawhid (one God) and 
seeks its flowering in the form of popular vicegerency (Khilafa) operating through a 
mechanism of Shura; this is supported by the principles of equality of humankind, 
rule of law, protection of human rights (including those of minorities), accountability 
of rulers, transparency of political processes and an overriding concern for justice in 
all its dimensions: legal, political, socio-economic and international.
418
 One of the 
key concepts of Islam is that it has established a system of life based on following 
the true path of God. This true path includes the way society is governed. 
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Chapter Four: Shura: Deliberative Democracy, An Islamic Perspective  
 
And consult them in affairs (of moment) then, 
when thou hast taken a decision, 
put thy trust in God.
419
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Democracy is a set of ideals to create a just society, as well as a form of 
government. It is meant to preserve the dignity of the citizen and freedom from any 
type of oppression, along with the ability of citizens to participate in government. 
However, direct democracy is not practical in nations that have large populations, so 
democratic countries use representative democracy, where elected representatives 
make political decisions based on the interests of those they represent. To make the 
most informed and wisest decisions, deliberation is required. Democracy is meant to 
provide a vehicle for the will of the people to manifest itself in governance. Ideally, 
the will of the people is both deliberative and representative. Deliberation provides a 
variety of viewpoints and interests and representation should be broad enough to 
cover the interests of a majority of citizen groups. In Islam, the practice of Shura 
amounts to deliberation, and when those involved in Shura represent various parts of 
society, then two of the most basic requirements of democracy can be met—the will 
of the people through representation.
420
  
4.2 The Nature of Al-Shura 
The introduction of the Majlis Al-Shura law states: 
… in compliance with the words of God, “Consult them 
on the affair,” and His other words, “Their affairs are carried out 
in consultation among themselves,” and following the Sunna of 
His Messenger (PBUH) who consulted his companions, and after 
taking cognizance of the previous Shura (Consultative) Council 
of 1347H…. and following the Sunna of His Messenger (PBUH) 
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who consulted his Companions and urged the Nation to engage in 
consultation, Majlis Ash-Shura shall be established to exercise all 
tasks entrusted to it according to this Law and the Basic Law of 
Governance while adhering to the Book of God and the Sunna of 
the Messenger (PBUH), maintaining brotherly ties and 
cooperating in kindness and piety.
421
 
 
Al-Shura is meant to be conducted with freedom where people are free to 
speak their mind and express their opinion without any hesitation or pressure. There 
are many examples in Islamic history from the life of the Prophet Mohammed that 
models his desire to have his companions freely express their opinions. For example, 
at the battle of Uhud, the Prophet wanted to defend the city from inside, but his 
companions did not agree, so he followed them. The tradition of freely speaking was 
carried on in the spirit of the prophet. 'Umar, the second Khalifah is reported to have 
addressed the meeting of Al-Shura by saying, 
I have called you for nothing but this that you may share 
with me the burden of the trust that has been reposed in me of 
managing your affairs. I am but one of you, and today you are the 
people that bear witness to truth. Whoever of you wishes to differ 
with me is free to do so, and whoever wishes to agree is free to do 
that. I will not compel you to follow my desires.
422
  
 
It is this spirit of respect and collaboration that represents the tradition of 
Shura in Islam and is why it is highly valued as a part of the collective identity of 
Muslims. Westerners pride themselves on individual liberties and individual identity; 
however, collectivity is more valued in Islam as a concept that brings unity, harmony 
and peace among human beings. Ultimately, a goal of Islam is that all humans should 
be united in peaceful cooperation so that all can live in peace and happiness. The 
idea of collective decision-making in government is a natural offshoot of the way 
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Islamic society should work in general. Is this democracy? Not exactly, but it has a 
similar spirit which is to protect the good and dignity of human beings in their 
society.  
Most Muslim scholars would argue that Shura is actually a superior form of 
democracy in action than any Western-style representative decision-making. The 
principle of Shura is considered to be a Muslim duty and it is believed that when it is 
used correctly, as it was in the time of the Prophet and his four successors, that it has 
all the benefits of liberal democracies. However, the difference is that it does not 
possess the same weaknesses and therefore carries less risk. 
423
 
To participate as a member of the Shura Council is highly respected. The 
tradition is that men or women who serve as Shura members are highly talented and 
educated and held in high esteem within their respective professions. Such a body of 
well-respected men served the Prophet and gave him their opinion on matters 
referred to them. This was the Shura or consultative body. Shura was developed as a 
fundamental practice in governance in Islam from before the time of the Prophet. His 
first four successors are known by history to have practiced Shura as well. A 
consultative Council was to be established by each leader of government so the 
leader could consult with this Council in order to administer the affairs of State with 
their consent.
424
 Shura is considered sacred due to its revered nature. The Prophet 
declared that Muslims need to practice mutual counsel in their affairs. He is reported 
to have said: “If your leaders are virtuous, your rich men generous and your affairs 
are settled through mutual consultation the surface of earth is better for you than its 
bottom.”425  
4.2.1 Shura before Islam 
Shura is pre-Islamic in that it is a part of ancient Arabian culture and tribal 
government. In fact, it is a continuation of the tribal institution called nadi (Council 
of Elders), which was later perfected by the moral principles set forth in the 
Quran.
426
 Tribal leaders were elected by consensus (Shura), based on wisdom, 
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leadership, generosity, and skill in battle. Once elected, if the situation changed or if 
they were felt not to be up to the challenge, a new leader could be chosen, also by 
consensus. There was no automatic right to be the leader and no hereditary right to 
assume leadership from one’s father, uncle or brother, although close relatives of a 
former leader were often chosen. Every man in the tribe had the right to lead and 
even when chosen by the application of Al-Shura, he led as the steward of tribal 
resources, the “first among equals.” Such a leader was required to use Al-Shura in 
major decision-making by consulting tribal elders.
427
  
When a patriarchal kingship was established in Mecca by Qusayy around 
500CE, supreme authority was given to a relatively small number of privileged 
people based on social status. These were most commonly the heads of the various 
clans of the tribe of Quraysh and of their allies, who together formed the nadi. This 
Council regulated all the religious, political, economic and social affairs of the 
community in Mecca. The Council of Elders was not an elected body, but was 
accepted as reflecting the will of the tribe because of its legitimacy within the tribal 
structure. It was an executive more than a legislative Council.
428
  
4.2.2 Islamic Influence on Shura 
Later, under the influence of Islam and Shura, the members of the Council 
were no longer selected because of ancestry or their social status within the tribe but 
on the basis of their religious affiliation. The nadi was replaced by Shura, the 
authority of which came from the consensus of the Muslim ummah (community). 
Through this transformation of tribal communalism into Islamic individualism and 
collectivism, the conditions for a new kind of popular participation were created.
429
  
The sanctity of Shura cannot be overemphasised, because it is believed that 
Allah asked the Prophet Mohammed to use Shura in matters of government. Thus, 
the directive to use Shura comes directly from God. Additionally, it is believed that 
God asked Mohammed to use Shura to set a precedent for the way in which 
government should be managed in the future.
430
 When decisions had to be made, and 
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if there was no clear and specific guidance to be found in the Quran, then the Prophet 
is reported to have explained that Muslims should resolve any issues through mutual 
counsel, but on condition that the men were pious and held sound opinions.
431
 
Tradition also maintains that when the Prophet was asked about the meaning of some 
of the terms in the Quranic verse III: 159, he was reported to have said: “Consulting 
men of sound opinion and resolving the matter in light of the same.”432 
Even though the concept of consultation comes from a much older Arab 
tradition, it is considered inherently Islamic because the process was used and 
recommended by the Prophet. There are two Shuras in the Quran which discuss al-
Shura: Al-Imran and Al-Shura. There are also books which attempt to explain the 
Hadiths regarding Al-Shura and books which explain Al-Shura as used in Islamic 
law. Thus, Shura has a long heritage and is a broad and profound concept within 
Islam. Obviously Shura has not been fully implemented in accordance with Islamic 
law in and by modern Islamic governments.
433
 There are various reasons for this, 
including tribal legacy and power structures. While a majority of Muslims may not 
be pushing for more Shura, in the opinion of most Muslim jurists, Shura is part of 
aza'im al-ahkam (the commandments), which are obligatory for the ruling authority 
and the Muslim people.
434
 
The concept of Al-Shura is mentioned specifically in the Quran in two places; 
one being the chapter on Al-Shura described above, as found in Surat/chapter 42, 
Ayat/verse 38. The second mention of Shura in the Quran is when Allah ordered 
Mohammed to practice Shura during his lifetime:  
It is part of the Mercy of Allah that thou dost deal 
gently with them.  Wert thou severe or harsh-hearted, they would 
have broken away from about thee: so pass over [their faults] and 
ask for [Allah’s] forgiveness for them; and consult them in affairs 
[of moment].  Then, when thou hast taken a decision put thy trust 
in Allah.  For Allah loves those who put their trust [in him].
435
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This particular passage is written in the imperative tense, which is used in 
Arabic to discuss obligations, further reinforcing the idea that Shura is obligatory.
436
 
Additionally, the fact that these statements are attributed directly to revelations of the 
Prophet Mohammed gives them extra weight.
437
 
Subsequently, the Prophet went on to construct a set of practices regarding 
Shura, which he and the four Caliphs who immediately followed him, used 
frequently in their dealings with the community. This is reflected in the many 
Hadiths where the Prophet was consulted regarding the concerns of daily living, and 
where he consulted with his advisers on the decisions which had to be taken for the 
good of the community. For example, one of the companions, Abu Huraira, is quoted 
as saying: “I have not seen any person doing more Shura than [Mohammed].”438 
Additionally, it appears that in addition to the companions, the Prophet counselled 
many others about the value of Shura. It might be argued that with Allah to guide 
him, Mohammed did not need the opinion of his companions. In reality, however, he 
both wanted and needed their counsel, especially concerning the day-to-day matters 
of the community.
439
  
The Quran and the Sunna both show the need for multiple perspectives when 
dealing with worldly issues.
440
 One requirement of Islam is that all must work for the 
interest of the community. This can only happen if leaders take the opinions of their 
subjects into consideration when making decisions, which in turn makes them more 
likely to serve the public interest.
441
 Umar describes Shura as follows: "The opinion 
of one man is like the cloth woven of one thread; the opinion of two like the cloth 
made of twisted thread and the opinion of three (or more) like a piece of cloth woven 
of several threads together that can hardly be torn into pieces."
442
 
The Quran suggests that all members of a community should participate in 
Shura. However, as the numbers of Muslims increased, the practice of Shura 
underwent some necessary changes and became more indirect. The companions of 
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the Caliph would first consult with the ummah (Muslim community). After gathering 
the input of the people, the companions would act as the representatives of the 
members of the community whom they had met, and decisions would then be made 
based on the outcome of those consultations. 
443
  
Through the practice of Shura, a collective product is generated that comes 
from joint thinking, experience, diligence, scholarship, knowledge, expertise and 
continuous research and study.
444
 Shura applications and results should conform to 
the Islamic faith and Shar’ia. 
Shura requires serious and effective participation in making any decision. 
When the Prophet received the divine revelation to rely on Shura in making 
decisions concerning common matters for which no specific revelation had arrived, 
this knowledge alone might have been expected to reveal the necessity of Shura in a 
Muslim society. Ibn ‘Atiyya stated his opinion by commenting:  
Shura is one of the basics of Islamic law (Shar’ia), and 
a mandatory rule; and any [who is entrusted with a public 
authority] who does not take the counsel of those who have 
knowledge and are conscious of God, should be dismissed from 
his [or her public] position, and there is no argument about 
that.
445
  
 
On confronting his enemies from Quraysh, who had challenged him by 
setting up their camp near Medina, the Prophet consulted his companions on the 
matter. On the basis of their opinions, he decided to meet his enemies in the battle of 
Badr; this occurred in the year 1 AH/622 CE. Later, the Prophet also consulted his 
companions about whether to go out of Medina to meet the attacking army or to stay 
in the city and defend it when they attacked; he followed the opinion of the majority 
and met them in the battle of Uhud in 3 AH/624 CE. When a coalition of tribes 
launched an attack against Medina in the year 5 AH/626 CE, the Prophet’s 
suggestion to give one of the attacking tribes some of the city’s produce to persuade 
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them to withdraw, was met with disapproval by some of his companions. He 
accepted their views. Later, in the year 23 AH/644 CE, when the Caliph ‘Umar was 
stabbed to death by an assassin, a committee had been appointed to discuss, among 
themselves and with the people, who would succeed him; their decision had to be 
that of the majority.
446
 
Caliph Omer Ibn Al-Khattab is reported to have said: “No one can become 
caliph without Shura.”447 This implies that there should be a consensus among 
Muslim scholars as to the importance of Shura in Islamic Law; however, there are 
those who, while conceding its importance, believe nevertheless that Shura should be 
practised in a flexible manner. For example, there is apparently no established way of 
choosing those to be included in a Shura Council, or any agreed number of 
participants. It is believed that all practices and procedures for this important system 
should be flexible, to meet the needs of the people at a specific time and place.
448
 
Most jurists see the practice of Shura as a sacred responsibility, and true believers 
would necessarily incorporate Shura into Islamic governance. In this way Shura with 
its strong moral roots, would become a form of worship, a religious ritual, by means 
of which a Shura Council member, a Muslim individual, and the society as a whole 
would strive to please God.
449
 However, recognising the religious importance of 
Shura in society does not settle the questions about Shura or its practice.  
The Quran praises Muslims who use Shura in their daily affairs. As a 
consequence of faith in God, participation with others is required in decisions that 
concern them, in part because in Islam all are equal and no one should be placed 
above others. The necessity for consultation comes directly from the Quran, in which 
an entire chapter is devoted to it: “and those, who respond to [the call of] their Lord, 
and keep up the prayers, and whose rule in a matter [of common concern] comes out 
of consultation among themselves...”450 Thus, Al-Shura is a principle in Islamic Law 
to ensure majority rule, not autocratic rule.
451
 Although considered a principle of 
Islamic Law, this has not necessarily led to the use of Shura by modern Islamic 
leaders, and in fact Saudi Arabia did not re-implement the practice until relatively 
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modern times. However, Islam is a pioneer in introducing the widely-cherished 
concept of consultation in conducting everyday affairs, although the applications of 
this concept are not specified in detail. The Quran speaks of “… those who… 
conduct their affairs by mutual consultation…” [Q, 42: 38]. Consultation is 
considered one of the important pillars of the Islamic way of life. To ignore it is an 
express violation of the law prescribed by Allah.
452
  
Shura begins within the family when decisions are made, and is extended to 
national and international levels of governance. Injustice occurs when people’s needs 
are ignored. When large numbers of people are involved, then trusted representatives 
should be part of the decision-making process. If consultation is not used when 
decisions are being made there will be an impact upon others. Islam teaches that such 
people have been deprived by the selfishness of those who have seized their rights. 
When the interests of many are at stake, consultation becomes a grave responsibility. 
A conscientious individual, who does not wish to be held accountable by his Creator, 
would not dare to carry such a burden by himself, but instead would painstakingly 
employ the means of consultation for reaching a broader-based decision that would 
be in everybody’s best interests. Thus, if there was an error of judgement, no one 
individual would be held responsible.
453
 Islam also teaches that those who are 
affected by collective decisions have the right to be fully informed of all matters 
under consideration. 
4.3 The Significance of Shura in Modern Islamic States 
Currently, Western descriptions of Islamic societies show an evaluation of 
Islam based on looking at current political realities rather than at the religion itself, 
which in fact is largely misunderstood in the West. Islam provides a vision of a just 
society, and also presents general principles for a way of life for the individual, the 
family, the society, the State, and world relations in order to secure balance and 
justice in life on earth.
454
 It offers the basic moral and organisational rules for 
relationships between people within the family and society, and between rulers and 
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those ruled.
455
 Islam does not provide detailed programmes, since human 
circumstances go through a process of continuous development and specific details 
will need to be changed over time. Instead, Islam offers messages of guidance. 
Indeed, Muslims consider that living in a community of believers in God will result 
in freedom and equality for all human beings.
456
 
According to Islamic history, Shura played a very significant role in shaping 
the way the religion developed into an established system of living. It is documented 
that the main task of Shura after the death of the Prophet was to help frame laws 
when no direct revelations were available upon which to base a specific law. When 
considering how a law should be designed the Caliphate would consult with 
esteemed peers. Laws would only be adopted after consultation with members of the 
Shura had taken place.
457
 For example, records show that when Abu Bakr needed to 
make a decision, he followed the traditions of the Prophet. New ordinances would 
only be issued once consensus had been reached.  
Since Shura is a basic standard of Islam, it exemplifies, at least in part, the 
most basic principle of democracy by requiring consent and representation of the 
citizens in an Islamic nation, and too, accountability and transparency from Islamic 
leaders. Just as human freedom and equality are fundamental in any democracy, 
Islam considers ‘human dignity’ to be the foundation for the right way of life. For 
example, the Quran says: “We have indeed conferred dignity on the children of 
Adam, and carried them on land and sea, and provided for them sustenance out of the 
good things of life, and favoured them far above most of Our creation.”458  
There are four primary principles in any Islamic socio-political organisation – 
namely Shura, justice, equality and human dignity.
459
 The need for human dignity 
covers all aspects of life, including its moral, intellectual and physical aspects. Every 
human being has the right to live a dignified life through fair conditions of work and 
decent social welfare for those who cannot work either temporarily or on a 
permanent basis. Freedom of choice and to move freely is another primary aspect of 
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human dignity. Any limitations imposed on these two facets run counter to such 
beliefs and are therefore considered immoral.
460
  
As one of the four cardinal principles of Islam, Shura reflects basic Islamic 
values, which are established on three precepts. One, that all people in a society are 
equal in human and civil rights. Two, public issues are best decided by the majority 
view. Three, the other cardinal principles of justice, equality and human dignity 
constitute the moral core of Islam and are best realised in public life through Shura 
governance.
461
  
Islam teaches that God alone is the One who is all-knowing, all-powerful, and 
who, according to a genuine conviction and belief, must be obeyed unconditionally.
 
Islam also teaches that human beings have relative knowledge and no absolute 
power. Being equal, each person is thus accountable for their choices and actions. 
Every decision should be based on what is right and what is wrong. In other words, 
as Osman states, no single individual can decide arbitrarily and independently a 
matter that concerns others and not himself or herself alone: “The Quran makes 
“shura” or participation with others in making a decision that concerns them, 
subsequent to and a consequence of the faith in God.”462  
Shura is presented in the Quran as a principle, not a system. This was meant 
to allow successive generations of Muslims to continue to strive for a more perfect 
form of Shura.
463
 However, an important distinction needs to be made between 
Shura and democracy. They are similar in that both require citizen participation in 
governance and decision-making. Whilst democracy recognises and endorses the 
ultimate sovereignty of the people, Shura sanctifies the ultimate sovereignty of God. 
Accordingly, democracy can suffer from the limitations of human reason, whereas 
Shura, it is argued, does not suffer from any inadequacies if constitutional, legal, 
economic and social matters are underpinned by Shari’a.464  
Muslims believe that humans cannot perfect the laws that are prescribed by 
God through his prophets. However, a government that follows God’s laws is one 
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that is just and moral. Mickenburg suggests that democracy in Islam is absent 
because of “patriarchal orders, and […] geopolitical and regional factors”, not 
because of any incompatibility with religious principles.
465
 In other words, the 
patriarchal social structure has facilitated a less open and participative culture than 
was ever intended by Islam.  
4.4 The Role of Majlis Al-Shura in Islamic Polity 
Shura is consultation. Majlis (a place of sitting) Al-Shura is the institution or 
Council formed when members are officially part of a permanent Shura body. First 
and foremost, the purpose of Majlis Al-Shura is to make new laws in areas where 
there is no clear command or law found in the Quran and Sunna. Majlis Al-Shura is 
not a product of historical developments. It is accepted by many Muslims as a 
commandment from Allah as seen in the verse, “Those who hearken to their Lord 
and establish regular prayer; who (conduct) their affairs by mutual consultation”.466 
It is one of the most important tenets of the religion only second to Al-Salat, which is 
to worship Allah, as in the practice of collective worship.  Collective worship teaches 
Muslims how to organise themselves and such organisation is considered to be 
essential for the well-being and peace of Muslim communities. The obligatory Al-
Salat for all, five times throughout the day, reinforces this sense of  organisation and 
order. The masjid (mosque) has functions beyond the place of prayer; communal 
consultation takes place to discuss community affairs.
467
  
It is believed that Al-Salat and Al-Shura are given equal standing from Allah.  
Collectivity is of key importance to Islam. In collective worship, for example, all 
people are equal without discrimination based on who is rich or poor, black or white, 
Arab or non-Arab. From the collective worshipers, the group would elect the one 
most pious to become the imam. In earlier times it is not surprising that Al-Shura 
took place in the mosque, the same place of collective worship.  
Decisions made through Al-Shura are not considered infallible of course. 
They are prone to human error. However, collective wisdom is highly valued. Shafiq 
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claims that Al-Shura is considered a necessity because it brings understanding, 
cooperation and unity in the lives of the people. It compels its members to think 
seriously without any reservation about their own problems. A community which 
once becomes aware of its problems will surely find its way to peace and prosperity. 
Al-Qasimi has summarised the importance of Al-Shura; he states that the Prophet 
was ordered to use  Al-Shura in conducting his affairs, not because he needed to do 
so, but because he was guided by divine intervention. Al-Shura was used to allow an 
opportunity for all to express opinion and to deal with issues in a fair and correct 
way.
468
 In addition, the precedent set by the Prophet of consulting with the most 
talented and esteemed of men is recognised as having been instrumental in Islam’s 
legal and political development.
469
 
4.5 Shura and Contemporary Issues  
Just as Shura has been a heated topic of debate among modern Islamic 
scholars, the relationship between Islam and democracy has become a matter of 
public scrutiny. There are basically two visions related to the debate: (i) those who 
deny any connection between Islam and democracy; and (ii) those who argue that 
Islamic tradition contains a number of concepts, ideals, institutions and values which 
are essentially democratic in nature. These include such concepts as: Shura, Ijtihad, 
Bay‘a, Khilafa, Ijma‘, Maslaha and Ahl al-hall wa al-‘aqd.   These, especially the 
first three, provide a practicable foundation of democracy in Islam.
470
  
However, Samuel Huntington argued that democracy does not exist in Islam, 
and because of that, Muslim and Western societies will always clash.
471
 This is 
clearly not what most Muslim scholars believe. In fact, the former chairman of the 
current Shura Council in Saudi Arabia, Dr Salih bin Abdullah bin Humaid, compares 
Shura principles to democratic ones. He reports that in Shura public rights and public 
freedoms are transformed into religious and social obligations which are connected 
to Shar’ia, with the intention of finding a balance between an individual’s interests 
and the interests of society generally. In contrast democracy leans towards individual 
rights and freedoms over society’s interests. In addition, he states, the rights and 
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freedoms of both the individual and society are restricted by Shar’ia. Conversely, in 
democracy they become limited only when they violate the rights and freedoms of 
others or violate the law.
472
 Huntington’s thesis is very divisive, and not really 
accurate. It is just another example of dichotomous thinking that does not resolve 
conflict but adds to it:  
In a world in which we often succumb to the dichotomy 
between “us” and “them”, we are challenged to transcend (though 
not deny) our differences, affirm our common humanity, and 
realize that “we”, whether we like it or not, are interconnected 
and co-dependent, the co-creators of our societies and our world. 
473
 
 
4.5.1 Shura – Obligatory or Optional? 
A majority of Muslim scholars and jurists believe that Shura is obligatory.
474
 
They support this position through reference to the two texts mentioned previously. 
If Allah put Shura in a statement that included the obligatory prayers and charity, 
then Shura must be obligatory also. The Prophet Mohammed openly practised Shura 
with his companions, and this frequent practice was the topic of a discussion with Ali 
Ibn Abu Talib, the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, who ruled the Caliphate from 
656 to 661.
475
 When Ali asked the Prophet what he should do if he encountered a 
situation that was not directly covered within Islamic Law, the Prophet replied:  
“Counsel people and do not make your absolute decision.”476 This practice is 
believed to be the reason why the companions used Shura to decide on Mohammed’s 
successor as Caliph (Head of State) after his death. To depend on the opinion of the 
majority in decision-making is the only reasonable and acceptable procedure to 
follow, as there is less risk of error than there would be if it was the sole 
responsibility of an individual. With an assembly, the freedom to express views 
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collectively, to share different perspectives and explore opposing positions is critical 
for the purpose and efficiency of Shura.
477
 
The argument that Shura is obligatory is not limited to past debate. Modern 
Islamic scholars like M. Riaz Khan argue that Shura is a moral demand taught by 
Islam, and that to depart from Shura would be immoral. Consultation is an inherent 
principle in Islamic society, and the rule applies to all collective situations whatever 
the size: the family, the tribe, or the whole country.
478
 Additionally, Islam requires 
that the leaders of government should be chosen with the consent of the people, 
based on their judgment of the integrity of the individuals.
479
 Shura is connected to 
salat al-jamaah, which is collective prayer. Salat al-jamaah is preferred over 
individual prayer because it teaches Muslims how to organise and cooperate with 
each other. Thus salat al-jamaah is considered the essence of Islam and key to the 
process of Shura, because it promotes brotherhood, understanding, and mutual 
cooperation.
480
 History recounts that when Umar, the second Caliph, wanted to have 
a meeting of Shura al-naas (general assembly), he would call for salat al-jamaah, 
collective worship.  
The former Chairman of the current Shura Council in Saudi Arabia believes 
that Shura is a critical element in any Islamic political system or for that matter in 
any social structure. He argues that any Muslim State that seeks to attain security and 
political stability for its citizens “should base its government and political system on 
Shura […] a deeply rooted concept in the Muslim society and […] a distinctive 
quality of the Islamic political system.”481 
Not all Islamic scholars, however, agree that Shura is compulsory. Supporters 
of this position refer to the Islamic scholar Al-Shafai, who mentions that the use of 
Shura by a judge is not required.
482
 Others support this position by arguing that the 
Prophet requested that his companions follow Shura as a general principle, not as an 
obligation in all situations.
483
 These scholars argue that there is no formal guidance 
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about the way Shura is applied in society as the Prophet wanted the principle to be 
flexible, depending on circumstance. They point out that even the Prophet did not 
practice Shura in all situations, as for example, in cases of disputes between Muslims 
and non-Muslims.
484
 They argue that since Shura was not practised consistently, then 
it must in fact be optional, or depend on the nature of the situation. They contend that 
in Islamic Law nothing is considered obligatory unless proven with clear evidence. 
In short, they believe that since such evidence is lacking on the question of Shura, it 
must therefore, be optional.
485
  
The exact interpretation of how Shura should be applied in modern Islamic 
societies has been the subject of debate for the last several decades. One of the basic 
questions is whether the public is to be involved in the election of Shura members. If 
not, can the Shura truly represent them? In a famous debate in the 1960s, Mawdudi 
maintained that the head of State should be chosen by the people, who then entrusted 
the leader to make the appropriate decisions and to appoint a group of advisers who 
would help him make those decisions. This is one form of Shura according to 
Mawdudi.
486
 Though broadly in agreement, Mutawalli questioned this view, pointing 
out that the Quran said nothing about the need for all citizens to be involved in 
consultation, but that only specially selected people should be included in the 
process. In other words, general elections were not required, but specially-designated 
people should be part of the consultative process. The Quran states, “Let there be of 
you a community, who call people to goodness.”487 This verse has been interpreted 
as “Let there be a group of you”. Mutawalli contended that there did not need to be a 
majority as a criterion for truth; identifying what is true often required the most 
righteous among people.
488
  
The debate over Shura between Mawdudi and Mutawalli was concerned less 
about whether Shura required participation by all, and more about what the nature of 
Shura would be. For example, Mawdudi believed Shura was required in all things 
legislative, while Mutawalli argued that it was only necessary in military affairs and 
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therefore not even relevant in modern times.
489
 Both Mawdudi and Mutawalli did, 
however, agree that Shura representatives needed special qualifications so that the 
best possible advice could be given to the head of State, in order to ensure the best 
decisions would be made following this type of consultation.  
This attitude of only allowing the most skilled to be involved in making 
political decisions is the basic argument against direct franchise in an Islamic society. 
However, even those against direct franchise would still argue that Shura needs to be 
representative of all citizen groups. The more populist stance is that Shura is not 
meant for the elites of the society; there must be representation of all citizens, and 
there should be no distinction between the status of Muslims. Those who believe that 
Shura is obligatory in an Islamic society point out that people who argue that Shura 
is discretionary are often the powers that do not find Shura to be conducive to their 
interests.
490
 Nevertheless, the social contract between the ruler and the ruled is a 
strict one in an Islamic State.   
According to historical precedents in Islam, there was a genuine (not a 
fictitious) binding contract between the ruler and the ruled. This mutual pledge, 
which was called bay’a, held the ruler responsible for assuring the supremacy of 
God’s law (Shar’ia) and justice, securing human dignity, serving the public interest, 
and fulfilling all the duties of the position. The people were held responsible for 
supporting the ruler, for obeying his decisions that complied with God’s law, and for 
fulfilling their obligations.
491
 The early Caliphs were chosen primarily from a small 
group who had been given authority through bay’a. The chosen Caliphs would then 
address the public to gain their acceptance through the public bay’a. As noted, bay’a 
is a mutual pledge from the ruler that he will follow Islamic Law and satisfy the 
public, and from the people to support the ruler and advise him.
492
 Bay’a is therefore 
seen as a sacred responsibility and is likely to account for the willingness of most 
Muslims to support their rulers.  
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Another group of scholars believes that Shura is optional, but a highly 
desirable combination of the two positions on Shura discussed above.
 493
 Its 
adherents suggest that as each situation and ruler is different, the requirement for 
Shura can vary. If the ruler lacks the wisdom and experience to make a decision, then 
it is recommended that he use Shura. If this is not the case, Shura becomes optional. 
It is for the ruler to decide. This position is supported by al-Hasan al-Basri (642-728) 
and al-Thahakh. One reading of Ibn-Abbas states; “and consult them in some 
affairs,” emphasising the word “some” and indicating that Shura is optional. 494  
Other scholars would take great exception to the idea that Shura is 
optional.
495
 Some have gone so far as to suggest that classical doctrine was inaccurate 
because it led to the belief that Shura was merely a ruler asking subordinates for advice. 
However, the Quran asks for mutual advice, which means mutual discussions among 
people of equal standing. He also argues that if Shura and its democratic voice are not 
made available, then a ruling body is "wittingly or unwittingly guilty of rendering Islam 
null and void."496 
Overall, it is believed that in most cases Shura is an obligation under Islamic 
Law, and it is generally regarded as an underlying principle; Islam stipulates rida al-
awam, meaning ‘popular consent’. Rida al-awam is considered a prerequisite for a 
political authority to be accepted as legitimate, while ijtihad jama’i or ‘collective 
deliberation’ is requisite for the proper administration of public affairs. In addition, 
Islam requires mas'uliyya jama'iyya, which is ‘collective responsibility’, for 
maintaining the public good of society.
497
 
4.5.2 Shura and Legitimacy 
A central issue in modern governance is legitimacy. In fact, legitimacy or 
lack of legitimacy may be the urgent political issue for international legal 
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scholarship.
498
 Illegitimacy in government is “the single most important 
impoverishing and destabilising element in our global neighbourhood.”499 
A traditional source of legitimacy is established when people participate in 
deliberative democracy. To establish legitimacy, deliberative democracy promotes 
that the public deliberation between citizens is the basis for legitimate political 
decision-making and self-government. Deliberative democracy includes four 
principles, the first, being the common good. Second, public reason (the legitimacy 
of deliberative outcomes is derived not simply from the will of the majority, but 
instead from the results of collectively reasoned reflection by political equals 
engaged in a shared project of identifying laws and public policies that respect the 
interests, preferences, and values of all citizens).
500
 Third, preference transformation 
(which means that those involved in deliberation are willing to listen to other views 
and perhaps even change their opinions) and finally, egalitarianism. 
Shura represents legitimacy for an Islamic society because it is a system 
immersed in deliberation, which is its primary purpose, and it is based on a value 
system that is deeply rooted in the Islamic system. Because Shura is part of Islam, it 
cannot be changed according to the whimsical wishes and attitudes of any one 
person. Therefore, Shura controls the affairs of the Muslim nation, whereas 
democracy stems from a relative moral value system that is subject to the wishes, 
tendencies and attitudes of the majority in a parliament, and to circumstances that 
change over time.
501
  
In response to the claim that Islam and democracy are incompatible, Humaid 
states that democracy is not contradictory to Shura, but neither is it identical. Each 
has its own principles, basis and rules. The vast field of scholarly diligence given to 
Muslims during the application of Shura enables practitioners to benefit from any 
innovations that may arise in the applications of democracy.
502
 
Shura has a role in several areas of Islamic society. It has an important role in 
the election of the people’s representatives in the parliamentary body – or bodies – 
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and the practice of legislation therein. This role is intended to guard the public 
interest and place a check on executive power, and it facilitates consideration of the 
people’s concerns. If the practice of “one person, one vote” does not secure a fair 
representation for all groups, then the structure of Shura has to be changed; for 
example, assigning to each of these groups a certain number of seats in proportion to 
their size.
503
 In addition, a limited number of seats must be made available to 
represent any minority groups in the society. It is also necessary to implement ways 
of reaching the best possible representation of the people and their diverse structure 
and interests.
504
  
Shura is therefore needed when discussions and hearings are held, and when 
decisions are arrived at by the representative body and its committees, along with 
executive bodies or other organisations or individuals in relation to any public 
concern. In certain matters of special importance, a significant practice of Shura may 
occur if a public referendum is deemed to be appropriate; this may be decided by the 
legislature or by a requisite number of voters through a designated procedure.
505
  
Shura obviously has a role in the executive branch and its departments when 
discussions and decision-making occurs. It should also be practised in the elections 
of leaders and boards of the unions of workers; professionals and students; in the 
discussions and decision-making of these elected bodies; and in any wider 
conferences they might arrange. Furthermore, technical and professional Shura ought 
to be conducted in schools, hospitals, factories, companies or any other business. In 
the courts, Shura is followed when more than one judge makes a ruling over a case, 
or when the jury system is used.
506
 
4.6 Building upon Shura 
In its technical sense, Shura may be defined as a collective endeavour for 
seeking an objective truth. Affiliations through Shura are created, not based on 
kinship or status, but on the principles of religious practice and faith and equality 
among peers. Any Council of elders created to practice Shura was egalitarian in 
nature, which is a principle of deliberative democracy. Everyone had equal status, 
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just by membership. The elders made up the Council because these were considered 
to be the wisest men, and wisdom is a virtue that is a requirement for participation in 
a Shura Council.  By its very nature, many describe it as the most democratic 
institution in an Islamic society.  For the last 30 years, Arab/Muslim scholars have 
published a large amount of literature related to the debate on democracy in the 
Muslim world.  Not surprisingly, considering the diversity within Islam, there are 
various schools that offer different approaches regarding Islam and democracy.  
The Muslim Brothers movement integrates some aspects of democracy and 
discard others. They argue that the principle of Shura is a Muslim duty and that when 
it is rightly applied, as was the case at the time of the Prophet and his four righteous 
successors, it has the same qualities as liberal democracies – but none of their flaws. 
In the opinion of the Muslim Brothers, implementing Shura relieves Muslim 
societies from despotism and weakness. Ultimately, the Muslim Brothers believed 
that returning to the true spirit of Islam would rescue Muslim nations from their 
current distorted status. “If Muslims only returned to its true nature, that of equality, 
fraternity and consultation, tyranny will have no place among them.”507  
However, a Muslim nation should not blindly copy Western democracy. For 
example, personal freedoms should never be considered if they contradict the 
teachings of Islam. Jihadi-salafis reject that Shura and democracy share anything in 
common. They argue that any comparison and use of Western terms or concepts runs 
the risk of “shattering” the identity of Muslims, and reading things into the text that 
are not there is illegal: “Democracy and Shura are described as being as far apart as 
heaven and earth. Democracy is described as a tyranny of human beings; Shura is 
described as a God-ordained regime that, when applied guarantees the best of 
fortunes for individuals and societies.”508 Western democracy is seen as lesser than 
Islam in guaranteeing a just society. Any process that transfers sovereignty from 
Allah to people is deemed immoral and improper. Muhammed Qutb argued injecting 
non-Islamic terms into Islam while trying to defend Islam is a sign of defeat. So, 
Muslims are cautioned not to incorporate the ideas of democracy into their discourse. 
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Any resemblance is just imaginary: Islam can only accept a regime that is lead by 
Allah’s law and which is based on the process of Shura.509 
Liberals consider Shura to be a cornerstone of Islamic democracy, whilst 
governments recognise Shura as a process which legitimises the existing political 
order. The term Shura is also being used in the contemporary debate in Arab 
societies on the desired system of government by scholars and activists whose main 
concern is the introduction of Western-type democracy in Arab countries. These 
scholars are suspicious of synthesis and compromises between Muslim and Western 
terminologies, noting that these have resulted in the past in abandonment of 
pluralistic politics altogether. Their aim is rather simple: that Arab society goes 
through the same political transformations as Latin American, East European and 
other societies have experienced since the mid-1970s. While this goal has found 
more resonance in intellectual circles since the mid-1980s, and even more so since 
the collapse of communism in Europe in 1989, it still enjoys little advocacy in most 
Arab societies, where Islamism has become more firmly entrenched and where 
suspicions are common as to the real intentions behind calls to return to the liberal 
democratic model – a model which failed Arabs in the past.510 
It is in relation to these suspicions that some liberals call upon Shura. 
Ironically, liberals are in agreement with jihadi-salafis in their narrow, literal 
interpretation of Shura as a form of consultation rather than a comprehensive system 
of government resembling Western democracy.
511
 
One recurring issue is the structure of the Shura body. Should it be comprised 
of experts, or of anyone elected through universal suffrages, and once it exists, what 
should be the mechanism of its operations? Al-Turabi, for example, distinguishes in 
one of his works between four types of Shura: a) universal Shura, which is also the 
highest and strongest one, such as that used in referendums and general elections. 
This type of Shura constitutes ijma‘ – a consensus within the nation, which is legally 
binding so long as it does not contradict the Quran and the Sunna; b) Shura based on 
the people’s representatives in government; c) Shura based on experts; and d) Shura 
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based on opinion polls. Al-Turabi seems to describe here the decision-making 
mechanism of Western democracies, without committing himself to technicalities 
such as the frequency of elections or the balance of power between legislators and 
the head of State.  But elsewhere he states that the principle of Shura is governed in 
accordance to knowledge, because he who possesses more knowledge, sees things 
more clearly. Thus, he leaves the door open to both a theocratic and a republican 
form of government. 
In the twentieth century, many Islamic scholars began to equate Shura with 
democracy. These scholars argue that being democratic, Islam calls for the people’s 
leaders to be elected, non-elected leadership is illegitimate.
512
 Al-Qaradawi notes that 
in the Muslim system, as is the case in the Western one, the nation elects its ruler, 
and the ruler cannot be imposed on the nation. The concept of Shura is that of a 
system whose leaders are chosen, monitored and expelled if they fail in their duty to 
the people. Shura is not a right for individuals to practise, but rather a system which 
is a Muslim requirement. 
The literal meanings of Shura and democracy are similar; however, their 
connotations are not. They both involve public participation in political affairs; 
democracy, though, honours the ultimate sovereignty of the people; Shura honours 
the ultimate sovereignty of God, and through the Quran, a textual authority is 
recognised. Islam requires that the way the Quran is interpreted be kept flexible to 
adapt to changing social needs, so a consultative body like the Shura is singularly 
important in ensuring that fiqh law meets the needs of modern people. Democracy 
has the shortcoming of relying on human reason for its authority, while Shura is able 
to avoid such a pitfall by addressing constitutional, legal, social and economic 
matters as underpinned by Shar’ia.513  
If Shura does not rely on Shar’ia, it could resemble liberal democracy in 
which the enjoyment of political rights is mostly figurative and essentially controlled 
by economic structures. For human theories are not complete, but sectional. For 
example, capitalist economy theory concentrates wealth in few hands, others, like 
communism, disperses personal wealth; in both, real authority is held by the few; 
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“This dialectical problem results from the dependence of human theories on 
circumstantial tendencies and prevents the development of perfect political equality, 
unity and freedom.”514 
4.7 Shura- A Resurgence 
The last three decades have witnessed a resurgence of the debate on 
democracy within Muslim scholarship. Any attempt to try to narrowly classify how 
Muslim scholars interpret democracy in Islam would be misleading because there are 
diverse views within Islamic scholarship on the shape and characteristics of Shura 
and how it should be applied. Nevertheless, whilst different approaches are held, all 
recognise the need for Shura in one form or another. Of course, Muslim scholars are 
not the only ones investigating the compatibility of Islam and democracy; the 
congruency of the two, or lack thereof, has received much attention from the West. 
The importance of Shura and democracy was first addressed by the reformist 
movement in Islam led by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897) and later by 
Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905).  Al-Afghani and his students introduced the idea 
that the principle of Shura rejects tyranny. Abduh promoted the idea that 
implementing Shura is an Islamic obligation rather than an imitation of western 
practices. Although Islamic law did not clarify how Shura should be implemented, 
Abduh appeared to be satisfied with the limited consultative roles reserved for the 
assemblies of his time.
515
 Later, one of Abduh’s students, Abd al-Rahman al-
Kawakibi (1855-1902), asserted that Islam should be seen as being synonymous with 
democratic government; consequently, if Muslims truly lived the foundations of their 
faith – equality, fraternity and consultation – tyrannical rule would not exist within 
Islamic States.
516
 
The reformist movement helped to free Islam to be open to democratic 
reforms. However, it did not free the societies to embrace religion as the primary 
origin of legitimate democracy. That said, the overall rationale underpinning the 
movement was the synthesis of divergent ideas, namely, “embracing the West so that 
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it can be repudiated; instituting rationalism in Islam, so that scriptures remain a 
comprehensive framework of life.” 517 
4.8 Shura and Deliberative Democracy 
In the past decades, up until the mid 1990s, most consultation taken by the 
monarchs occurred behind closed doors. If agreement was not achieved, then policies 
generally were not implemented because the necessary consensus had not been 
reached. The matter would be left pending until the problem could be considered 
further. The consequence to a State which does not follow such practice is likely to 
be instability and unrest.  
Shura may also be seen as an effective model for Islamic monarchies as they 
differ from other forms of absolute rule. Other types of monarchy do not embrace 
consultation to this extent, if at all.  Luciani asks a very important question - as Shura 
has not resulted in democratic governance, why is it seen as preferable in many 
Islamic societies over more traditional forms of democracy? His answer reveals the 
motivation underpinning the nature of Islamic society. 
The first motivation has to do with the role of religion in politics. Because 
Islam aims at being a political order as well as a personal faith, a clean separation of 
religion and State is almost impossible. Consequently, there must be a place for 
religion somewhere in State institutions. Thus, either a) you have direct government 
of the clerics; or b) you assign ultimate power of control to the clerics (the Iranian 
situation being somewhere in between); or, finally c) you have a “secular” ruler 
whose job is to balance various opinions, including religious opinion (the Saudi 
situation). Indeed a “secular” ruler will never accept being as such, and will try in all 
ways possible to acquire religious legitimation, even if his power was originally 
acquired by conquest or use of force; the ruler will certainly not define himself as 
“secular” in the sense of not being a believer! Having credible religious legitimation 
is an essential element of strength for any incumbent ruler, and in this sense a factor 
facilitating the practice of consultation and consensualism.
518
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Luciani’s assessment clearly describes the current and historical nature of the 
Saudi regime in searching for a balance between its secular hold on power and the 
need to satisfy the religious components of Saudi society. By maintaining the 
sanctioning of its power by its religious base, the Al-Saud family has maintained its 
position and authority. Luciani argues the necessity of this and how it is related to 
Shura:  
Indeed, if one plotted the various Arab political systems 
on a diagram, with one axis showing the degree of religious 
legitimacy claimed by the ruler, and the other the extent to which 
consultation takes place (assuming that both variables could be 
measured); we would then find a positive correlation, in the sense 
that those rulers who have no claim to religious legitimacy also 
are less prone to engaging in consultation. The cases of Iraq, 
Syria or Libya illustrate this point very clearly.
519
 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
Samuel Huntington, in his famous “Clash of Civilizations” theory 
(1993/1996) argued that there was no room for democracy in an Islamic society and 
that in fact the problem was not Islamic fundamentalism, but Islam itself.
520
 In 
challenging Huntington, Minkenberg pointed out that the “democratic deficit” in 
Islamic countries could not be accounted for by the apparently problematic 
relationship between Church and State or the fact that secularism was lacking in 
these societies. Rather, the main reason was to be found in the patriarchal structures 
of such societies, and in the servitude and oppression of women.
521
 While scholars, 
like John Esposito, claim democracy can easily be found in Muslim societies, 
including through the practice of Shura,
522
 others angrily challenge such an assertion. 
Those who are strongly critical of scholars like Esposito accuse them of twisting 
definitions to make them fit into the structure of Islamic government. Thus, as Bukay 
notes, terms like democracy become relative – or else, as is the case with Esposito 
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and his fellow scholars, distort the truth of what life is like in Muslim countries to 
reinforce their ideas.
523
  
Such interpretations of Islamic society are deeply flawed. However, such 
sweeping generalisations are fairly representative of a Western response to Islam. A 
clearer understanding of Islamic principles is therefore desirable. This should focus 
on correcting such widespread misrepresentations which circulate in the Western 
world, especially those related to Saudi Arabia. Because the Kingdom is the home of 
two of the most holy sites in Islam, it attracts millions of visitors annually. 
Consequently, Saudi Arabia will always have a special position in the Islamic world. 
This means, of course, that developments within Saudi Arabia are bound to play a 
crucial role in influencing the way that the Islamic world relates to the wider world, 
and in particular how radical Islamist forces are controlled or accommodated within 
the global system.
524
 If the international community fails to understand how an 
Islamic society like Saudi Arabia functions in practice, fear and distrust between 
cultures seem likely to continue and will only serve to exacerbate the likelihood of a 
future ‘clash.’525 
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Chapter Five: Contemporary Politics in the Arabian Gulf - Power, Legitimacy 
and the Need for Reform 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Modern governments in the Arabian Gulf are being pressured to become 
more democratic or lose the support of their citizenry. In response, some of the 
leading Saudi political leaders are promoting a change to the constitutional 
monarchy.
526
 Their primary concerns, however, appear to be for more security rather 
than a personal desire to see their country become more democratic.
527
 Some 
scholars argue that the only way the current ruling party can maintain legitimacy will 
be to initiate structural reform and nurture the development of a democratic 
framework to underpin the legitimacy of the State.
528
  
In Saudi Arabia, the authority may be “majestic,” yet even the King’s 
authority has to meet the moral scrutiny of the people in order to be accepted as 
legitimate. The State’s moral authority has been challenged since the 1970s. The 
need for reform has been recognised by the Saudi ruling body since then.
529
 A 
statement related to political reforms made over the last few decades is posted on the 
website of the Law of the Board of Grievances, presented by the Saudi Embassy 
which states, “The revitalization of Saudi Arabia's political system reflects the 
nation's adaptability to modern development without compromising its religious and 
cultural values.”530 One could understand this to mean that in order to maintain 
religious and cultural values political change will be small, gradual and incremental 
and will not destabilise the status quo.  
5.2 Pressures for Reform come to the Arabian Gulf 
The 1990s saw major political changes that affected the Arabian Gulf region. 
For example, there were important changes in the political climate in the region after 
the 1991 Gulf War, the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
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Europe, and the rise of Islamist opposition movements throughout the Middle East 
and North Africa. The governments recognised that reforms would likely be 
required. 
An example is the Sultan of Oman who decided it was necessary to liberalise 
the country’s political system. But the Sultan wanted to introduce reform gradually to 
avoid alienating his traditional power base.
531
 So, he created the Omani Consultative 
Council (OCC), which was Oman’s response to Majlis Al-Shura. The OCC was 
based on the State Consultative Council (SCC) created ten years previously. The 
State Council, however, was mostly an advisory Council, much like the Shura 
Council of Saudi Arabia today. Nevertheless, the State Council of Oman was a 
critical step away from absolute tribal rule. The Council’s functions were advisory, 
but it still represented Omani citizens, and it became a modern model for other Gulf 
States.
532
 The State Council was very welcomed and seen as an important symbol of 
reform in Oman; however, its implementation did not really change the manner of 
governance in the country.  
The Sultan and some members of the ruling party close to him worried that 
the traditional system of rule was not in the long-term interest of Oman. So, the 
Sultan then decided to reform the SCC, give it more power and authority, involve it 
in a wider range of activities, and involve ordinary citizens so it would have a more 
significant role in the political, economic and social development of the country.
533
 
The result was the Omani Consultative Council.   Although the members of the OCC 
were to be elected, this is not exactly what took place. Each member was chosen by 
the Deputy Prime Minister for Legal Affairs from a list of three candidates that had 
been voted for in caucuses held in the wilayat (administrative system), in which 
hundreds of leading citizens participated. Of the three names for each position, the 
Deputy Prime Minister chose one and submitted the list to the Sultan for final 
approval.  
In 1994, the OCC underwent further reform. The number of members was 
expanded from 59 to 79, and a chairman was appointed. Each district would elect 
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representatives to be appointed to the Council.  Those areas with less than 30,000 
people elected two representatives and those with more than 30,000 elected four 
representatives to serve.
534
 The elections added more representation and political 
participation of the people. The Sultan believed these reforms would help to rally 
support from the different tribal sectors of the country and help gain support in his 
efforts to modernise the country. Al-Haj notes that not only did the Sultan want to 
secure support from the tribal groups, but from the newly educated young people, the 
leading families and merchants of the country: 
The OCC brought together these diverse segments of the population, giving 
them greater recognition and providing them with new financial resources in order to 
secure their support for the regime. Also, the Sultan wished to give the leading tribal 
and merchant families and the emerging educated elite an input in his new socio-
economic policies, to ensure that they were implemented.
535
 Even with all of these 
reforms, however, the OCC has no real significant legislative powers. These powers 
are still under the control of the Council of Ministers who create and implement 
legislation in the country. The role of the OCC is still advisory only.  
When it is time to elect members to the OCC, each district votes for its 
appropriated number of representatives, from 2-4. Selected candidates are allowed to 
publish pamphlets and to place billboards, banners and posters announcing their 
candidacy in the streets and public places, although these adverts have to stay within 
the person’s district. The maximum number of billboards for each candidate is 20. 
Candidates can also publish advertisements in the local press and on TV, and for the 
first time in 2011, to hold public meetings, in farms, halls or electoral tents. Many 
female candidates used the Oman Women’s Association local halls for the purpose. 
Instant texting and other instant access mediums, along with the Internet were used 
to campaign. For the most part, however, candidates use personal networks for their 
campaign activities.  
Unfortunately for the Sultan, Oman’s reforms did not guarantee there would 
be no unrest in the sultanate. Apparently, this is because the country is being ravaged 
by the same forces that are plaguing other areas in the Middle East:  
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It's about a youthful, worldly, more connected population 
who basically want a voice -- publicly accountable ministers, free 
and independent press, even separation of State powers. It's also 
about an economy in which during 2009, nearly 75 percent of 
private sector jobs drew monthly wages of OMR 200 or less 
(USD $520), and in which non-nationals in the active workforce 
outnumbered nationals by more than two-to-one.
536
  
 
External pressures have made a major impact on the undemocratic countries 
of the Arabian Gulf. In response, both Qatar and Oman developed elected 
consultative Councils with women having the right to vote. Kuwait and Bahrain have 
both created parliaments, and there is economic liberalisation in the United Arab 
Emirates. At the end of last year, Sheikh Mohammad al Maktoom, Crown Prince of 
Dubai, suggested that Arab leaders needed to introduce reform to avoid challenges to 
their power.
537
 Some of the reforms already undertaken have been described as mere 
“tokens” of democracy, meant to appease international criticism. For example, in a 
review of the role of the OCC in Oman, unlike the promotion by the government that 
refers to the OCC as parliamentary, the OCC is not a parliament. A parliament must 
have the power to legislate and the ability to monitor the executive authority. Also 
the membership must be based on free and universal election. However, in Oman, 
selection of Council members is made by the government and ultimately determined 
by the Sultan. Such a system of selection challenges the validity of the electoral 
process. Oman also differs from other parliamentary systems in that the competition 
of political parties for seats in parliament does not apply. 
538
 External pressures for 
democratic reforms have been imposed on the countries of the Arabian Gulf, 
including Saudi Arabia, for decades, since the Reagan Administration in the US 
when Western normative standards were demanded in order to determine whether the 
nations were trade worthy-friend or foe. However, the implementation of blanket 
reforms in the Arabian Gulf would have failed: 
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… far from being a uniform, undifferentiated region, [it] 
is one of considerable complexity, strewn with booby traps for 
the unwary outside policymaker. If there is Ariadne's thread 
leading through the labyrinth, it is the determination of these 
various countries to decide for themselves what is in their best 
interest, to set their own national goals, and to cooperate among 
themselves only when they perceive it in their interest to do so. 
Any program to impose external leadership must be undertaken 
with extreme caution. 
539
 
 
Just implementing elections for executive leadership, for example, would 
likely not have the desired results. That is because the societies and their political 
relations are embedded in the traditional relations between the rulers and ruled and 
voting systems or elections are not likely to lead to more political participation or a 
balance of power and access.
540
  
5.3 The Current Saudi State and Legitimate Rule 
In Saudi Arabia, legitimacy is bound together with an ideology that is 
coloured by a religious perspective which seeks to set out how society should be 
shaped and organised.
541
 The monarchy has always presented itself as a protector of 
Islam. The Basic Law of Governance emphasises this role in Articles 6, 7 and 8, of 
the Basic Law of Governance when it declares: 
Article 6: 
In support of the Book of God and the Sunna of His Messenger 
(PBUH), citizens shall give the pledge of allegiance (bay'a) to the 
King, professing loyalty in times of hardship and ease. 
Article 7: 
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Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its authority 
from the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet (PBUH), 
which are the ultimate sources of reference for this Law and the 
other laws of the State. 
Article 8: 
Governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is based on justice, 
shura (consultation) and equality according to Islamic Shar’ia.542 
 
Additionally, the State has traditional legitimacy, in that the monarchy has 
been responsible hitherto for bringing the country together. Therefore, the monarchy 
lays claim to its right and the responsibility for the creation of a modern State of 
Saudi Arabia. This they would argue is what the royal family, historically, is entitled 
to do and thus on this basis they legitimise and retain the rulership of the country. 
543
 
The government also stresses its achievements in developing and modernising the 
nation and in its ability to meet the needs of its population. Another form of 
legitimacy maintained by the monarchy is its circles of cooperation and bases of 
support from key groups. The family itself is vast. With 7,000 princes, the political 
role of the family could be compared to a political party.  
A critical constituent group of the regime is the ulama, the religious leaders. 
Considering that the regime’s legitimacy is due in part to its commitment to Islam, 
the relationship between the regime and the ulama is critical. The line between the 
two often becomes blurred as the ulama depend on State financing for most of their 
activities. The tribal constituency is also pivotal (and always has been), to ensure 
cooperation between tribes in order that stability is maintained across the region. As 
Niblock argues (2006), over time, tribal leaders embraced the role of being 
guarantors of the people’s passivity to the regime’s rule and, too, acted as 
representatives of the people during dialogue with the King.
544
 Tribal loyalty 
continues to be a powerful force in the country. However, in order to maintain the 
complicated relations and sources of cooperation required in Saudi Arabia, they all 
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must share the government’s belief in the legitimacy of its rule.545 Ultimately, “The 
House of Saud has relied on Islam to unite and rule its tribal society, to legitimate its 
authority and institutions, and to assert its leadership in the Islamic world.”546 
Figure 2  illustrates the dynamics and relationships inherent in the current 
Saudi Arabian political system.
547
  
Fig. 2: Saudi Arabian political system 
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In order to maintain legitimacy, the regime within Saudi Arabia will have to 
convince the various stakeholders depicted here that the existing political institutions 
are the most appropriate for its society. Considering the relatively stable nature of 
Saudi society, the government should be able to avoid the use of force and coercion 
to maintain its rule and the status quo, if it nurtures widespread belief in its 
legitimacy.
548
  
Yet, whilst the Saudi government derives its legitimacy from several key 
sources, does it possess democratic/structural legitimacy? In a democratic, 
constitutional framework, it is apparent that legitimacy depends on the will of the 
majority of its citizens. On this basis alone, the case for Saudi Arabia in its claim of 
democratic legitimacy is very weak. In response to this view, the regime argues that 
by maintaining a coherent system of law and governance, it possesses a greater 
legitimacy than that which is founded on the Quran. In addition, it is asserted, the 
majlis (informal Councils) of the King and of senior members of the royal family 
represent the traditional role of interlocutor between the people and the ruler, in as 
much as any citizen may present their case to them as if they were talking directly to 
the King.
549
 Although these informal meetings are important for citizens, they are not 
a vehicle for their active participation or input into major policy issues. The 
transition to a more democratic form of government is one of the Saud regime’s 
stated long-term goals, the implementation of which will need time and careful 
consideration.
550
 
Legitimacy in Islam comes foremost from the Supreme law of Shar’ia, and 
secondly, the requirement that society is governed in accordance to the will of the 
people. Kurshid states that whosoever is in authority “must enjoy the confidence and 
support of the Muslims, the Umma, the real repositories of Khilafa.”551 The 
legitimacy of the Saud regime has not gone uncontested in the last four decades, and 
in particular, came under intense scrutiny in the late 1970s. During the reign of King 
Faisal, from 1962 to 1979, the country was able to use its new, huge revenues from 
oil to maintain stability through modernisation and by taking steps to reduce the 
levels of income inequality across the State.  However, regional events have had a 
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major impact. When the Shah of Iran was overthrown in 1979, one of the first actions 
the new Iranian regime initiated was a political attack on the Saudi claim to Islamic 
leadership.
552
 The Saudi Kingdom was declared to be corrupt, outdated and 
compromised by its relationship with the US. Unfortunately for the Kingdom, during 
the same time period, the volatility of oil prices had a major impact on the economic 
well-being of the country. Stability was maintained by a top-down approach. First, 
religious authorities were given more power to satisfy sections of the population, and 
the government used “welfare policies” to keep most of the population acquiescent. 
However, no real political reforms were introduced.  Therefore, people benefitted 
from the government’s generosity, but had no role in shaping their communities.553 
5.4 Saudi Arabia Responds 
Although there were calls for reform in Saudi Arabia during the 1980s and 
1990s, they were generally quietly quelled. 
554
 Reforms were described as not being 
relevant to the needs of the Saudi people or dismissed as being untimely or too 
radical. However, the last decade has witnessed a new spirit of reform in the GCC 
monarchies.
555
 Some of the events that have caused the Arabian Gulf States to 
examine the need for reform are: the invasion of Kuwait and the first Gulf War; 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks; the second Gulf War; the war in Afghanistan; 
and most recently the revolutions associated with the Arab Spring. After the attacks 
of 9/11, relations between Saudi and the US were shaken when it was discovered that 
fifteen of the hijackers were Saudi citizens.
556
 The monarchies often refer to the need 
for reform in terms of what Anoushiravan Ehteshami describes as “new realities.”557  
Incremental change is more suitable to the people of Saudi Arabia, but this 
does not mean Saudis will not become restless if there are no real reforms made. As 
one Saudi journalist states, “We live in a society that has its own peculiarities, and 
we should move down the path of reform at a speed appropriate to the ability of 
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society to accept change.”558 Because the nature of government and political 
leadership in Muslim monarchies within the Arab Peninsula rests on family-based 
fiefdoms, which have held ruling power long before each of their lands evolved into 
independent States, any discussion on the shape of political reform in any of their 
States is inexorably tied, ultimately, to what the ruling families see as good 
governance and too, to the extent they are prepared to allow the process of change to 
alter the balance of power. Thus, hitherto, the status quo has been maintained by 
careful changes in the running of the State. 
Widening participation across the Arab Peninsula through more active 
implementation of Shura practices has opened up the individual States to a range of 
international measures defining good governance. These include: “transparency, 
accountability, absence of corruption and nepotism, and rational and fair policy-
making, along with efficiency and responsiveness in the public sector, the presence 
of an independent judiciary which operates (and is seen to operate) without 
prejudice, privacy laws and freedom of information.” 559  
While Saudi Arabia responded to external pressures, internal political 
pressures began to increase. For example, in May 2003, terrorist attacks were 
launched within the Kingdom. Al-Qaeda targeted Saudi Arabia between 2003 and 
2005. A total of 221 people lost their lives.
560
 At the same time, several citizen 
petitions were filed demanding an increase in political participation by Saudi 
citizens. In January 2003, the King received a petition for open elections to the 
Consultative Council and a request for more civil rights. More petitions followed. 
The final petition openly demanded a changeover from an absolute to a constitutional 
monarchy.
561
 
The pressures within the Kingdom were exacerbated by other issues too: high 
unemployment and a labour market that had to absorb 130,000 young men, when 
only 30,000 - 40,000 graduates were able to find jobs. Unrest grew. Additionally, 
both King Abdullah and his Crown Prince Sultan were over 80 years old and the 
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ruling family was in disagreement about how to make the necessary generational 
changes. The Saudi powers find themselves facing internal and external criticism, 
which has raised concern regarding the security of their rule. This has alerted them to 
recognition of the need for action.
562
 
King Abdullah initiated a process of reform, while still in the position of 
Crown Prince. He established the Forum for National Dialogue, a panel for 
discussion of various proposals for change. To date, six meetings have been held. 
Discussion topics have included extremism, the rights and responsibilities of women, 
education, youth and perceptions of foreigners.
563
 
Thus, the regime in Saudi has taken small steps toward reform, although it is 
generally agreed that those steps have not weakened its power. Nevertheless, the 
people have been encouraged because under the Saud family regime, they had never 
experienced any fundamental change regarding their rights since 1932. And, whilst 
the reforms were intended to implement little change and maintain, by and large, the 
status quo, the steps taken have tried to satisfy demands from within the country.
564
 
Therefore, whilst the reforms are considered minimal, they do show that Saudi 
Arabia is capable of change, which has brought hope to the population.  
One of the first steps taken in response to internal demands was the creation 
of the constitutional document, ‘Basic Law’ in 1992. However, most scholars agree 
that the most important step was the formation of the Consultative Council (The Al-
Shura Council), which was established as a debating assembly consisting of sixty 
members, albeit they were appointed by the King. The Council was empowered to 
study all government regulations and international treaties before they became royal 
assent. The Council could also question cabinet members. It could not, however, 
initiate debates, without first obtaining permission from the King, who at the same 
time held the power to dissolve or reorganise the Council at any time.
565
  
Members of the Al-Shura Council were chosen from the country’s most 
important groups of constituents, both conservative and liberal, including religious 
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bodies, government, law and business. Most could be described as experts in their 
field. Establishing the Council was seen as significant, which explains its growth 
from sixty to ninety members in 1997, to one-hundred and twenty in May 2001 and 
to one-hundred and fifty in April 2005. Its influence, whilst not necessarily grounded 
in law, has been a function of its members’ prominence and diversity. It also reflects 
the tradition of governance in Saudi Arabia, which concerns itself with avoiding 
conflict by maintaining harmony through consultation and consensus.
566
 The Council 
is rarely divided over issues. Although the Al-Shura Council has been applauded by 
Saudi citizens, it has not satisfied those who demand more democratic reform. This is 
because the views of the Council can be seen as recommendations only. The King 
and the Government are not bound to implement them. That said, ministers normally 
accept the recommendations or agree a compromise action with the Council.
567
 With 
the on-going threat of extremism, intense debate has continued, with the conclusion 
that the closed nature of the Saudi political system, largely imposed by the need to 
appease the religious establishment, is the main cause.
568
 
Of note in the process of change is a petition called A Vision for the Present 
and the Future of the Nation, which was signed by one-hundred and four academics 
in 2003 and supported by businessmen, religious scholars and professionals from 
various regions who represented different religious and political orientations. Among 
the various issues raised in the petition were calls to provide the Consultative 
Council with legislative and control powers; to make it an elected body; for an 
independent judiciary; to allow freedom of expression and; the establishment of civil 
society institutions. 
569
 
Most petitions, including the aforementioned, are very respectful in tone and 
content. For example, a recent publication to the King from Dr. Khalid Al-Nowaiser, 
openly praises the King for what he has done so far. He argues, however, that recent 
events are making the need for further reforms particularly urgent. Al-Nowaiser calls 
for reform of the Al-Shura Council.  While he describes the formation of the Council 
as being a step forward, under the current structure and role, it is not up to the huge 
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challenges faced by the country. He advocates the need for an effective Council to 
take part in decision making. Such a Council, if composed properly, would not be a 
threat to the regime, but would help to address the heavy responsibilities faced by the 
State, which no government can be expected to cope with without support. 
570
  
Al-Nowaiser also talks of the need for a social contract in Saudi Arabia, 
where rights and obligations of the government and citizens are clearly identified. He 
does not believe this can happen without a formalised constitution. Additionally, he 
says, the constitution should be derived from the Quran.
571
 
Since 2003, several petitions have asked for more limits to the power of the 
ruling family, along with more participation by citizens in decision-making. A 
response to the petitions was the development of the National Dialogue sessions. The 
issue of elections came up in the second debate of December, 2003. The results of 
the dialogue were presented to the Crown Prince, now King Abdullah, and the 
recommendations included holding elections for the State Consultative Council and 
local consultative Councils; encouragement for the establishment of trade unions, 
voluntary associations and other civil society institutions; and the separation of 
legislative and executive branches.
572
  
Although the rest of the world may see recent activities in Saudi Arabia 
related to democratic reform as painfully slow and inadequate, Abd al-Aziz al-Qasim 
argues,  
It is hard to overestimate the importance of this step in a 
society where non-interference in politics is considered the 
condition of good citizenship. [The local] elections in themselves 
may not have much substance, but the decision to hold them 
breaks a barrier and establishes the principle that society can 
participate in making policy. 
573
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Change is taking place, albeit slowly, but the pace and nature of that change 
requires careful consideration of the various stakeholders. If pushed too far, for 
example, religious conservative groups could easily destabilise the country.  
This alone, is one of the reasons modern Muslim scholars encourage democratic 
reform based on Islamic principles, identifying Shura and Ijma as the foundation for 
Islamic democracy.
574
 Ijma is consensus regarding a question of law. Add consensus 
to Shura – mutual consultation and decision-making between ruler and ruled – and 
the basis can be seen for a powerful foundation for the creation of a deliberative 
democracy within the Islamic nation. In order to develop joint deliberation on issues, 
Shura also requires a specific dilemma to be addressed by collating and sharing 
different points of view to reach resolution. This process is regarded as a source of 
democratic ethics in Islam and for some it is seen as another way of describing 
democracy in Islam: a foundation for democratic government. 
575
 Obviously, the 
Arabian Gulf countries had a long way to go to meet the conditions of good 
governance. 
5.5 The Arab Spring 
Before the events in 2011 that became known as the “Arab Spring,” many 
Western political analysts had been swayed by Samuel Huntington’s declaration that 
Muslims would never embrace democracy. Samuel Huntington wrote in his book 
Clash of Civilizations, that the “general failure of liberal democracy to take hold in 
Muslim societies is a continuing and repeated phenomenon [...] This failure has its 
source at least in part in the inhospitable nature of the Islamic culture and society to 
Western liberal concepts.”576  Huntington’s premise that Islam and democracy were 
incompatible was very convincing. If one made reference to the catalogue of 
repressive “Muslim” dictatorships in the Middle East, then history even, appeared to 
support his argument and proved to the West, that Huntington was right.  
Yet, the inevitable clash-of-civilizations premise appeared to unravel and be 
undermined by the upheaval caused by the Arab Spring. Millions of Muslims risked 
their lives to demand more democracy in their societies. The spirit of the Arab 
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uprisings are captured in the following quote from a new publication,  Encompassing 
Crescent, that was created in response to the popular call for change:  
If 2011 is demonstrative of anything, then it is that we the 
people demand accountability, transparency and a leadership that 
listens and is responsive to the calls of humanity. There are, 
however, some States that appear to hear these calls from below 
and those that transcend geographical boundaries.
577
  
 
Some important questions have arisen due to the major events of the Arab 
Spring. For one, what did the Arab Spring look like from the Arab world itself? 
Marwan Bashara, the senior political analyst with Al-Jazeera, discussed the Arab 
Spring by claiming that each Arab country and its people reacted according to its 
own circumstances and the nature of the regime and it relationship with citizens. 
While all the Arab countries do share a common history and culture, each nation had 
a different response specific to that society.  Bashara described the revolutionary 
wave as breathtaking, but also “too good to be true.”578 Revolutions for democracy 
would need to be able to make radical changes to be successful; this would entail 
ridding the old regime of its supporters and holding back its unbridled power.
579
 And 
after the initial revolution, a counter revolution would likely take place where the old 
forces compete. The revolutions do open the way for change and fill the people’s 
aspirations, but it takes time to develop democracy says Bashara. He also says we are 
not witnessing the new forms of a counter, counter-revolution. Bashara does remain 
optimistic, however. He says, “The promise of the Arab revolution was - and remains 
- a break with repressive authoritarian and totalitarian regimes to pave the way 
towards an era of freedom, dignity and prosperity.” 580 
                                                 
577
 Jerzy Buzek, ‘Introduction: A New Vision for a Changing World’ ( May 2011) 1 Encompassing 
Crescent  1. 
578
 Marwan Bishara, ‘Year Four: The Seasons Turn on the Arab Spring’ (17 December 2013) Al-
Jazeera 1   <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/12/year-four-seasons-turn-arab-spring-
2013121762345793639.html> 16 February 2015. 
579
 ibid.  
580
 ibid 1.  
  
138 
 
Another important question to ask in light of the Arab Spring is what would 
or should a Muslim democracy look like? This is a central question to the continuing 
debate over the compatibility of Islam with democracy. 
5.5.1 The Arab Spring and Saudi Arabia 
With waves of unrest flowing across the Middle East, the reality of the region 
has surely been changed, and Saudi rulers have not ignored potential threats to the 
Kingdom coming from dissatisfied, disaffected people.  But Saudi citizens will be 
more affected by internal conditions rather than influenced by radical protests in 
other countries. For example, the very high unemployment rate of young people in 
the Kingdom is seen as a bigger threat than any external political movement. 
Nevertheless, several steps were taken by the Saudi government to maintain a calm 
exterior. For example, in March, 2011, a day of demonstrations was planned called 
“A Day of Rage.” Learning of the upcoming protest, thousands of police were 
dispatched to the country’s Eastern region, where the demonstration was expected to 
take place.
581
  In addition, the government announced its plan to spend $35 billion to 
help the country’s middle income and low income families. It is this combination of 
resources distributed to the population, along with a ruling family that has been 
embedded in the region for centuries, which helps to maintain the government’s 
legitimacy: 
Given the size of oil revenues, they [Al-Saud family] 
have enormous economic means at their disposal to co-opt the 
population and to put in place economic development policies 
that can provide jobs for a young and restless population. Finally, 
large numbers of Saudis cannot imagine the country remaining 
unified without them in power and, moreover, have too much to 
lose if the regime is overthrown. 
582
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Still, the events of the Arab Spring were profound, leaving imprints along the 
way, including demands for reform in almost every corner of the Middle East; “The 
region has also seen unprecedented and growing freedom of expression and demands 
for greater public participation, where democratic discourse has gained a legitimacy 
that is hard to revoke.”583 Saudi has been able to quell radical calls for reform 
primarily because the contract between the Gulf rulers and their citizens retains its 
validity. This helps to maintain political stability, which is the desire of the 
population in general, and is essential for initiating positive and beneficial change.
584
 
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia’s subjects do desire substantive political reform. Calls for 
the creation of a constitutional monarchy, an end to corruption, and more political 
rights have been expressed for many years. Even though most Saudis respect King 
Abdullah and his leadership, a large number see the political system as rigid, 
unresponsive and corrupt, focused mainly on serving the interests of the ruling elite. 
There are plenty of diverse people who want to see change, but they do not want to 
see an end to the regime itself. What they want is more political accommodation, 
giving them more say in governance and more say over the wealth generated by oil. 
The fact that a popular uprising has not taken place in Saudi Arabia is not an 
indication of the lack of will from the population to do so, but rather, a sign of the 
level of control the central authorities hold over the public.
585
 
5.6 Conclusion 
In Saudi Arabia, the foundation of a true separation of power exists already 
through the principle of Shura as manifested in its Al-Shura Council.   The Al-Shura 
Council is highly revered in Saudi because it represents the most well-respected 
members of society coming together to consider whether contemporary law in Saudi 
follows Shar’ia. However, the Council does not follow the classical separation, 
where the fiqh scholars were independent from the ruler’s influence and sway. As 
long as the members of the Al-Shura are appointed by the King, there is no true role 
for non-governmental voices that articulate Shar’ia. In the past, the rulings of fiqh 
scholars were accepted so long as that scholar or scholars had built a worthy 
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reputation as someone wise in their interpretation of the sources of Shar’ia. So, their 
credibility came in part from public perception.  
To develop true credibility in the tradition of fiqh, public participation in the 
election of members to the Al-Shura Council based on the body of work developed 
by a person, is required. Saudi Arabia does not need to incorporate Western 
constitutionalism to achieve its own constitutionalisation. It needs only to adhere to 
its own classic tradition of the separation of fiqh and siyasah to create a more 
democratic national governance system. The Saudi State would not only create a 
more democratic system of governance, it would be a model for a viable Islamic 
constitutionalism, not as a re-creation of an old order but as a solution to 
contemporary challenges.  
The discourse on constitutionalism today only recognises law that comes 
from the State, but there are other sources. The separation of powers was a response 
to the State that tried to control the beliefs of its citizens. The Western solution was a 
separation of State and Church. The separation of law-making power into fiqh and 
siyasah was the Muslim solution. Both were astute and appropriate solutions, well 
matched to the nature of their citizens.
586
 Additionally, a government cannot achieve 
its goals if it lacks consensus and involvement of the people in support of its policies 
and decisions.
587
 It is unnecessary for the future of Muslim societies to break away 
from their heritage. It is quite feasible that Islamic nations can exist in a world of 
constitutionalism and offer equal freedoms and protections to its citizens: The 
concern that modernisation would lead to increasing westernisation and 
secularisation of Islamic society has been challenged by recent Muslim history. 
Social, economic and political development does not require secularisation of a 
society as a starting point. 
588
 In fact the most significant debates related to the 
Muslim world are not over the superiority of a secularised State as compared to an 
Islamic State in terms of democracy, rather they are about the constitutionalisation of 
existing States.
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Because of the strength of religion in the Muslim society, a government 
which would help to make the Shar’ia a real force in society would be best suited to 
contemporary Muslim nations.  Modern Muslims, like most people, seek a balance 
between continuity and change in their lives, and a more democratic system built on 
Islamic tradition would be a good choice to achieve the balance required. A key to 
any constitutionalism today is that it finds inspiration and a way to address diversity 
in order to find solutions while maintaining support from the people.  In my opinion, 
if Western leaders had a more clear understanding of the potential of Islam to 
promote democracy, they would have the ability to help Muslim nations reach 
constitutional goals of mutual interest to all citizens, Western and Muslim. However, 
the conventional Western interpretations, of religion, and in particular of Islam, leave 
little room for the recognition of the actual, complex development of such Islamic 
countries. Defining Islam and modernity as two more or less incompatible 
phenomena fails to recognise the potential of developing modern democratic Islamic 
societies with their cultural elements and particularities.
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Chapter Six: Contemporary Governance and Law in Saudi Arabia 
 
6.1 Introduction  
Saudi Arabia is governed by both Islamic and secular institutions that have 
undergone reform in the last 30 years. Although a relatively new country, Saudi 
Arabia is part of a region that is much influenced by its ancient history and traditions. 
So, even modern-day governance follows ancient traditions based on regional 
history. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia, in recent decades, has developed a legal and 
administrative system that is designed to meet the demands of modern affairs.  
6.1.1 Brief History of the Modern State 
The present-day Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was officially proclaimed by King 
Abdulaziz in 1931, following a process of unification by the Al Saud clan from the 
early 1900s.  However, whilst the history of the region extends for thousands of 
years, the existence of the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia only goes back some 
two hundred and sixty years, to 1744, when Muhammad bin Saud, founder of the 
first Saudi State, and Shaikh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, a well-respected 
religious authority, pledged to establish Islam and to apply the Islamic Shar’ia in this 
new entity. This principle was strongly reaffirmed in the Basic Law of Governance 
that was adopted in Saudi Arabia in 1992.
591
  
Saudi Arabia today, is made up of 13 provinces, each with a governor and 
deputy governor, who act as local authorities. Each province also has its own 
Council, which advises the governor and deals with the development of the province. 
Over the years, and since the modern Kingdom was created, the monarchy has 
worked hard to establish a modern Islamic State.   It has used a blend of pragmatism, 
and adherence to sacred values and beliefs, in order to maintain legitimacy in the 
hearts and minds of Saudi citizens.  
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6.2 Institutions of Authority in Contemporary Saudi Arabia 
Chapters 1, 2 and 6 of the Basic Law of Governance (1992) outline the 
structure of the Saudi State: Saudi Arabia is a monarchy based on Islam. The head of 
the government is the King, who is also the Commander-in-Chief of the armed 
forces.  The Crown Prince acts as an assistant to the King, and is second in line to the 
throne.  Governance occurs through the King and with the help of the Council of 
Ministers, also called the Cabinet. There are 22 government ministries in the Cabinet. 
Each ministry specialises in a different area of government, such as foreign affairs, 
education and finance.
592
 
The Council of Ministers, or Cabinet, is an official body presided over by the 
King (who is also the Prime Minister). It includes the Prime Minister and his 
Deputies, active ministers, ministers of State appointed by royal edict as Cabinet 
members, and consultants to the King who are appointed by royal command as 
members of the Cabinet. The law pertaining to the Cabinet does not specify the 
number of members of the Cabinet, which allows new ministries to be added as 
needed.
593
 
6.3 Executive Authority 
According to the system of law in Saudi Arabia, the King has ultimate 
authority over the executive branch.
594
  The King also implements the policies of the 
nation under the umbrella of Islam. In addition, the King is responsible for the 
implementation of Shar’ia, as well as Saudi Arabia’s laws, regulations and policies, 
along with the system of government and the general policies of the State.  If 
circumstances indicate a situation of emergency, the King is given extraordinary 
powers, allowing him to take whatever actions are necessary and implement them in 
order to deal with the crisis.
595
 Additionally, as head of the Council of Ministers, 
ministries and governmental agencies, the King directs general State policy, 
                                                 
592
 The Basic Law of Governance 1992 (n 542) Chapters 1, 2 & 6 accessed 15 August 2013.  
593
 Saleh Al-Saddan, ‘Stages of issuing law in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Office of the Al-Shura 
Council’ (2009) 15. 
594
 The Basic Law of Governance (n 542) Article 44. 
595
 ibid, Article 62. 
  
144 
 
administers advice and guidance and thereby strives to maintain harmony and unity 
within the Council of Ministers.
596
 
The Council of Ministers is the primary legislative authority in Saudi Arabia, 
and the Council of Ministers is led by the Council’s Prime Minister. As the Prime 
Minister of the Council is the King, there is no real separation of powers between the 
King and the Council, even though promises for more separation of powers have 
been made for the last few decades.
597
  
Article 56 of the Basic Law of Governance specifies: 
The King is the Prime Minister. Members of the Council of 
Ministers shall assist him in the performance of his mission 
according to the provisions of this Law and other laws. The 
Council of Ministers Law shall specify the powers of the Council 
in respect of internal and external affairs, organization of 
governmental departments and their coordination. In addition, the 
Law shall specify the qualifications and the powers of the 
ministers, ministerial accountability procedures and all matters 
pertaining to the ministers. The Law of the Council of Ministers 
and the areas of their authority may be amended according to this 
Law.
598
 
 
The King clearly has immense responsibilities, but he does share some of that 
authority with other agencies. According to Article 44 of the Basic Law of 
Governance, the Authorities of the State consist of the Judicial Authority, the 
Executive Authority and the Regulatory Authority; this Law dictates that these 
Authorities should cooperate with each other, in the performance of their duties. The 
King holds absolute power over these Authorities.
599
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The citizens of Saudi Arabia have accepted the powers assigned to their King 
as long as he rules under the umbrella of Shar’ia, as Article 45 of the Basic Law of 
Governance States: “… the King undertakes the legitimate policy of the nation in 
accordance with the rules of Islam.” He, therefore, oversees the application of 
Islamic law and the State’s laws, as well as the public policy of the State, and must 
also defend and protect the State.  Thus, there can be no doubt that the King’s most 
important responsibility is to oversee the application of the rules and obligations of 
Islamic law in order that the nation and its citizens will both achieve security and a 
state of wellbeing.
600
 
6.4 Legislative Authority 
Governance occurs through the regulatory (legislative) authority of the 
Council of Ministers and also the Shura Council. The King is the head and the 
reference of all regulatory and legislative authority. The Council of Ministers and the 
Shura Council provide the mechanisms for the issuing of laws. In developing law, 
there are two stages – proposal and discussion – which are of particular importance 
before a law is issued. As the head of the regulatory authority, the King has the task 
of endorsing all laws prior to their publication. Ultimately, if a proposed law is not 
ratified by the King, that law is rendered invalid.
601
 Legislative authority has the 
power to approve international treaties, agreements, regulations and concessions. In 
Islamic Shar’ia, only God can legislate; so the word "legislation", a secular term, is 
not used in the Saudi State.  The legislative authority is shared by the King, the 
Council of Ministers, and the Al-Shura Council, with the King as the ultimate 
authority.
602
 
Legislative/Regulatory authority is derived from Article 67 of the Basic Law 
of Governance, which states that the body known as the Regulatory Authority “… 
shall be concerned with the making of laws and regulations which will safeguard all 
interests, and remove evil from the State's affairs, according to Shar’ia.”  The powers 
that accrue to this body must be exercised according to the provisions of the Law of 
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Governance, and the Law of the Council of Ministers. This is undertaken through the 
legislative body called the Consultative Council (Majlis Al-Shura). In that regard, 
Article 67 of the Basic Law also states, “The regulatory authority lays down 
regulations and motions to meet the interests of the State or removes what is bad in 
its affairs, in accordance with the Islamic Shar’ia. This authority exercises its 
functions in accordance with this law and the laws pertaining to the Council of 
Ministers and the Consultative Council”.603 The Consultative (Shura) Council 
consists of 150 members (as amended from 60, to 90, then back to 150 members) 
who are appointed by the King for four-year terms, which can be renewed.  It 
proposes new laws and also reviews and/or amends existing ones.
604
  
6. 5 Statutory Law 
Besides the Islamic Shar’ia law, there are many statutory laws that have been 
passed in relation to criminal, administrative, and commercial areas in the affairs of 
the Kingdom. As the ruler of the Islamic State, the King has discretion over policies 
of public interest, al-Siyasah. All State regulations developed by the King are 
considered legal and legitimate as long as they are not contrary in any manner to 
Shar’ia. Siyasah is developed when there is no clear, definitive text in Islamic law 
that is related to a particular circumstance or issue.  
Saudi Arabia’s judicial system is based on Islamic law (Shar’ia). The King 
acts as the final Court of Appeal. Shar’ia courts are found throughout the Kingdom. 
Shar’ia is the main source of the judicial, as well as the general system of 
government.
605
 The foundations of Shar’ia are declared in Article 23 of the Law of 
Basic Rule: “The State shall protect and apply the Shar’ia of the Islamic faith 
[which] orders the doing of good and beneficial things and prohibits the doing of the 
forbidden; it will perform the duty of preaching for [belief in] God.”606 
Since the formation of the first Saudi State in the mid-18th century (which 
eventually developed into the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) Shar’ia has been 
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the foundation on which the country’s basic system of government is built. Shar’ia 
identifies the nature of the State and its goals and responsibilities, as well as the 
relationship between the government and its citizens.
607
 
The willingness of millions of Muslims to merge their faith and the State’s 
governance is an inherent part of Islam itself. As one commentator notes, when 
millions of Muslims begin their prayers, they ask to be guided in “the straight way – 
the way of those upon whom Thou has bestowed Thy blessings.”608 All Muslims 
pray to the Creator on behalf of all others who believe, and they ask God to show all 
Muslims the right way, both spiritually and in practical ways. Thus, “The realization 
that questions of society and politics are closely connected with spiritual problems 
and cannot, therefore, be dissociated from what we conceive of as ‘religion’ is as old 
as Islam itself.”609   
Correspondingly, when Muslim nations gained their independence from the 
power and influence of the colonialists, they needed to choose the most appropriate 
type of governance to ensure the best interests of their own people. Since Islam 
prescribes ethical, social and practical aspects of behaviour, most Muslim nations 
chose to create Islamic States, rather than to embrace Western ideals.
610
 Creating an 
Islamic State requires the application of the tenets of the religion to the life of the 
nation. Saudi Arabia exemplifies this choice. Nevertheless, because he recognised 
that his young country would have to adapt to changing times if it was to thrive and 
prosper into the future, King Abdulaziz built the foundations for a constitutional 
regime, and therefore, as recorded by the Saudi Arabian Embassy in 2006, he 
established “a modern government where once tribal rulers had reigned.”611 In 1953, 
King Saud established Saudi Arabia’s Council of Ministers and during the 1950s and 
1960s, 20 government ministries were created. Working with the King, the Council 
of Ministers then formed the executive and legislative branches of the government.  
The King also re-established the traditional Majlis – the holding of weekly 
meetings open to the general public so that concerns and issues can be raised and 
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brought to local, regional and national attention. These activities were meant to 
formalise the long-held Islamic traditions of popular consultation that had always 
been practised by Saudi rulers. The consultative nature of the governance can be seen 
in Article 8 of the Basic Law of Governance, which states, “The [system of] rule in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is based on fairness (justice consultancy), consultation, 
and quality, in conformity with the precepts of the Islamic Shar’ia.”612 Muslim 
leaders believed that an Islamic State would require much more than general 
principles concerning the need for a just State.  They believed a precise body of law 
would be necessary, one which would direct human life. This need was fulfilled by 
Islam through a divine law called Shar’ia. This law “has been provided in the 
ordinances of the Quran and supplemented (or, rather, detailed and exemplified) by 
the Prophet Muhammad in the body of teachings we describe as his Sunna, or way of 
life.”613 
Saudi Arabia remains one of the few countries in the world in which Shar’ia 
law continues to exert dominance over the legal system. The importance of Shar’ia 
for governance in Saudi Arabia can be seen in its position as the first general 
principle of the Basic Law of Governance as follows: 
Article 1. Basis of the State:  The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a 
sovereign Arab Islamic State.  Its religion is Islam and its 
constitution is the Book of Almighty God, the Holy Qur’an, and 
the Sunna (Traditions) of his Prophet... Its language is Arabic and 
its capital, is the city of Riyadh.
614
  
 
As a result, the Constitution of Saudi Arabia is regarded as a Sunna of the 
Prophet Mohammed, which means that it is considered a sacred normative directive 
which must be adhered to in the governing of society on the basis of the Prophet’s 
teachings.
615
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Thus Shar’ia, the general word for ‘law’ in Arabic, is a term that can be 
translated as “the path in which God wishes men to walk”. This, in essence, 
encapsulates the moral and practical injunctions of God’s commandments as 
embodied in the Quran and the Hadith (traditions of the Prophet), as well as other 
legal rules derived from sources that are complementary to the two principal sources. 
Furthermore, because it is all-encompassing, the Shar’ia is essentially the merging of 
religious and social duties, matters of ritual and devotion, and legal and moral 
obligations. And since Shar’ia is divinely inspired, it is therefore, “immutable by 
man.”616  
6.6 Sources of Islamic Law 
The four sources of Islamic law are the Quran, the Sunna, qiyas (analogy), 
and ijma‘(consensus).  
6. 6.1 Primary Sources  
The primary source is the Quran, the revealed word of God, which is much 
more than a code of law. Out of 600 verses in the Quran, there are only around 80 
verses that specifically address legal issues. Although, in general, most of its verses 
are ethical in nature, Hanson states that, “The ultimate sanction for the infringement 
of Quranic provisions is the blessing or wrath of God.” 617 The other primary sources 
of Islamic law are the Sunna and Hadith. These are the traditional laws that are based 
on the actual words and acts of the Prophet Mohammed. The Sunna and Hadith are 
very similar, but Sunna refers to the way the Prophet lived his life, and Hadith is the 
narrative/reports as told of his life.  
6.6.2 Secondary Sources of Law and the Evolution of a Dual System 
6.6.2.1 Fiqh Law 
Clearly, not all aspects of Islamic law could be specifically addressed in the 
Quran. Legal rulings that could be applied to individual cases were derived from the 
work done by the fuqaha (jurists) of the past, whose decisions were based on 
deductive reasoning using their own expert knowledge of the Quran, as well as the 
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use of qiyas (deduction through analogy). These fiqh (decisions) set legal precedents 
for future rulings,
618
 and the decisions became legal maxims. Fiqh was developed by 
the religious-legal scholars, ulama, who are independent of the State.  These are the 
laws of conscience which apply to religion, family, contracts, property, and tort, and 
they relate to individuals. In theory, fiqh has a rule for every type of human activity, 
but mostly this is true only at the level of much generalised norms. 
Legal maxims deriving from fiqh can be described as theoretical abstractions, 
usually in the form of short epithetical statements that, often in just a few words, are 
expressive of the goals and objectives of Shar’ia. These maxims consist mainly of 
statements about principles that are derived from detailed reading of the rules of fiqh 
on various themes. Generally, the fiqh have been developed by individual jurists in 
relation to particular themes and issues over the course of history, and in this sense 
they differ from the rules of modern statutory law, which are concise and devoid of 
detail. The detailed expositions of fiqh in turn enabled the jurists, at a later stage of 
development, to reduce them into abstract statements of principles.  In many ways, 
legal maxims represent the culmination of an expanding progress that could not have 
been expected to occur during the formative stages of the development of fiqh.  
The actual wording of the maxims is occasionally taken from the Quran or 
Hadith, but, more often they were the work of leading jurists, and have subsequently 
been refined by other writers throughout the ages: “It has often been a matter of 
currency and usage that the wording of certain maxims has been taken to greater 
refinement and perfection.”619 However, because many of these rulings were based 
on quite different circumstances from those to be found in modern situations, the 
modernists would like to see greater flexibility in the process of decision-making.  
Another secondary source of law is a judge’s ijtihad (i.e., deriving a rule as 
interpreted direct from divine law without relying on the views of other scholars).
620
  
In reaching decisions about cases that fall outside the stipulations provided by 
Shar’ia, Islamic jurisprudential tools are applied, such as qiyas (analogy) to the 
traditional sources.  
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In reviewing the facets of law in Saudi Arabia, it is useful to understand how 
fiqh became one part of a dual system. As the legal system evolved, two major sub-
systems emerged, each with its own form of authority. The first system that 
developed was fiqh. Saudi legal decisions derive from the body of work developed 
by fiqh. 
A judge in Saudi Arabia is not only guided by fiqh doctrine; he uses his own 
understanding of the texts from the Quran and Sunna. A judge is required to be a 
scholar of Islamic legal texts, so his judgment derives from these texts directly. 
 Saudi judges are expected to be guided by morality and a concern with the current 
moral state of the parties as with their previous acts or with legal outcomes. Judicial 
decisions arrived at by Saudi judges are considered valid and cannot be overruled. 
Saudi judges also apply ijtihad621 in reaching decisions about cases that fall outside 
the stipulations provided by Shar’ia. In such cases, they apply Islamic jurisprudential 
tools such as qiyas to the sacred sources. 
622
  
Hukm shar'i (legal rulings) often relied on dalil (proofs or an indication of 
evidence). Islamic jurists who could show four principal dalil based on sources of the 
Shar’ia, namely the Quran, Sunna, consensus and analogy, were considered 
definitive.
623
 When there is no direct dalil linked to the Quran or Sunna themselves, 
this is where ijma and qiyas are called upon-consensus and deductive analogy, 
among other things. 
624
 This type of ijtihad requires particular expertise utilising the 
full spectrum of religious sciences. The minimum requirement is that the mujtahid 
(early Islamic jurist) know all the proof texts that are relevant to solving the question 
before him, and that there is no unequivocal divine communication (khitab) 
governing the case.
625
  Fadel states that, “Valid ijtihad consists in following the best 
available evidence, whether that evidence is revelatory or empirical, as the context 
requires.”626 
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In relation to human behaviour and objectives of law, there are defining laws 
and declaratory laws. Defining (taklifi) laws are the laws that define or indicate the 
extent of man’s freedom of action and restraints imposed.  In other words they 
identify an individual’s rights and obligations to society.627 Islamic law, Shar’ia, in 
general, is defining and meant to address the principles that guide behaviour of the 
individual and his or her own behaviour toward himself or herself, family, 
neighbours community nation and Muslim polity, the ummah. Shar’ia also governs 
the interactions of groups and communities and their organisations. Indeed, “Shar’ia 
establishes the criteria by which all social actions are classified, categorised and 
administered within the overall governance of the State.”628 Declaratory (wad`i) laws 
are the laws that are interpretive in defining law. Through declaratory law, for 
example, laws of contracts, marriage and inheritance developed.
629
  
One of the most important challenges of developing Islamic law based on the 
Quran is the fact that it is not a legal text. Countless jurists have devoted their lives 
to identifying the verses in the Quran that advise on legal proceedings. Not everyone 
agrees upon, which verses are considered legal āyāt. M.H. Kamali in his text The 
Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (2005) identifies 350 legal āyāt in the Quran. 
Most of these were a response to social and legal issues of the time, such as 
infanticide, usury, gambling and unlimited polygamy. The Prophet created reforms to 
change practices that were considered unjust. Other verses presented the penalties to 
be issued if someone violated the reforms.  
The Quran is not considered a revolutionary document, but in general, 
confirmed existing customs and institutions of Arab society and only demanded 
change where it was thought to be necessary to overcome injustice.
630
 Approximately 
140 āyāt in the Quran are related to issues of faith. For example, there is salāh, legal 
alms (zakāh), siyām (fasting), the pilgrimage of hajj, jihad, charities and the taking of 
oaths and penances (kaffarat).
631
  Another 70 āyāt are related to marriage, divorce, 
and the waiting period of ‘iddah, revocation (raj’ah), dower, maintenance and 
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bequest. About the same number of āyāt cover rules related to civil and commercial 
transactions – sale, lease, loan and mortgage.  Approximately, 30 āyāt cover crimes, 
including murder, highway robbery, adultery and false accusation (qadhif). Another 
30 āyāt, address justice, equality, evidence, consultation, and the rights and 
obligations of citizens. Unsurprisingly, jurists do not agree on the number of āyāt.632  
The study of the Quran to create a system of law was so intense that a 
specific method or approach began to be applied. Usul-fiqh, the methodology of law 
or the science of the sources, developed as a scientific method to study āyāt: “Usul al 
Fiqh has been defined as the aggregate, considered per se, of legal proofs and 
evidence that, when studied properly, will lead either to certain knowledge of a 
Shar’ia ruling or to at least a reasonable assumption concerning the same; the 
manner by which such proofs are adduced, and the status of the adducer.”633 The 
Quran and Sunna do not provide a systematic approach, but rather provide 
indications from which Shar’ia can be deduced.634 Shar’ia is law that was declared 
during the lifetime of the Prophet and is found in the Quran and prophetic traditions. 
Fiqh is what has been gained from the efforts of scholars after the prophet's death.
635
 
Usul al-fiqh refers to methods used to derive law including analogy (qiyas), juristic 
preference (istihsan), presumption of continuity (istishab) and the rules of 
interpretation and deduction. These methods are meant to aid in the correct 
understanding of the sources and ijtihad.
636
 Usul al-fiqh is meant to help the jurists to 
obtain an adequate knowledge of the sources of Shar’ia and of the methods of 
juristic deduction and inference. Usul al-fiqh also regulates the application of qiyas, 
istihsan, istishab, istislah, etc., the knowledge helps the jurist to distinguish which 
specific method of deduction is the most appropriate tool to obtain the hukm shar'i 
(legal ruling) of a particular problem.
637
 Hukm shar’i is further divided into 
prescriptive or descriptive rulings. 
638
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Complicating matters even further is the fact that the Quran emerged over a 
23-year time period. During that time, there were changes made, and naskh occurred. 
Naskh, or the abrogation of a ruling, did take place when the Prophet recognised a 
need to change a ruling because the community changed. There is debate about the 
number of naskh among Islamic jurists: “The ‘ulami’ are unanimous on the 
occurrence of naskh in the Sunna. It is however, with regard to the occurrence of 
naskh in the Quran on which there is some disagreement, both in principle and on 
the number of instances in which naskh is said to have occurred.”639 They go on to 
say that it is this type of controversy and conflicting opinions that caused the 
importance of ijtihad to increase.  
6.6.2.2 Siyasa  
Another Islamic principle meant to hold rulers accountable for their actions is 
siyasa: the laws of rule and governance in an Islamic society. Specifically, siyasa is 
Muslim law as expressed in regulatory decisions or policy of government.
640
 The 
siyasa does not relate to individuals, but originates from the heads of State and is 
applied to the nation and all citizens, or more specifically to the rules of the public 
sphere.  Under siyasa, “a ruler is free to take any legal action as long as it meets two 
conditions: first, it serves the public good – the general or public interest (maslaha 
‘amma); and second, it does not in any way offend any fundamental principle or rule 
of the Shar’ia.641 
Jurist, Abu Hamid Muhammed Al-ghazali defined maslaha in the 5
th
/11
th
 
century and his interpretation has been maintained in Islamic law. Al-ghazali 
declared that a law or policy is legitimate and correct if it promotes benefits of good 
for all people or prevents harm to people (maslaha). The notion of maslaha, along 
with legal reasoning of the jurists was “aimed at curbing the unchecked use of human 
reasoning in the area of religious law and at making the law-finding process less 
arbitrary and more objective.”642 
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Some scholars argue that Islamic legal prescriptions were intentionally kept 
vague so that laws would not become too rigid in the face of changing times. To 
support this view they quote the Quran (v. 5:48): “To every one of you, We have 
appointed a right way and an open road. If God had willed, He would have made you 
one nation; but that He may try you in what has come to you.”643 Thus, according to 
this view, the divine lawgiver purposely left legal decisions in a state of open-
endedness, so that the eventualities that arise in life and that were not dealt with 
directly by the Quran or Sunna could still be addressed; “… the real Shar’iah is 
extremely concise and, therefore, easily understandable; and because it is so small in 
volume, it cannot – nor [...] was it ever intended to – provide detailed legislation for 
every contingency of life”.644 Instead the Prophet intended that additional laws and 
regulations would be determined through reasoning and would be based on 
circumstances, as long as they followed the spirit of Islam.
645
  
Even so, many who want legal reform in Saudi Arabia see the practice of 
Shar’ia as a challenge to modernisation.646 For example, although there have been 
proposals to codify Shar’ia law, rather than leaving decision-making to the discretion 
of individual Shar’ia judges, there has been considerable resistance to the idea of 
reforming the legal system. This is not altogether surprising – after all, how, in 
practice, can a divinely-inspired body of law be improved upon?
647
 In addition, the 
importance of tradition cannot be underestimated in Saudi society. For example, one 
of five of the most important legal maxims developed over time is, “custom is the 
basis of judgment.”648 This Saudi dilemma provides “a keen opportunity to examine 
the tensions that arise when law and governance become complicated by reference to 
religion, history, and competing paradigms of legitimacy and authority in governance 
and the rule of law.”649 
6. 7 Dual Judiciary 
Currently the Saudi Arabian judiciary is a dual system made up of: 
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6.7.1 Shar’ia Courts 
On 1 October 2007, King Abdullah issued a Royal Decree for the purpose of 
reorganising the Judicial System under a new Law of the Judiciary. The change 
established a High Court, which took over the role of the Supreme Judiciary Council 
as the highest judicial authority in the Kingdom. New Courts of Appeal are to be 
established in the various regions in the Kingdom. In addition, First-Degree Courts 
are to be established in different regions according to the needs of the system, and 
their authority comes from specialised Criminal, Commercial, Labour, Personal 
Status, and General Courts. Some of these courts would also mediate disputes that 
had previously been addressed by special administrative committees.
650
  
The Royal Decree of 2007 will establish a new High Court (Supreme 
Court).
651
 The courts of appeal that exist now will be replaced with new courts of 
appeal in the various provinces, and they will address labour, criminal, commercial 
and other specialised areas of the law. As a part of the judiciary reorganisation, a new 
Board of Grievances Law has been created, which has also yet to be put into effect. 
The new Board of Grievances will have a narrower jurisdiction to determine matters 
involving the government.  
Thus, whilst under the new Judiciary Law of 2007, the Supreme Judiciary 
Council will no longer function as the highest court, it will continue to oversee 
administrative aspects of the judiciary.
652
 There will now be a Supreme Judicial 
Board/Council made up of a president and ten members: the Chief of the High Court, 
four full-time members of the rank of Chief of the Appellate Court appointed by the 
King, the Deputy Minister of Justice, the Chief of the Bureau of Investigation and 
Prosecution. Three of the members will possess the qualifications required by the 
Appellate Judge, appointed by the King. All Supreme Judicial Council members will 
hold tenure for four years, which is renewable. 
In accordance with article 5 of the Statutes of the Judiciary, the Shar’ia 
courts consist of: 
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 (a) The Supreme Judicial Board; 
 (b) The Court of Cassation; 
 (c) The general courts; 
 (d) The courts of summary justice. 
 
The new structure of the Shar’ia courts is set out, overleaf in Figure 3:653  
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Fig 3 Structure of Shar’ia Courts 
 
 
   
  
 
   
     
           
                                                                                                                                   
 
No matter what their place in the hierarchy or their purpose might be, it is important 
to remember, that all courts in Saudi Arabia fall under Shar’ia law, and the two main 
sources upon which it relies are the Quran and Sunna.
654
  
6.7.2 Board of Grievances  
The Board of Grievances (Diwan Al-Mazalem) is an independent judiciary. In 
addition to the previous judicial bodies, there are several Administrative Committees 
that have jurisdiction to hear certain specified cases. The new Board of Grievances 
will be structured in the following way: (See Figure 4, overleaf) 
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Fig 4: Board of Grievances 
656
  
 
 
 
   
  
 
   
     
           
                                                                                                                                  
Article Three of the Law of the Board of Grievance identifies that its 
President will be appointed by the King, and that he is directly responsible to the 
King. The President can only be terminated by Royal Order. The Vice Presidents are 
also appointed by the King.
657
  
6. 7.3 The Independence of the Judiciary 
According to Part One of the Law of the Judiciary (1975), the judges of the 
various courts are guaranteed their independence: 
Article 1: Judges are independent and, in the administration of 
justice, they shall be subject to no authority other than the 
provisions of Shar’iah and laws in force. No one may interfere 
with the Judiciary. 
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In addition, judges cannot be arbitrarily removed from office, nor can 
they be transferred to another position except by consent.
658
 
The independence of the judiciary is considered central to Islamic 
governance; “An independent judiciary is absolutely essential for the administration 
of justice and government under the rule of law. Historical practice in this area is 
inconsistent and, on the whole, uninspiring in that often in Islamic history the 
atmosphere was not congenial for the judges to work fully independently.”659 Birgit 
Krawietz elaborates that there is no one body of Islamic law. During its history, 
Islamic law has been laid down in monographs based on specifics, which do not 
strictly distinguish between the various areas of the law. There are literally thousands 
of variations and versions of legal writings produced by individual scholars, but not 
only have they not been collected in a comprehensive canon, no hierarchy of 
authorities has been formed, at least not in Sunni Islam. Specific versions were only 
developed to be applied under the influence of Europeans, when Islamic law began 
to be partly codified.
660
  
6.8 Jurisdiction 
According to the Statutes and the Basic Law of Governance, Shar’ia Courts 
have general jurisdiction to decide all civil and criminal disputes. They usually 
decide only cases and controversies that are related to personal status or family 
affairs, civil disputes, and some criminal cases. The reason why the Shar’ia Courts 
do not hear all legal matters is based on historical factors. For instance, when King 
Abdulaziz exerted his influence over Western Saudi Arabia, the region had been 
using Ottoman-oriented laws and the King did not wish to change that. However, the 
ulama viewed the Ottoman laws as man-made and they were duly rejected by the 
Shar’ia courts. The attitude of the ulama and of the Shar’ia courts towards enacted 
laws and regulations prevented the Shar’ia courts from deciding many important 
disputes.  
The ulama were also strongly opposed to the idea of codifying the rules of 
Shar’ia and insisted that Islamic Shar’ia had to be applied according to what was 
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stated in the Quran and the Sunna through the explanations in the books of 
jurisprudence, especially those from the medieval period. Meanwhile, however, they 
rejected government imposed laws and regulations.
661
 It has been observed that such 
resistance to changing the legal system is part of the strong influence of the 
traditionalist movement in Saudi Arabia’s history, and that, because it secures 
religious principles, the movement’s credibility in Saudi society is very high. This 
traditionalist movement is mainly represented by the ulama in Shar’ia universities 
by: Shar’ia Court judges; the Board of the Senior Ulama which gives fatwas in all 
daily affairs, including worship and legal transactions; the Higher Council of Justice; 
and finally by independent ulama who are not within the structure of the 
government.
662
  
The books of jurisprudence that were written by ulama scholars are held in 
high regard, just as the scholarly ulamas themselves are highly esteemed. 
Traditionalists would rather rely on the wisdom encapsulated in the views of these 
highly regarded ulama scholars than risk change. Codifying Shar’ia would cause a 
gap in the ability of jurists to rely on the true source of legal power, i.e., the Quran 
and the Sunna, and it was felt that codifying the rules of Shar’ia would deter judges 
from turning to its main sources; indeed “God says in the Holy Qur’an: ‘O ye who 
believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged with authority 
among you. If you differ in anything among yourselves, refer it to Allah and his 
Messenger if you do believe in Allah.”663 
Article 8 of the Law of the Board of Grievances outlines the jurisdiction of 
that body: 
One: The Board of Grievances shall have jurisdiction to decide the 
following: 
Cases related to –  
 the rights provided for in the Civil Service and Pension 
Laws for government employees and hired hands; 
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 Cases of objection filed by parties concerned against 
administrative decisions; 
 Cases of compensation filed by parties concerned against 
the government and independent public corporate entities 
resulting from their actions. 
 Cases filed by parties concerned regarding contract-related 
disputes where the government or an independent public 
corporate entity is a party thereto; 
 Disciplinary cases filed by the Bureau of Control and 
Investigation; 
 Penal cases filed against suspects who have committed 
crimes of forgery as provided for by law;  
 Cases within the jurisdiction of the Board in accordance 
with special legal provisions; 
 Requests of foreign courts to carry out precautionary 
seizure on properties or funds inside the Kingdom. 
Two: With consideration to the rules of jurisdiction set forth by law, the 
Council of Ministers may, at its discretion, refer any matters and cases to the 
Board of Grievances for hearing.
664
 
Article 9 of the Law of the Board of Grievances also declares: 
The Board of Grievances may not hear requests related to 
sovereign actions, nor objections filed by individuals 
against judgments or decisions issued by courts or legal 
panels which fall within their jurisdiction.
665
 
 
It should be noted that Saudi Arabia is not just influenced by traditionalism; 
there is also a modernist movement. There is always tension between the two. 
Interestingly, members of the Shura Council are often influenced by the modernist 
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movement. The modernisation movement is promoted mainly by members of the 
educated elite, technocrats, and such legal professionals as lawyers and law 
professors; most of these intellectuals have studied in the West and their ideas and 
approaches to the development of their country, including its legal system have been 
influenced by Western countries. The Council of Ministers and more recently the 
Shura Council (Consultative Council) are the main governmental institutions that 
have been making an effort to modernise.
666
 
The modernists would prefer the codification of Shari‘a law since they 
consider that there is too much inconsistency in the way Shari‘a  is applied in various 
cases. They point out discrepancies, especially with Tazir crimes which are minor 
crimes that are not mentioned in the Quran.
667
 The tension between the modernists 
who would like to see legal reform and the traditionalists, accurately reflects the 
same kind of tensions that are seen in Saudi society in general. In order for stability 
to be maintained some scholars argue for a more harmonious balance between these 
two powerful influences and the demands of both:  the traditional adherence to 
religious principles and the call for growth to ensure survival in a complex 
commercial world.
668
 It is felt that taking other legal systems as examples on which 
to model Saudi Arabia’s legal system should not be the starting point. Instead, the 
country should rely first on the resources of existing law and secondly, on the 
jurisprudential heritage of the Saudi legal system in order to create equilibrium 
between new developments that exist in the world and its own Islamic heritage. 
Making use of approaches from other legal systems may lead to conflict between the 
rules of Shar’ia and those which have been ‘imported.’ If the resources of the 
Shar’ia do not have provision for governing certain issues, it would be better to turn 
to the jurisprudential heritage before resorting to other legal systems to seek ways of 
developing the Saudi legal system.
669
 
6.9 Case Law  
Shar’ia law does not acknowledge case law because the foundation and 
interpretation of the law are the rulings made by the scholar-jurists, the fuqaha. 
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Through their works to interpret law, Shar’ia law is provided. Case law, then, is not 
required to be used as precedent. The fuqaha develop the authoritative works and 
judges use them to apply the law to specific cases. The authority to make decisions 
derives from recognised texts not previous rulings.  As a result, it is scholars and not 
judges who frame the law.
670
 A characteristic of a Shar’ia legal system, 
subsequently, is inconsistency in legal rulings, especially because of the variety of 
schools of law upon which legal decisions are made by individual judges. A trend 
has been recognised, however, where some consistency has developed. When an 
individual judge makes a ruling that is considered preferable, it becomes a dominant 
rule in its related school of law, and other rulings will follow suit. Examination of 
legal literature reveals this consolidating trend.
671
 
6. 10 State Authority and Hierarchy of Powers 
A legislative hierarchy exists in Saudi Arabia. Most sovereign is the 
Constitution, which is considered a manifestation of the Quran and Sunna; next is 
the Basic Law of Governance, the Law of the Allegiance Commission, the Law of 
the Council of Ministers, the Law of the Shura Council, and the Law of Provinces. 
The next in line are the regular laws, followed by the regulations. A lower court or 
law can never override higher laws.
672
 
In Saudi Arabia, the Basic Law of Governance sets forth the elements of 
regulatory authority. It has the jurisdiction to create laws and regulations. One of the 
Law’s primary purposes is to eliminate corruption in the affairs of the State, in 
accordance with the rules of Islamic law. This regulatory authority is vested in the 
two bodies – the Council of Ministers and the Shura Council.  Nevertheless, the King 
is the head of the State and the reference to all the powers within it, in accordance 
with Article 44 of the Basic Law, which reads: “The State’s authorities consist of: the 
judicial authorities, the executive authorities and the regulatory authority. These 
authorities cooperate in the performance of its functions, according to this law and 
other laws, and the king is a reference to these authorities.”673 Ultimately the King is 
the head of the regulatory (legislative) authority, and makes the final decision in the 
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event of disagreement between the Council of Ministers and the Shura Council.   As 
set forth in the Basic Law of Governance, “The King is the ultimate arbiter for these 
Authorities.”674 
6. 11 Human Rights and International Law in Saudi Arabia 
In 1992, for the first time in the history of Saudi Arabia, the Government 
acknowledged human rights as a legal issue.
675
 The new Basic Law of civil and 
political rights addressed human rights in its Article 26, which reads briefly: “The 
State shall protect human rights in accordance with the Shar’ia.” The article does not 
specify what those human rights are. However, later in the text of the Basic Law it 
does state that it will guarantee the rights of citizens and their families in the case of 
emergency, illness, disability and old age, but does not elaborate.  
Article 28 promises the Government will facilitate job opportunities for 
everyone, and create laws to protect employees from employer abuse. Article 30 
promises public education for every citizen, and article 31 guarantees universal 
health care for all Saudi citizens. Article 39 protects the right to privacy as provided 
for by law.
676
 One clarification made very clear in the Basic Law, related to the 
international human rights standard. This requires that when an international human 
rights treaty has been ratified through royal decree, the implementation of the Basic 
Law must conform to those treaties. Perhaps this is why there has been hesitation on 
the part of the Saudi Government to ratify all human rights treaties, especially those 
seen as contrary to Shar’ia law.  
Besides protection of human rights appearing in the Basic Law, the Law of 
Criminal Procedures, based on Shar’ia law does contain several provisions to ensure 
citizens are protected from human rights violations. For example, Articles 2 declares 
that –  
No person shall be arrested, searched, detained, or imprisoned 
except in cases specified by the law. Detention or imprisonment 
shall be carried out only in the places designated for such 
purposes and shall be for the period prescribed by the competent 
authority. A person under arrest shall not be subjected to any 
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bodily or moral harm. Similarly, he shall not be subjected to any 
torture or degrading treatment.
677
 
 
Besides language to guarantee rights of the accused, the new court procedures 
introduced another safeguard to ensure people’s rights are protected. The new law 
established one or more Courts of Appeals in each of Saudi Arabia’s provinces. Each 
court will function through specialised circuits comprised of three-judge panels, 
except for the Criminal Circuit, which reviews judgments involving certain major 
crimes, including those which bear the death sentence. It will include five judge 
panels. Courts of Appeals have the following circuits: Labour Circuits, Commercial 
Circuits, Criminal Circuits, Personal Status Circuits, and Civil Circuits. It will also 
be possible to establish specialised Appeals Circuits in the counties of each province 
where a Court of Appeals is established. Each circuit will be composed of a president 
appointed by the Chief of the Appellate Court and judges holding the rank of 
Appellate Judge. The Courts of Appeals will hear and rule upon decisions from 
lower courts. After hearing the litigants' arguments in accordance with the Law of 
Procedure before Shar’ia Courts and the Law of Criminal Procedure, the judges will 
present their verdict.
678
  
The Book, Empty Reforms: Saudi Arabia’s New Basic Laws (May, 1992) 
criticises Article 26 because the Shar’ia is not codified. So, its interpretation is left to 
the government appointed Council of Senior Scholars, which is a reference to the Al-
Shura Council. However, the Human Rights Watch Organisation does not see it as a 
separate decision-making authority set apart from the King. The authors of this book, 
published by Human Rights Watch, argue that the Council, for the most part, defers 
to the King’s interpretation of the Shar’ia, including those that relate to human 
rights.
679
 The authors from the Human Rights Watch claim that the small attention 
given to protect human rights under the new Basic Law is even more alarming 
because Saudi Arabia has been unwilling to sign most international human rights 
agreements (See Appendix I).  
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Saudi Arabia is one of the few countries that did not vote for the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights presented by the United Nations General Assembly. 
Saudi’s reasoning is that some of the language of the Declaration violated precepts of 
Islam, such as the call for freedom of religion. Saudi officials claimed also that 
human rights protections under Islamic law are superior to the Declaration. These are 
the two primary reasons given for Saudi’s refusal to sign later human rights 
documents, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The 
New Basic Law of 1992 was an important step in codifying Saudi’s legal system, 
but, according to Human Rights Watch “they fall short of internationally recognized 
standards in their treatment of civil and political rights.” Nevertheless, the United 
States and other countries have applauded King Fahd ibn Abdel-Aziz for the new 
laws as “important steps toward participatory government and recognition of 
citizens’ rights.”680  
6. 11.1 Reservations on International Human Rights: The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties 
The recognition and acceptance of international human rights law is difficult 
in Saudi Arabia. When recognition or acceptance does occur, it is often limited by 
reservations and understandings to the treaty provisions. In six out of nine 
international human rights treaties, Saudi Arabia has reservations in six of them, and 
all refer to Islamic law.
681
 
Saudi Arabia has used the option to qualify the ratification by publishing 
reservations regarding those treaties. Under international law, as specified in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), individual States can post 
reservations on specific parts of a treaty based on the State’s concern that the treaty 
may be in conflict with State-held policies or values. For example, Saudi Arabia 
posted the following reservations in relation to The Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979), which Saudi Arabia ratified in 
2000: 
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1. In case of contradiction between any term of the Convention and the norms 
of Islamic law, the Kingdom is not under obligation to observe the 
contradictory terms of the Convention. 
2. The Kingdom does not consider itself bound by paragraph 2 of article 9 of 
the Convention and paragraph 1 of article 29 of the Convention.
682
 
 
Saudi Arabia did not want to be bound by such terms as found in Article 9 
because it requires that the State grant women equal rights with men to acquire, 
change or retain their nationality, in the event of marriage to a non-native Saudi. 
They also do not want to be bound by the requirement that women be granted equal 
rights with men with respect to the nationality of their children.
683
 
Saudi Arabia also posted a reservation when it ratified the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1996.  It published the following general 
reservation, “[The Government of Saudi Arabia enters] reservations with respect to 
all such articles as are in conflict with the provisions of Islamic law.”684 The main 
concern with this reservation is that, although Saudi Arabia, assures the Committee 
of Review on this Convention that it guarantees all of the rights of children under its 
Shar’ia law, there are two problems with children’s rights issues in Saudi Arabia. 
First, the country has been known to execute people under the age of 18 years, which 
is a violation of the Convention, and second, there is discrimination against non-
marital children.  
Some may argue that a nation who ratifies a treaty is obligated to follow all of 
the requirements of the treaty. According to the Vienna Convention of the Law of 
Treaties (1969), however, a country who files a reservation to a treaty before 
ratifying it is exempt in accordance with its reservations. The United Nations defines 
a reservation as a unilateral statement made by a State or an international 
organisation when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty.  
The system of reservations was designed to ensure all nations would be more 
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encouraged to participate in international treaties because of the flexibility a 
reservation can exert, “especially if a requirement in a treaty seems contrary to a 
nation’s system of beliefs.”685 The system of reservations allows States to implement 
a treaty in a way that is consistent with their domestic laws. The reservation, 
therefore, subordinates the treaty law to domestic law. Article 20 of the Vienna 
Convention outlines how reservations function.  
For example, (1) A reservation expressly authorized by a 
treaty does not require any subsequent acceptance by the other 
contracting States unless the treaty so provides. If a treaty appears 
to require that all participants apply all aspects of a treaty in its 
entirety, then in that case, all parties are required to accept the 
reservations made by an individual State.  Also, if a treaty is a 
constituent instrument of an international organization, and unless 
it otherwise provides, a reservation requires the acceptance of  that 
organization.
686
 
 
Saudi Arabia has declared reservations related to the four following 
Conventions: The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (1997), The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (2000), The Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1997), and (4) The 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1996).   As long as the other nations accept 
the reservations, then the State declaring the reservations can defer to their particular 
requirements. However, other States do not always accept a reservation. For 
example, when the United Arab Emirates published reservations to the Convention to 
Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Austria objected to those 
reservations saying that the specific reservations made by the UAE would inevitably 
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result in women being targets of discrimination which violates the purpose of the 
Convention.
687
  
Once a reservation has been submitted, countries who object to its substance 
have 12 months to publish an objection.
688
 There are certain conditions under which 
reservation making is not allowed, including: (a) If the reservation process has been 
prohibited by the treaty; (b) The treaty provides that only specified reservations, 
which do not include the reservation in question, may be made; or when the 
reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.
689
 
In the case of Saudi Arabia, the Government defers to Shar’ia law if there is 
ever a question related to the laws of the treaty and how they should be implemented. 
Saudi Arabia is using the same principles in Sweden as its response to ratifying an 
international treaty: “… it adheres to the principle that international treaties do not 
automatically, on ratification, become part of Swedish law. To become directly 
applicable, international treaties must either be transformed or incorporated into 
Swedish law.”690 The Vienna Convention does stress, however, that a State which  
has ratified a treaty should take steps to ensure its domestic law is compatible with 
treaty law. The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
explains that a State does not have to make a Covenant directly applicable to its legal 
system; however, the Committee emphasises that the State takes steps to achieve the 
rights through adopting legislation to make it so. However, merely because the 
Covenant is not incorporated does not mean a person cannot invoke the content of 
the Covenant in a particular case, and it does not prevent anyone from raising the 
question whether a law or a provision in law is in conformity with the Covenant.
691
 
Saudis view Islamic texts as binding. This should be borne in mind when 
considering Saudi Arabia and international law, because it is important to note that, 
international conventions are not. Nevertheless, it is not surprising that the Saudi 
Government still feels external pressures on what critics sees as its ongoing 
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violations of civil rights. For example, although Saudi Arabia declared that its 
Shar’ia law takes precedence over the rights of women as outlined in the Convention 
on The Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979), one critic 
argued that the reservation should be viewed as a political one and not as a religious 
one. Even though most Muslims view Shar’ia law as timeless and immutable, in 
reality, there is little consistency in the law, and in fact, it has changed over time: 
“Evolving political contingencies, not Islamic beliefs, turn out to be the 
determinative factors.”692  
Those supporting Saudi Arabia’s reservations related to the Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women argue that there are 
differences in Western and Islamic underlying assumptions about what it means to be 
human. For example, Islamic jurists emphasise “honour” (‘ird) and affiliation with a 
patrilineage (nasab) as aspects of the basic needs of all human beings.
693
 Reformist 
jurists in the early 20
th
 century worked to protect these needs in the form of huquq 
(rights). Huquq has led to rulings banning extra-marital sex and the like. The 
difference in ideas between the West and Islam about what it means to be human has 
therefore, led to a different emphasis on which human rights are considered 
fundamental to promote and protect. 
694
  
For several decades, legal scholars have debated the notion that human rights 
are universal and applicable to all cultures. The debate has continued even more so in 
relation to international law and human rights. Universalism suggests that human 
rights apply to all humans, with cultural differences being irrelevant, while relativism 
argues that human rights are culturally dependent. Consequently, it would be 
inappropriate to assume all moral principles apply to all cultures.  Some would argue 
then, that such human rights principles as those seen in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights of 1948 are distinctly Western. The origins of the Declaration can 
easily be identified as having come from political landmarks like the Magna Carta of 
the United Kingdom (1215), the French Revolution (1789) and the American Bill of 
Rights (1791). As a consequence, such Western ideals are a form of cultural 
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imperialism.
695
 Cultural relativism developed from evolutionism, which held that 
human societies evolved from primitive/savage  to modern. Unsurprisingly, Western 
civilisation ranked highest on the scale because standards are based on Western 
values: “Cultural relativism was introduced in part to combat these racist, 
Eurocentric notions of progress.”696 
Likewise, Muslim scholars have criticised the hegemonic assumptions about 
the universality of human rights in general. Western ideas about human nature are 
assumed to form the basis of a universality of human rights. This position is a barrier 
to understanding how human rights are perceived in Muslim and other non-Western 
societies.
697
  
The most recent attention given to human rights in relation to actions taken 
by the Saudi Government is its treatment of journalists and activists who are calling 
for human rights reforms. According to a report from Human Rights Watch (August 
11, 2014), Saudi Arabia had increased the number of arrests, trials, and convictions 
of dissidents who had acted peacefully. It has also used force to disperse peaceful 
demonstrations by citizens. Authorities continued to violate the rights of Saudi 
women and girls and foreign workers. In addition, authorities subjected thousands of 
people to unfair trials and arbitrary detention. Courts convicted human rights 
defenders and others for peaceful expression or assembly demanding political and 
human rights reforms.
698
  
This statement was more than likely prompted by the arrest of Waleed Abu 
Al-Khair, a human rights lawyer, who founded the Monitor of Human Rights 
Organisation in Saudi Arabia. The charges against him include: “preparing, storing 
and transmitting information that undermines public order” and violating Saudi 
Arabia’s cyber-crime law.”699 
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Needless to say, such circumstances in Saudi Arabia leave it wide open to 
strong criticisms of its true stance on human rights. One of the most notable critical 
scholars of Saudi’s human rights record is Ann Elizabeth Mayer, whose book Islam 
and Human Rights was recently released in its 5
th
 edition.
700
 Mayer’s purpose in 
writing the book is to expose the ways in which Saudi’s human rights laws deviate 
from international human rights laws. Mayer makes no apology in her lack of a 
neutral approach on the subject. She declares from the outset that her beliefs concur 
with “… the normative character of human rights principles set forth in international 
law and in their universality.”701 However, as a Western scholar, Mayer lacks 
knowledge of a clear understanding of the history and context of Islamic human 
rights laws and traditions. She uses no original texts based on Arabic, but mostly 
reference texts written in English or French. She is very polemic in her discourse. 
She seems to ignore the trend of more tolerance to cultural differences related to 
human rights. Nakissa delivers a  strong criticism of Mayer’s work, arguing that 
scholars have become more sensitive to the distinctly different forms of cultural 
practices found from one society to another. This is especially true in recent work on 
human rights. Mayer’s position reveals that she takes a universalistic perspective of 
human rights. However, this viewpoint is a barrier to understanding how human 
rights are perceived in non-Western and specifically Muslim societies. 
702
  
Regardless of scholarly debate, it is clear that not allowing freedom of 
expression violates the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, which is the 
foundation for the later treaties; the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights; and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. As 
stated by the United Nations, the two Covenants included most of the articles of the 
original UNDHR, “making them effectively binding on States that have ratified 
them. They set forth everyday rights such as the right to life, equality before the law, 
freedom of expression, the rights to work, social security and education.”703 
Some scholars argue that circumstances like the limits related to human rights 
for women and freedom of expression in Saudi Arabia are precisely why there needs 
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to be international standards and mandates related to human rights because cultural 
differences are used to justify the denial of human rights to some groups. Saudi 
Arabia argues that it has developed its own protections of the rights for women based 
on tradition, faith and custom. Regardless of whether Saudi Arabia agrees with 
international mandates of human rights, the Al-Saud government is under continuing 
pressure to reform rights for women, rights for children, rights for immigrants, and 
rights for the freedom to express opinions. For example, in its 2008 Annual Review, 
the Committee on the Discrimination Against Women made a recommendation to the 
government of Saudi Arabia, even though the Vienna Convention intended that 
States have the ability to declare reservations to international treaties. The 
recommendation was as follows: “The Committee urges the State party to consider 
the withdrawal of its general reservation to the Convention, particularly in light of 
the fact that the delegation assured that there is no contradiction in substance 
between the Convention and Islamic Shar’ia.”704 The Committee also suggested, 
after reviewing Saudi Arabia’s Report on Human Rights as required by the Treaty 
that it “encourages the State party to amend its legislation to confirm that 
international treaties have precedence over domestic laws. The Committee calls upon 
the State party to enact a comprehensive gender equality law and intensify its efforts 
to raise awareness about the Convention among the general public.”705 The 
Committee expressed a concern, that while it acknowledged Articles 8706 and 26
707
 of 
the Basic Law (1992) do guarantee the principle of equality:  
neither the Constitution nor other legislation embodies 
the principle of equality between women and men. It expresses 
concern that neither contains a definition of discrimination 
against women, in accordance with article 1 of the Convention, 
covering both direct and indirect discrimination and extending 
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State responsibility to prohibit acts of discrimination of both 
public and private actors.
708
  
 
The Committee specifically emphasised its concern about discrimination 
against women in Saudi Arabia related to mehrem (male guardianship over women). 
Even though mehrem is not a law, it is widely practiced. Mehrem is viewed as being 
a severe limitation on women’s rights, especially in relation to legal capacity and 
such things as personal status regarding, marriage, divorce, child custody, 
inheritance, property ownership and decision-making in the family, and the choice of 
residency, education and employment.
709
 The Committee argues that the practice of 
mehrem reinforces the country’s patriarchal ideology, with stereotypes and the 
persistence of deep-rooted cultural norms, customs and traditions that discriminate 
against women and constitute serious obstacles to their enjoyment of their human 
rights. Other practices prevalent in Saudi Arabia, such as the de facto ban of women 
from driving, which is a limitation of their freedom of movement, also contribute to 
the maintenance of such stereotypes. The Committee is concerned about the limited 
efforts by the State party to directly address such discriminatory cultural practices 
and stereotypes.
710
  
Ultimately, because Saudi Arabia continues to resist international human 
rights standards and conventions because it does not want to defer to legal standards, 
it believes should be subordinate to Shar’ia, the legitimacy of the Government comes 
under scrutiny by the global community. In response, Islamic scholars have been 
even more assertive in the justification they argue is provided by the Vienna 
Convention for the intention of flexibility: “that a flexible, international treaty law 
based approach to human rights treaties is more effective in the propagation of 
human rights norms in diverse cultural-legal environments as noted in this case study 
of the reservations to human rights treaties made by Islamic States.”711   
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However, with the growing importance of international law, conventions and 
treaties related to human rights, Saudi Arabia will undoubtedly be placed under 
growing pressure by the global community to implement democratic reforms to 
improve its record on human rights issues.  
6. 12 Conclusion 
Besides human rights issues, as reviewed above, another limitation on 
democracy in Saudi Arabia is the issue over the separation of powers. In reviewing 
the various institutions of governance in Saudi Arabia, it becomes clear that there is 
very little separation of powers between them. Although many of the functions of 
government have been delegated to various institutions, the King is the “ultimate 
arbiter” who has the power to Issue Royal Decrees that strip or infuse power 
according to his discretion. This lack of separation of powers is also partly due to the 
fact that the King and Prime Minister are positions held by the same person, and that 
the King’s decrees are sovereign above all others. He alone has the power as to 
whether or not to ratify laws that are proposed by the Shura Council.   
Nevertheless, separating or allocating these functions or powers into distinct 
or separate authorities is not a mandatory part of the Islamic political system. Rather, 
an Islamic political system is based on the centralised authority of the head of State, 
where the head of the State is responsible for all State functions including the 
judiciary. The King, as head of State, can take on all State functions himself, or 
appoint judges even though he has the right to act as a judge himself.
712
 The Shura is 
the element of Saudi society that is intended to be a balance to the whims of a ruler, 
and to make sure that Islamic governance follows the right path. The citizens of 
Saudi Arabia are comfortable with their monarchy because the adherence to Shar’ia 
is its most important legitimising factor, and the Shura Council is a manifestation of 
Shar’ia in the form of a legislative body. For example, the Shura Council has the 
right to summon a Minister or any government official for inquiry.
713
 The right to act 
on behalf of the Shura is held on the authority of the Prime Minister. In Saudi 
Arabia, the King is also the Prime Minister, as well as being the head of the Council 
of Ministers. 
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The Quran does not directly address the separation of powers in the State.  
Each Islamic State chooses the way it will practise governance. In the case of Saudi 
Arabia, the citizens have entrusted the King with this power. The main requirement 
of his ability to use his immense power is that he follows the right path of Shar’ia. If 
the monarchy were to stray too far from Shar’ia, then his power would no longer be 
seen as legitimate. To maintain legitimacy, the Shura Council must be formed in a 
way that maintains a complete spirit of consultancy, and where its decisions could 
actually provide a true balance of power to the monarchy. At this time, however, 
with members of the Shura being appointed (and therefore, equally able to be 
removed) by the King, the legitimacy of the system of governance in Saudi Arabia, 
in relation to the way its power is structured, remains very much open to question.  
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Chapter Seven: The Evolution of Majlis Al-Shura (Al-Shura Council) in Saudi 
Arabia 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Since the horrific events in New York on 11 September 2001, the relationship 
between Islam and democracy has come under intense scrutiny from Western 
scholars. A pervasive and entrenched attitude exists in the minds of most Western 
people. Islamic societies are perceived as being oppressive and authoritarian. An 
example of this view can be found in the following espoused argument. Tibi argues 
that despite claims that moderate or liberal Muslims are more open to democratic 
principles, in reality the political ideology of Islamism is closed to the core values of 
democracy, specifically pluralism and power sharing.714 Islamism, at the core of 
Islamic societies, is presented as radical jihadist Islam. According to Tibi’s line of 
thinking, any Muslim who pursues the principle that an Islamic State should be a 
Shar’ia-based Islamic order715is completely closed to democratic concepts. 
Therefore, it supposedly follows, that anyone who desires a Shari’a-based society is 
the adversary of others who seek a more democratic society.716  
Saudi Arabia has an important part to play in international politics, and its 
role in the international arena is of vital importance for global peace and security.717 
One of its most important developments in modelling democratic reform has been 
the building of Majlis Al-Shura (the Al-Shura Council) into its current status. 
7.2 Development of Majlis Al-Shura in Saudi Arabia  
In Saudi Arabia, the consultative process developed unevenly. The first 
Council was created in 1924 and was named the National Consultative Council.  
Sheik Abdul Gadir Al-Shebi was the first chairman, and the Council itself consisted 
of twelve members. At that time, when the State structure was incomplete, the 
Council was asked to draft the basic administrative laws for the country. In its early 
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stages there was no law to specify the functions of the Council, and in its initial form, 
it lasted for approximately six months.
718
 The structure of the Council became more 
formalised in 1925. It had a vice president and a secretary, and six articles of 
instructions were developed for the Council membership. The instructions included 
the qualifications for membership, and specified the way voting would take place. In 
the same year, seven more articles were developed to address jurisdictional 
matters.
719
 For example, jurisdiction included regulating all matters in courts, 
municipalities, endowments, education, security, and commerce, in addition to 
forming permanent committees to solve problems related to social traditions that did 
not contradict Shar’ia.720 The Council was to be made up of 12 elected members to 
represent all 12 of Saudi Arabia’s districts.721 
In 1927, the function and jurisdiction of the Shura Council became part of 
Basic Law. For that reason, 1927 is often the date given for the formal creation of 
Shura in Saudi Arabia.
722
 In 1928, amendments were made to the original law, with 
the number of articles increasing from 15 to 24. The new law required the Council to 
meet daily, instead of once a week. Half of the Council’s members were to be 
elected, with the other half appointed by the King, and all the members were to be 
selected from people who were scholars or experts in religion or commerce. In 1928, 
14 new articles were added to the Basic Law relating to Shura. For example, one 
article required that there would be two vice presidents of the Council, one elected 
and one appointed by the King.
723
 The Basic Law of the Shura remained unchanged 
until 1953, when many of the responsibilities of the Shura Council were transferred 
to the Council of Ministers.  
After the first Shura Council had been dismantled, it was decades before 
another was developed. Even so, Shura has been incorporated into the Saudi 
government in one form or another since the beginning. At the time of the initial 
Council, the State structure was incomplete and it was charged with drafting the 
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basic administrative laws.
724
 From that time onwards, a Shura Council was part of 
many governments, with its duties, functions and title varying according to the needs 
of the country and the monarch at the time.
725
  
Although both King Faisal (1964-75) and King Khalid ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz al-
Sa'ud (1975-82) promised to establish a Majlis, it was not until September 1992 that 
King Fahd developed the next formal Council and named Shaikh Muhammad ibn 
Jubayr, a conservative ‘alim (religious scholar), as the chairman of Saudi Arabia’s 
first Majlis al-Shura.
726
 
In the early 1990s a crucial decision was made in Saudi Arabia when a 
consensus could not be reached, namely, when the regime invited the American 
military into the country. Saudi still feels the negative backlash of this decision. The 
process of consultation has become more and more public with further developments 
being made to ensure communications and dialogue with the Al-Shura Council are 
increasingly transparent. The Council represents an institutional process of 
consultation and is now a part of the State system of governance. However, not all 
consultation takes place within the Council.  Old practices remain and a substantial 
amount of informal consultation continues to occur. This may change over time as 
the institution of the Council becomes more familiar to those in government as an 
entity to consult; is recognised by the people and the regime as being an effective 
representative of the people’s interests; and is embedded within the engine of State 
governing practices.  Nevertheless, trust of the people in the process of Shura within 
the Council is likely to grow. Whereas Council debates were initially held away from 
the eyes of the public, they now receive a good deal of media attention and are also 
live streamed and debated over the Internet:
727
  
The Majlis is becoming more important, and to stop 
something it has approved will require its opponents to spend a 
lot of political capital. In fact, the opponents of a given measure 
are more likely to concentrate on preventing the Majlis from 
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taking it up and deliberating on it. The Majlis is also a way to 
accommodate the growing importance of the “experts” and 
business community, which find this forum quite congenial to 
their respective agendas and approaches. 
728
 
 
The structure created in 1992 for the Shura Council is still in use today. The 
changes that were made in 1992 were intended to be more closely aligned with 
modern political developments in the Kingdom, as some of the qualitative changes 
suggested. The new law contained 30 articles to provide greater comprehensiveness 
and clarity in the functioning of the Shura. After members have been appointed, the 
Council remains intact for four years without change rather than two, which had been 
the case initially. Originally two vice-presidents had been appointed for the Council, 
whereas currently there is one vice president and one deputy. The current law also 
changed the minimum accepted age for membership of the Council to 30 years of 
age rather than 25 years.
729
 
7.3 Shura Council Law (1992) 
Article Eight of Chapter Two of the Basic Law of Government, 1992, stated, 
“Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is based on justice, Shura 
(consultation) and equality.” Article 68 of Chapter Six specified, “The Shura Council 
shall be established. Its Law shall specify the details of its formation, powers and 
selection of members. The King may dissolve and reconstitute the Shura Council.”730 
On March 5, 1992, Shura Council Law was published. At that time 60 members were 
to be appointed to the Council, which was later amended to 150 members. Article 15 
of the Shura Council Law outlines its functions: 
The Shura Council shall express its opinion on State's 
general policies referred by Prime Minister. The Shura Council 
shall specifically have the right to discuss the general plan for 
economic and social development and give views; revise laws 
and regulations, international treaties and agreements, 
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concessions, and provide whatever suggestions it deems 
appropriate; Analyze laws; Discuss government agencies annual 
reports and attaching new proposals when it deems 
appropriate.
731
 
 
Article 17 of Council law provides that Shura Council resolutions 
shall be submitted to the King who then will determine which be referred 
to Cabinet; if both the Shura Council and Cabinet agree, the resolutions 
are issued after the King’s approval. On the other hand, if views of both 
Councils vary, the issue shall be returned back to Shura Council to 
decide whatever it deems appropriate, and send the new resolution to the 
King who takes the final decisions.
732
 
Article 18 provides that all laws, international treaties and 
agreements, and concessions shall be issued and amended by royal 
decrees after being reviewed by the Shura Council.
733
 
Obviously, although the Shura Council has the right to review all 
resolutions and other legal instruments, the King has ultimate authority 
under all circumstances, with the ability to embrace or reject any 
referrals, resolutions or recommendations provided by the Shura Council.   
Article 19 of Majlis Al-Shura Law provides that minutes for each 
session recording all aspects of the session, including the venue and date 
of the session, the time it started, the name of its chairman, the number of 
members present, the names of those absent and the reasons for their 
absence, along with a summary of the discussions, the results of voting, 
the texts of the resolutions, as well as anything else the Chairman wishes 
to record.
734
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The consultative process is triggered when a particular matter is submitted to 
the Majlis, and the chairman begins the consultative process by assigning the matter 
to one of the specialised committees of the Majlis. The chairman acts as the 
moderator of deliberations, and when consensus is reached, he reports the advisory 
opinions of the Majlis to the King. The way the Shura Council is structured causes 
major delays in the process of even its advisory role. Figure 5, overleaf, shows the 
hierarchical process involving matters put forth to the Council. 
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Fig 5: The Stages of making legislation in the Majlis from the beginning through to the issuance 
of law by the King 
 
 
  
The King 
  
  
Council of 
Ministers 
  
A Royal decree is issued after the 
approval of the King 
  
  Publication in the official Gazette 
  
  
Law 
  
  
The resolution is raised to the King 
who decides what he deems right 
  
If there is a disagreement in views 
of the two Councils 
  
The issue is returned to the Ash-
Shura Council for reconsideration 
  
Committee Stage  
In this stage a discussion takes place of all draft law articles forwarded from the government. Once the 
Committee has completed the study, the steering committee adds it to the agenda of the Council sessions, 
with all the necessary documentation attached. 
  
  
Council Stage (Applicability) 
 At this stage, there is a general reading of the draft law inside the Council, the giving of notes, remarks from 
the members on the idea of the project and its expected benefits, followed by a vote on its applicability 
  
Discussion 
Presentation of the draft law for a general discussion article-by-article with no vote 
  
Voting 
The voting is carried out on each article of the draft law after hearing the response of the committee to the 
remarks of the members regarding every article. Then issuing a resolution. 
  
  
Source: after figure 5.1 within The Majils Ash-Shura in the Kingdom of Saudia Arabia  
(published by the Majilis, July 2004). 
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Beyond these specific criteria of age, citizenship and good character, there are 
also personal characteristics that influence who will be appointed to the Shura 
Council.  Typical members will come from four major categories: the ulama (Islamic 
scholars and clergymen), ahl al-'ilm (people of learning), ahl al-ra'y (shapers of 
opinion) and ahl al-khibra (experts). Although these groups are well represented in 
the Majlis, R. Hrair Dekmejian argues that a careful analysis of members “shows a 
carefully crafted strategy of inclusion aimed at strengthening the political 
foundations of Saudi legitimacy.”735  Table 1, overleaf, highlights the type of 
membership in the 1997 Shura Council. 
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TABLE 1 
Occupational Backgrounds of the Members of the 1997 Majilis 
al-Shura 
Occupation Number Percentage 
 
Academic (secular fields) 
 
23} 
  
Academic (religious 
fields) 
 7} 33 36.7% 
Academic/Journalist  3}   
   
Bureaucrat 19}   
Bureaucrat/Academic  7}   
Bureaucrat/Businessman  7}   
Bureaucrat/Judge  3} 39 43.3% 
Bureaucrat/Journalist  1}   
Bureaucrat/Lawyer  1}   
Bureaucrat/Religious  1}   
   
Police 4  4.4% 
   
Diplomat 4  4.4% 
   
Military 3  3.3% 
   
Businessman  3}   
Businessman/Lawyer  3} 7 7.8% 
Businessman/Journalist  1}   
 90     99.9% 
    
Source: Aggregation of data from Al-Yamama, 12 July 1997; 'Ukaz, 
8 July 1997; 'Ukaz al-Usbu'iya, 7 July 1997; Al-Majalla, 19 July 
1997; Al-Quds al-'Arabi, 8 July 1997; Al-Riyad, 7 and 8 July 1997; 
Al-Jazira, 7 July 1997; and Al-Shara al-Awsat, 15 July 1997. 
 
  
187 
 
According to Dekmejian, about 20 percent of Majlis members are from 
religious universities, mostly specialists in Islamic studies, while the rest are from the 
non-religious universities with diverse secular specialisations. The religious 
membership includes several high ranking ulama and other specialists in Islamic 
studies, while among the secular academics are some of the Kingdom's top scientists 
and scholars, who have published in Western academic journals. The country's 
security concerns, both internal and external are reflected in the appointments of the 
retired police and military generals to the Council.  There are some diplomats 
appointed which may show that the Council will play a more important role in 
foreign policy, and by including several important business men, the private sector is 
represented: 
Among the journalists, bureaucrats and academics are 
also well-known men of letters, poets, writers, television 
producers, and the editors of two major newspapers, Al-Yamama 
and 'Ukaz. The inclusion of these members of the Saudi literati 
class brings distinction to the Majlis. A breakdown of the 
bureaucrat component reveals the inclusion of several key 
ministerial and professional constituencies, such as petroleum, 
urban affairs, information, health, water resources, the National 
Guard, and the religious establishment.
736
 
 
In 1997, when the King appointed 30 new members to the Al-Shura Council, 
it was met with surprise from both within the country’s borders and from the 
international community. The appointments were seen to represent an important step 
in the development of the Saudi political system for two interconnected reasons. 
First, it was a declaration of the King’s intention to institutionalise the consultative 
process he was responsible for creating in August 1993. The second reason was that 
the King extended the consultative process in Saudi Arabia substantially, by 
increasing the Council’s membership from 60 to 90.737  
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The Shura Council in Saudi Arabia is perceived as a manifestation of Islamic 
social and legal principles that can be derived from Articles 1 and 2 of the Law of the 
Shura Council which states:  
Article 1: And His words ‘Those who answer the call of 
their Lord  [...] and offer their prayer perfectly, and who (conduct) 
their affairs by mutual consultation, and who spend of what we 
have bestowed on them .… and following His Messenger [...] in 
consulting his Companions and urging the Nation to engage in 
consultation, The Shura Council shall be established to exercise 
the tasks entrusted to it, according to this Law and the Basic Law 
of Governance, while adhering to the Book of Allah and the 
Sunna of his Messenger [...], maintaining brotherly ties and 
cooperating unto righteousness and piety.
738
  
Article 2: The Shura Council shall hold fast to the bond 
of God and adhere to the sources of Islamic legislation. All 
Members of the Council shall serve the public interest, and shall 
preserve the unity of the community, the entity of the State and 
the interests of the Nation.
739
 
 
Shura refers to the act of consultation; i.e., it seeks the opinions of 
knowledgeable people, the nation, or the nation’s representatives, about various 
issues, which is why Muslims took Shura as one of the principles and bases of 
governance, and why mature Muslims elect those whom they consider worthy of 
power and governance.
740
  Muslim society believes that Shura is a necessary system, 
and a necessary imposition on the leadership. Shura is also considered an important 
manifestation of a just and civilised society. Some regard it as one of the most 
important elements contributed by Muslims to creation and consolidation in the 
Muslim community. Others have been influenced by Shura, especially in Europe 
since the thirteenth Gregorian century. Thus, Shura represented a kind of expression 
                                                 
738
 Article 1, Law of the Shura Council, Royal Order No. (A/91), March 5, 1992, Umm Al Qura 
Gazette, 1. 
739
 ibid Article 2. 
740
 El-Sergany (n 600). 
  
189 
 
of the divine will on the basis of what the Prophet said: “My nation shall not agree 
upon an error.” El-Sergany explains that this is why a ruler in an Islamic society is 
not entitled to give himself the right to express divine will, because in the absence of 
indisputable evidence from the Quran, legislation belongs to the Muslim 
community.
741
 
Although Shura refers to shared decision-making, it is not the same as secular 
democracy. Democracy requires that the rule of people should be assumed by people; 
that people develop their own constitution and laws; and that judicial authority is 
used among people through the application of secular laws. To attain authority, 
people are elected who regulate authorities. Shura, however, has a different 
perception. 
Shura in Islam is based on the fact that ‘rule’ is Allah’s rules revealed to the 
Messenger of Allah, and that adherence to that rule is the basis of faith. Scholars are 
people of power and decision and are placed at the top of the people of Shura. Given 
Allah’s rules, scholars have nothing to do in their consultations but to work diligently 
to prove the text, understand it accurately, and draw systematic plans for its 
application. In fact, the democratic system can be easily circumvented, by certain 
powers so that this or that party could impose its view on the nation. The Islamic 
Shura, however, leaves domination for Allah only and prioritises Allah’s rules over 
any other provision and legislation. This leads to the emergence of men living in the 
company of Allah and fearing Him honestly.
742
 
Originally the Majlis was divided into eight committees that specialised in 
different areas of social life, such as Islamic affairs or health and education, culture 
and media, etc.
743
 To address growing needs the number of committees was 
expanded to 11 in 2004 and now has 13 committees to address social and economic 
issues. Once the committees have had time to investigate and deliberate on a 
particular matter, they present an advisory opinion which the Chairman then delivers 
to the King. During deliberations, people who have expertise related to the matter are 
often asked to report to the Committee so they can be as well-informed as 
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possible.
744
 The Council often receives petitions from Saudi citizens asking the 
Council to review specific issues, and the Council reviews the petitions and will refer 
them to other bodies if they feel a matter is better served in a different venue,
745
 such 
as a specific ministry. The Committee is in place for one year, and each member of 
the Shura Council belongs to at least one committee.
746
 
In order to address the petitions developed by Saudi citizens, the Shura has 
established its relationship with citizens through a special committee that was created 
to receive and study the petitions and proposals of citizens and consider their ideas 
and views. The committee becomes the liaison between the Council and the citizens 
by studying the petitions; when required, the Chairman of the Council will decide 
which specialised committee in the Shura is most appropriate to consider the 
petition’s subject.747 
Members of the Shura Council are held in high regard as they represent 
people who are well-educated and at the top of their professions. The value of higher 
education in Saudi Arabia can be seen here, in that over 60 percent of Al-Shura 
members hold doctoral degrees.
748
 The members are in fact referred to as the “cream 
of men.” Furthermore, the representational role of the Majlis is very significant 
because is it the only Saudi institution that brings together the various segments of 
Saudi society: social and political interests, tribes, ideological factions, sects, and 
regions. In this sense, representation promotes a sense of community solidarity and 
identity with the Saudi nation, although some social sectors, such as women, remain 
under-represented, or excluded from the Majlis altogether.
749
 In recent years, this 
matter has been addressed, with the appointment of several women to the Shura 
Council.   
In general therefore, the Shura Council supports the Council of Ministers in 
the decision-making process by presenting its views in the form of resolutions. 
However, as a result of the establishment of the Council of Ministers in 1953, the 
power of the Majlis began to decline since the newly-founded Council of Ministers 
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took over most of its jurisdiction and embodied both the legislative and executive 
authorities. As reported by Al-Muhanna (2005), “the Majlis was still legally alive, 
but inactive until 1992 when King Fahd bin Abdalaziz re-modelled it, introducing 
modernizations and improvements to make it fit with the progressive development 
occurring in all areas of the Kingdom and to enhance its efficiency and vitality.”750 
Today, when the King refers resolutions to the Council of Ministers, the Shura 
Council reviews such resolutions. If the two Councils agree, a resolution is issued 
after the King’s approval. If the views of the Councils vary, the matter returns to the 
Shura Council to decide whatever it considers appropriate; its new resolution is then 
sent to the King who has the final decision.
751
 
According to Article 15 of the Law of the Shura Council, the Shura Council 
has the following authorities: 
The Shura Council shall express its opinion on the general 
policies of the State referred to it by the President of the Council 
of Ministers. The Council shall specifically have the right to 
exercise the following: 
a. Discuss the general plan for economic and social 
development and provide an opinion on it. 
b. Review laws and regulations, international treaties and 
conventions and concessions, and provide whatever 
suggestions it deems appropriate. 
c. Interpret laws. 
d. Discuss annual reports submitted by ministries and other 
governmental agencies, and provide whatever suggestions 
it deems appropriate.
752
 
 
The jurisdictions of the general panel, along with the Council’s Chairman, 
Vice President, and Secretary General were clarified. Another internal regulation was 
also issued explaining the rights and duties of the members of the Council, the rules 
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governing the Council’s financial and personnel affairs, and the rules and procedures 
for the investigation and trial of members of Majlis al-Shura. None of these issues 
had appeared in the previous law.
753
 In addition, the Council was relocated from 
Mecca to Riyadh. 
In August 1993, the King appointed 60 new members. The Majlis was 
developed in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, which was a critical time in 
modern Saudi history since the war had exacted not only massive costs, but had also 
had a psychological impact on Saudi Arabia’s sense of stability. All of these factors, 
along with the decline of oil revenues created serious challenges for the Saudi State.  
This situation was further compounded by the unprecedented rise of an Islamist 
movement that sought to play a decisive role in both domestic and foreign affairs. 
The establishment of the Majlis was in fact part of the regime’s response to the 
demands of its Islamist and nationalist critics for reforms in the aftermath of the 
war.
754
  
The new Council was also developed according to the law of the new 
Constitution. The Basic Law of Governance of 1992 required in its eighth Article 
that the Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia should be based on Equity, 
Shura, and Equality, in conformity with Islamic legislation. Moreover, Article 68 of 
the same law stated that: “The Shura Council shall be established. Its Law shall set 
forth its formation, the exercising of its powers and the selection of its members. The 
King may dissolve and reconstitute the Shura Council”.755 
King Fahd believed Shura was necessary to maintain the relationship 
between the ruler and the people; with the principle of mutual consultation based on 
the Quran, Sunna (custom) and Shari'a (Islamic law) that means Shura is sanctioned 
by Islam and aligned with the practices of the Prophet himself. King Fahd’s royal 
decree declared that the main purpose of the Majlis was to provide nasiha (advice) to 
the King in four areas: the Kingdom’s laws; the general plan for economic and social 
development; the annual reports submitted by ministries and other State agencies; 
and international laws, treaties and agreements.
756
 The King authorised the Council 
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to contribute to the development of the Kingdom and its growth, always keeping in 
mind the interests of all Saudi citizens (al-maslaha al- 'amma).
757
  
In 1997, the King formalised the Majlis Al-Shura and expanded the 
membership from 60 to 90; eventually, the membership would be enlarged to 150.
758
 
This move surprised both the citizens of Saudi Arabia and the international 
community. The appointment of an expanded Council was welcomed as an important 
milestone in the continuing development of the Saudi political system for at least two 
major reasons. First, it represented the King’s apparent determination to 
institutionalise the consultative process which he had initiated in August 1993, and 
secondly, the decision to increase the Council’s membership from 60 to 90 was seen 
as representing a major broadening of the consultative process in the Kingdom.
759
 
The current Council has limited authority. The members are appointed by the King 
for four years. They study the drafts of all laws that have been referred by the 
government. The members will read, research, take expert testimony, and discuss the 
proposed law until they are satisfied that they understand how this particular law will 
be of benefit to the nation. They must offer their own views and recommend possible 
amendments. They may also choose to recommend that a particular draft is not suited 
to the country’s needs, or submit a draft of new proposed legislation or 
recommended amendments to an existing law. After study and deliberation within 
the Council, its Chairman has then to refer the final decision to the King.
760
 
The Shura Council also has the right to express its opinion on the general 
policies of the State and to discuss the General Plan for Development. This Plan is a 
national project, consisting of social, educational and economic objectives that are 
positioned on a developmental schedule. It also includes the policies, programmes 
and methods that will be required to accomplish these objectives.
761
 The Shura 
Council discusses the various programmes and recommends additions/changes as it 
sees fit. It also has to discuss the annual reports forwarded by the ministries and other 
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government bodies. The Council members have the right to summon any government 
official and to request clarification.
762
 
The criterion for selection of members relies heavily on scholars, experts and 
specialists. Scholars are expected to have scientific qualifications in various subjects 
and specialisations. Without exception, all members must represent the general 
interests of the nation in their actions. For the King, choosing these members is a 
time-consuming and important task, which requires clear and detailed information, 
and a number of different selection techniques and criteria have been used over the 
years. As each member represents the religion and the entire country, any kind of 
partisanship is unacceptable. There should be no pressure from members, interest 
groups, or partners for special needs or attention, and all members should be able to 
enrich discussions with a broad range of knowledge and clear, but neutral 
understanding.
763
  
Saudi Arabia’s Prime Minister is the head of not only the Shura Council, but 
of the Council of Ministers as well. Of course, the King is the Prime Minister, and 
the Crown Prince is Deputy Prime Minister. The Council of Ministers is the true 
legislative body in Saudi Arabia, being responsible for drafting and overseeing the 
implementation of the internal, external, financial, economic, education and defence 
policies, and general affairs of the State.  The Council meets weekly and is presided 
over by the King or one of his deputies.  
It is the Council of Ministers that are in charge of siyasah, or ruler made law 
while the Shura advises on whether the laws created are aligned with Islamic 
principles. The laws created by the Council of Ministers are legitimatised by the 
notion of maslahah, in service of the public good and what is considered necessary 
for social order. Siyasah (law-making) “best resembles the work that happens in 
legislatures today.”764 In the past maslahah was determined by the specific ruler, 
however, it can now be decided democratically by the majority.
765
 Because of this, 
siyasah could easily become part of a secular legislative process and still be 
acceptable within the boundaries of an Islamic society;  
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The implications of this reconceptualization are many. 
First, if laws made by democratic legislatures are recognized as 
modern versions of ruler-made siyasah, then a whole range of 
important social order legislation could gain credibility as the 
siyasah arm of a Shar’iah-based legal system.766  
 
Upon recognising that in making siyasah law is consistent with Islam, this 
shift in perception could inspire Muslims to develop a new respect for secular 
legislation.
767
 Secular legislation could include addressing a wide range of things 
(because it is maslahah), including civil rights, health care, poverty and education. It 
certainly could bridge the current gap between Islamic law and international rights 
norms. Now that traditional forms of governance, that included the separation of 
powers through the duality of fiqh and siyasah, have been replaced with the nation-
State model, where the State holds all of the authority, fiqh scholars do not have the 
same power and influence in the society. Even the esteemed Shura Council does not 
have true legislative power.  
Indeed, because the members are appointed by the King, he maintains control 
of the persona of the Shura Council.  Investigation by R. Hrair Dekmejian, has led 
him to claim that upon further analysis of the Shura Council, the makeup of the 
membership shows a continuing selectivity by the King to solidify public support for 
the Council.  Two Shiite members were appointed to represent the Shiite minority in 
Saudi Arabia, in spite of criticism, and 30 women have also been appointed. 
According to Dekmejian, several Salafi activists, many of whom had previously been 
imprisoned for their opposition to the government, were appointed. These activists 
include Zayd 'Abd al-Muhsin al-Husayn, Mani' al-Juhani and Ahmad al-Tuwayjiri, 
who were jailed in 1993 for leading an activist Salafi group at King Sa'ud University. 
Dekmejian asserts that “King Fahd's decision to bring these Salafi critics into the 
Majlis represents an unprecedented act of co-optation of former opponents, reflecting 
an unusual degree of political flexibility and accommodation.”768 
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Although forming the Shura Council fulfilled earlier promises of democratic 
reforms in Saudi Arabia, and there has been obvious commitment to broadening the 
scope of the Council, the Shura Council is still not a true source of real political 
participation for Saudi citizens, even though the appointments are meant to try to be 
representative of the broad spectrum of Saudi interests. People do feel relieved that 
their needs and interests are more effectively addressed by the Council and its 
various committees; however, the importance of political participation and the 
element of self-determination that is essential to democracy remains unrealised. 
Additionally, no true separation of power exists if the King has final determination in 
all decisions. It is true that the King will likely want consensus among influential key 
players regarding major decisions; nevertheless a true check on the King’s power is 
still elusive. 
Saudi Arabia’s Shura has obviously passed through several stages since its 
use as a process of consultation among the early Arab tribes and by the Prophet 
Mohammad in early Islam.
769
 Fortunately, since it is not described as having specific 
rules as to who may consult, or how many consultants are advisable, it can be 
modified to suit the times and the situation as needed.
770
 If we believe that Shura is 
mandatory (which seems to be the majority opinion), then the choice of the late King 
Abdul-Aziz to use Shura as a foundation for his government in 1924 was obviously 
correct, even though this practice had been limited or even left unused by previous 
rulers of the area. Current rulers in Saudi now believe that implementing Shura is a 
requirement for filling the divine order by applying Shar’ia as is prescribed in the 
Quran and Sunna.   
If we accept that Shura is divinely inspired and required of an Islamic 
government, the only options to be considered are how best to design the process and 
use it to provide the most effective and efficient consultation for the government. 
Who should provide this consultation and what method of choice should be used to 
provide the most fair-minded and balanced outcome for all concerned?  
Over the last few years, the nature of the Majlis Al-Shura has been addressed 
to ensure it is truly representative of Saudi Arabian society. Dekmejian remarks upon 
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one important change made in the modern Council regarding the age of its members: 
“In a patriarchal society that reveres seniority such as Saudi Arabia, the relative 
youth of the new Majlis' aggregate membership is both surprising and politically 
salient.”771 Towards the end of the 1990s, the average age of the members was 52 
years, with the youngest being 34 years old and the oldest 69. Members in their 60s 
represented only 17 percent of the Council, 30 percent were in their 30s and 40s and 
53 percent were in their 50s. This reflected a clear decision by King Fahd to bring 
youthful dynamism into the consultative process. The inclusion of a large youthful 
cohort might also have been in recognition of the increasing proportion of youth in 
the Kingdom’s population.772 A Council made up of individuals mostly in their 50s 
was very different from other elite political organisations in Saudi Arabia where the 
average age was over 60.
773
  
Another important feature of the Council that distinguishes it from some of 
the other Saudi political organisations is that the members do not necessarily have to 
have close ties to the Al-Saud family. It is true that tribalism is still an obvious 
feature of Saudi society; however, it is not a major factor in the Shura, none of 
whose members are, in fact, tribal leaders, even though the members do come from a 
variety of tribal backgrounds, including  the 'Anaza, Mutayr, 'Utaiba, Shammar, 
Ghamid, Harb, Zahran and Dawasir tribes. Thus tribal politics do not play an 
important role in the functioning of the Majlis.
774
 
One of the most important changes ever to have occurred is the appointment 
of 30 women to the Shura Council.  A new royal decree delivered in January 2013 
declared that 20 percent of the Council would be made up of women.
775
 When the 
Saudi news presenter Fouz Auwadh al-Khmali was interviewed about this 
development she stated, “This is the beginning of a new era for Saudi women. It’s 
about time women had a say – we are 50 percent of Saudi society, you know.”776 
These Council appointments are just the beginning of some important changes for 
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women that are taking place in Saudi Arabia. In 2015, women will finally be given 
the right to vote in the Provincial Councils.
777
 There are also steps being made to 
dismantle the country’s guardianship system that requires women to have permission 
from a male guardian for many activities. These changes are considered major 
achievements by King Abdullah, who had been working for reform for women for 
the last eight years.  
7.4 Conclusion: Working Toward Mutual Understanding 
Ideological misunderstandings are often mutual. A Western public is not the 
only group that is suspicious of ideologies that are not its own. Many Muslims 
become disturbed at the demand for more democracy in their governance because 
they associate the term with secular authority which they believe is imperfect. This 
negative association is unfortunate and does not fit with the basic democratic 
principles of an ideal Islamic State.  In the same way that Islam, for most Westerners, 
is immediately associated with being anti-democratic and oppressive, Muslims often 
have an automatic response to the term ‘democracy’, which they see as laden with all 
the hallmarks of Western imperialism. This is unfortunate, because it is the 
suppression of democracy that often leads to militancy and radicalised groups. When 
assembly and expression are blocked, this will lead to explosive tendencies surfacing 
in society. Violence occurs when it has been impossible for people to have a voice or 
to participate in their own governance.
778
 Therefore, Muslims should not develop 
hypothetical and unrealistic fears about a democratic process to implement Shura in 
a contemporary Islamic State.  Nor should non-Muslims have unsubstantiated fears 
about Islam, since Islam is an ideological and moral safeguard for justice and equal 
human rights and because the Islamic faith deepens the commitment of Muslims to 
human dignity for all mankind. Human rights that had been secured by democracy 
would be not threatened by Islam or Muslims, but would be observed more as a 
matter of faith.
779
 
Obviously, there is much more common ground between principles of Islamic 
governance and democratic principles than most people, even international political 
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scholars, seem to recognise. If greater understanding could be developed between the 
groups who hold these two very important belief systems, it could help to alleviate 
some of the tensions between them. In various ways, the bias between the two groups 
is based on ideological stereotypes and misunderstandings. Muslims fear Western 
democracy, seeing it as a rejection of God’s intention for how a society should 
function, and most Westerners see Islam as rejecting personal choice and liberty. 
Instead, both philosophies promote the dignity of the human being and the need for a 
government to reflect the will of the people, and not to serve its own selfish interests. 
The basic goal of Shari’a is to create a just society, in which human rights are 
protected. This goal is the same as that of democracy. The distance between them is 
really not so great that the two philosophies concerned cannot find mutual respect for 
each other. 
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Chapter Eight: Achieving Further Constitutional Reform in Saudi Arabia;  
A More Democratic Shura Council 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Islam teaches Muslims to obey authority, and so if a regime is challenged, it 
is usually because that regime is in egregious violation of its obligation to its polity 
under Islamic values and principles. The Quran states: “O you who have believed, 
obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. And if you 
disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in 
Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result.”780 
In the spirit of democracy, the classic separation of powers in an Islamic State 
is not between different government institutions, but between government and the 
non-government force of religious academia. In Saudi Arabia, the authority of fiqh 
law was given over to the Al-Shura Council, whose members represent scholars and 
experts on both fiqh and siyasah law. In its contemporary function, however, the Al-
Shura Council does not represent a true separation of powers because the members 
are appointed by the King rather than elected by the people. If Saudi Arabia is 
serious about its claims of undergoing democratic reform, then it needs to adhere to 
the basic necessities of constitutionalism—the separation of powers combined with 
the protection of individual rights, which Quraishi claims “form the matrix of 
constitutionalism.”781 In order for a system to meet the current standards of 
international human rights law, the separation of powers and the protection of 
individual rights are indispensable.  A system that does not have the mechanisms for 
a judiciary that is independent would not be in a position to serve the rule of law.
782
 
In order to be accepted as a legitimate ruler, the ruler of an Islamic nation 
must have the acceptance of the religious authorities, who will only approve a leader 
who is bound by Shar’ia, religious law. Just claiming that a ruler is subject to the law 
is not enough. The ruler would no longer be accepted if he strayed from the law in 
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any way. So, in an Islamic nation, no secular ruler has unlimited power, at least not 
in the spirit of Islam. Noah Feldman notes that to motivate rulers to follow law 
required incentives:  
And as it happened, the system of government gave him a 
big one, in the form of a balance of power with the scholars. The 
ruler might be able to use pressure once in a while to get the 
results he wanted in particular cases…. the ruler could pervert the 
course of justice only at the high cost of being seen to violate 
God’s law — thereby undermining the very basis of his rule.783 
 
8.2 Saudi Arabia’s Reform Movement – Post-Arab Spring 
One of the major justifications for constitutionalisation is the concern for how 
power is distributed in a country. The power is manifested in the way government 
activities are distributed among agencies and how conflicts of interests are resolved 
between them. In other words, the rules of the game and the way the game plays out 
to produce an orderly conduct of the business of government depends on the 
structures of power.  In this regard many constitutions in the developing world and 
particularly in the Middle East are found lacking.
784
  For the most part, institutions 
are not arranged to maximise checks and balances on power, so that personal 
interests are subordinated to public interests.  
Another important justification for constitutionalisation is the importance of 
public participation in the quest for self-determination. The ideals of 
constitutionalism also support a dynamic political process rather than a fixed system 
of distributing power and rights:  “…the functional view thus emphasizes social 
reality, i.e., the practice of constitutionalism as something to be achieved and 
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commonly learned, not something that can be merely announced by an elite in final 
documentary form.”785 
Constitutional reforms have been promised in Saudi Arabia since the 1960s, 
and fulfilment of those promises has been slow to come to fruition. In 1962, for 
example, right after the unrest and Nasirist movement in Yemen, Crown Prince 
Faysal promised a constitution that would allow the creation of regional and national 
assemblies. No assemblies were actually developed at the time. When King Faysal 
was assassinated in 1975, there was again a mention that the assemblies might be 
created. Then when the Grand Mosque of Mecca was seized in November 1979, 
Crown Prince Fahd announced that a basic law of governance, which would include 
provision for a consultative assembly, would be drafted.  Again, no such 
developments occurred.  In trying to gather popular support in the war against Iraq, 
however, the House of Saud once again promised it would re-establish the Majlis. 
Still, King Fahd's November 1990 announcement of a consultative assembly was 
quite vague when he mentioned that it would be established "soon, God willing."
786
 
The Majlis al-Shura was established in 1992, but was considered at best a small step 
in part because members would be appointed by the King. There is no proposal at 
this time to introduce elections or to permit political parties. 
Nevertheless, the importance of the development of the Shura Council goes 
beyond its political aspects. It serves other functions as well. For one, being 
appointed to the Shura Council is an important honour given to a citizen, which is 
based on thiqa malakiya (royal trust). With the appointment comes the prestige and 
respect that their selection gives to the members and their families. The appointment 
indicates a commendation for service to the country. It also has an important 
symbolic function, at both the domestic level and the international level. In 
emphasising the qualifications of its members, the Saudis can show their country is 
governed by "safwat al-rijal" (the cream of men) to serve in their Council.
787
 The 
members are a showcase of men with doctorates and expert qualifications. In fact, 
even though members are appointed to the Council, it is also seen as a venue for 
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liberal professionals to express their views and an acceptance for more pluralism in 
the society.
788
  
The Council also serves a representational function, which is very valuable, 
since is it the only Saudi organisation that brings together the various groups of 
stakeholders in the country, representing various  social and political interests, tribes, 
ideologies, sects, and regions. This function helps to promote unity, community, 
solidarity and identity, even though some segments are underrepresented, such as 
Shia and women.  Finally, the Council has a cooptative function. Not only have the 
appointments brought together the cream of men, it has unified various factions that 
could otherwise cause conflict. This type of cooperation between factions is 
unprecedented in Saudi political history, and a very wise move on the part of the 
King who seeks to maintain widespread support and legitimacy among his people, 
not necessarily an easy task.  
In recent years, a greater urgency for reform has developed in Muslim 
nations. There has been a corresponding new trend among religious scholars:  a shift 
in interest towards democratic reforms in Saudi Arabia and other Islamic societies. 
For example, the well-known and influential religious scholar Sheikh Salman al-
Awdah recently claimed that although democracy may not be ideal, it is the least 
harmful system of governance; it offers flexibility and adaptability to meet local 
needs.
789
 Support for democracy is relatively revolutionary coming from a religious 
authority such as al-Awdah, especially keeping in mind that many religious leaders 
hold the view that “democracy” is a foreign concept imposed by Westernisers and 
secular reformers upon Muslim societies. They argue against any type of Western 
democracy and its principle of popular sovereignty as an unacceptable rejection of 
the sovereignty of God. Therefore, when Sheikh Al-Awdah sends a message of 
support for democracy, it is a significant event.  
Al-Awdah was active in petitioning the Saudi government in the 1990s 
calling for the creation of the Shura Council.  Now, he is embracing a more 
democratic form of government and asking that the Saudi government reform itself 
further. Because of his activism in the 1990s, Al-Awdah was imprisoned by the 
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Saudi regime, which caused a lot of criticism and backlash against the government. 
The Sheikh was released in 1999, and while still active, he is more subtle in his 
criticisms of the Al-Saud clan.
790
  
Like Sheikh Al-Awdah, several other Islamic scholars have shown approval 
of democracy in Muslim nations. In their discussions, the scholars often combine 
historically important concepts from within the Islamic tradition together with the 
concepts of democracy in order to fit the needs of people in the modern world. In 
1992, Rashid Ghanoushi stated in the London newspaper, The London Observer: 
If by democracy is meant the liberal model of 
government prevailing in the West, a system under which the 
people freely choose their representatives and leaders, in which 
there is an alternation of power, as well as all freedoms and 
human rights for the public, then Muslims will find nothing in 
their religion to oppose democracy, and it is not in their interests 
to do so.
791
 
 
These Muslim spokespeople are not promoting that Islamic nations copy 
Western forms of democracy, but develop new forms that include religious norms 
that are appropriate for their Islamic societies. Most Muslims believe secular 
societies are devoid of spirituality and Islam can provide a framework to combine 
democracy and religious governance. 
Unsurprisingly, a secular government does not seem acceptable in an Islamic 
nation because of tawhid, which means oneness with God. Tawhid is central to the 
idea that you cannot compartmentalise life; faith and spirituality are found in all 
aspects of life, especially in one as important as the governance of people. That is 
one reason the Al-Shura Council plays such an important role in the Saudi society. 
For many it is a confirmation that Islam serves its people well in many ways—
socioeconomically, politically, and spiritually.  
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8.3 The Al-Shura Council, Potential for Balance 
Reform in Saudi society proceeds slowly because of the differing ideologies 
of the various stakeholders. However, because it is an institution that has developed 
from Islamic tradition, the Shura Council is held in high esteem by most members of 
Saudi society - both elite and non-elite. The Shura Council represents an egalitarian 
solution to the balance of power, Muslim style. However, in order to have a 
balancing role, the Shura Council needs equal weight in decision-making as 
compared to the Council of Ministers, the country’s cabinet. Currently, the Council 
of Ministers has the final authority regarding decisions related to financial, executive 
and administrative matters. The resolutions are only binding as agreed upon by a 
majority vote. If there is a tie, the prime minister casts the tie-breaking vote. Its 
authority is defined in the Basic Law of Governance and the Council of Ministers is 
advised by the Majlis Al-Shura (Consultative Council).
792
 Therefore, the Al-Shura 
Council only has advisory influence over the Cabinet.  As long as the Cabinet 
dominates the Al-Shura, Al-Shura is not as effective in its check on the executive or 
as a balance of power. Ultimately, at this time, the nature of the Majlis depends on 
“whether the king wishes to make it a useful mechanism, particularly in its 
legislative and mediational roles, as well as on the ability of the Majlis leadership to 
expand the scope of the organization's influence and responsibilities within the 
political system.”793 
The reforms needed depend on a delicate alliance of custom, faith, legitimacy 
and relevancy. It would be advantageous to undertake an investigative study to 
determine which regulatory and legislative powers would enhance the Al-Shura 
Council’s authority to provide a more balanced system of governance. It seems 
appropriate that the Shura Council address some of the more humanitarian issues of 
society, such as civil rights and education. It already addresses these issues in its 
various committees, but it needs to be given the authority to act on these issues 
independently. The Council needs to be allowed to legislate policies it deems 
appropriate without seeking guidance and consent from the King.  
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Political participation in the country is also a major concern. Therefore, 
government implementation of a method of electing members to the Al-Shura 
Council would be a welcome move. The country could adapt a system similar to that 
of Oman. The work of the Shura Council also needs to become more visible. 
Currently, most Al-Shura Council affairs are quite secretive; the implementation of 
greater transparency to the Council’s undertakings would be beneficial. 
To legitimise the Muslim nation according to Islamic principles, Shura 
should exist as a political institution that is a manifestation of the basic spirit of 
Islamic society. Collective deliberation and joint responsibility are considered 
prerequisites to proper administration: “In the first place, Islam stipulates "rida al 
awam", that is, popular consent, as a prerequisite to the establishment of legitimate 
political authority, and ijtihad jama'i, that is, collective deliberation, as a requisite to 
the proper administration of public affairs.”794 Sulaiman argues that both Shura and 
democracy derive from the same consideration that collective deliberation is more 
valuable to the public good than individual preference, and that all people are equal 
in rights and responsibility.
795
 Additionally, it is commonly accepted that majority 
judgments are more likely to be comprehensive and sound than individual decision-
making:  
both thereby commit to the rule of the people through 
application of the law rather than the rule of individuals or a 
family through autocratic decree. Both affirm that a more 
comprehensive fulfillment of the principles and values by which 
humanity prospers cannot be achieved in a non-democratic, non-
Shura environment.
796
  
 
Although many Muslim scholars call for more democracy in Arab/Islamic 
States, they concur that Islam has already provided the tools to develop a democratic 
society. Such a claim was made more than fifty years ago by Mawlana Azad (1888 - 
1958) a theologian, scholar and reformer in India who is described as regarding,  
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the Islamic system of government established by 
Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) as the real picture of democratic 
system of government and calls it “Islamic democracy” for which 
the holy Qur’an uses the term ‘Shura.’ Islam is synonymous, he 
maintains, with the “spirit of democracy and equality”, and it 
cannot consider any government which is not parliamentary and 
constitutional as in accordance with God`s will. 
797
  
 
S. Yusuf al Qaradawi, a renowned modern scholar argues: “The tools and 
guarantees created by democracy are as close as can ever be to the realization of 
political principles brought to this earth by Islam to put a leash on the ambitions and 
whims of rulers. These principles are: Shura [consultation], good advice…”798 
Although the compatibility of Islam and democracy has been a heated debate 
of increasing intensity among modern Muslim scholars for the last decade, there 
seems to be agreement that a key to democratic reform in Muslim societies is to 
increase the participation of the people in government.
799
 However, the form that 
participation should adopt is not entirely clear, although many would argue 
participation needs to be harmonised with Islamic principles to create a democratic 
system of government. 
8.4 Reform Begets Reform 
Once the small reforms made in recent years are seen to work, most expect 
there will be more, such as, elections for regional Councils, and eventually for the Al-
Shura Council.  In 2012, Prince Sultan bin Abdel Aziz, the Minister of Defence 
informed the Council of the leadership views. It agrees with the demands for the 
Council to be given further powers. The Shura members have welcomed these 
overtures, and would like to see a model introduced which is similar to Kuwait’s 
parliamentary framework.  The members want to see the role of prime minister to be 
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separate from that of the King, as well as an elected assembly which would be 
responsible for passing a budget and which would have the power to grant or 
withdraw confidence from ministers.
800
  
However, ruling members of the Saudi family disagree over the causes of 
tensions in the country and on how to confront them. Nevertheless, there is concern 
within the regime that too much liberal reform is also a threat. They are not alone in 
holding this concern as many Islamists consider elections to be anti-Islam.
801
 
Not everyone believes that enhancing Shura will guarantee more democracy 
in an Islamic State such as Saudi Arabia. For example, Giacomo Luciani argues that 
Shura is a concept that depends on how it is actually practiced. It can exist in a 
method where actual consultation is minimal at best, and if approval from the people 
is lost by not conforming to the “correct” conclusion, a leader and/or a regime could 
suffer political repercussions and an increasing challenge to the status quo.
802
  
Consequently, the process of Shura in a country where the ruler holds absolute 
power, demands that consultation is practised whenever an important decision is 
faced and a policy will not be enacted unless key stakeholders are in agreement. This 
is by and large the most common political reality within a majority of the Arabian 
Gulf States today. 
803
 
At the present time, no reasonable person would describe the country of 
Saudi Arabia as being democratic, in spite of its promotion of Shura. However, the 
regime has been able to maintain legitimacy because it has been able to integrate 
religion with politics through its religious alliances. Additionally, reform has been 
enacted because of the deep fear that dissent by the people can destroy the State.  So, 
Saudi has implemented reform, albeit cautiously and incrementally. Now is the time, 
however, for the Kingdom to take a more meaningful step by allowing members of 
the Al-Shura Council to be elected by the public, as opposed to being appointed by 
the King. This will not guarantee a democratic society, but it is a step in the right 
direction towards more balance of power in Saudi Arabia, as the Council is not 
dependent on the King for its body politic. Additionally, elections can help bring 
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more transparency to the system of governance, as those being elected will be held 
more accountable to their constituents. Considering the Al-Shura Council is a revered 
Islamic institution, it seems to be the best place to implement democratic reform. 
Firstly, as its role is already approved and accepted, a new form of political 
participation is not required.  Moreover, the Council can be portrayed as an Islamic 
way towards democracy and thus erode the strength and appeal of any political 
argument from those who would accuse Saudi of caving in to Western models of 
governance.  
That the Council is currently up to 150 members is a continuing 
demonstration of the commitment to strengthen the status and importance of the 
Shura Council.  
8.5 Conclusion 
Islamic leaders have long held onto the tradition of people’s ability for self-
determination through their right of consultation, guaranteed in Islam. The Ayatollah 
Baqir al-Sadr, who was executed by Saddam Hussein in 1980, said in his work, 
Islamic Political System, that the people are entitled to use the practice of 
consultation in addressing their affairs. This view was reaffirmed by Iran’s President 
Khatami in a recent interview. He stressed that citizens have a fundamental role in 
not only bringing a government to power, but also in monitoring it and possibly 
replacing it without  stress and difficulty. 
804
 
Currently, the Al-Shura Council’s function in Saudi society is a key to the 
country’s ability to constitutionalise and implement more democracy into its system. 
More democracy has been promised to Saudi citizens since the 1960s. Slowly but 
surely, reform has taken place, which has manifested most importantly in the form of 
its Majlis Al-Shura, its consultative Council,  an institution that has become the pride 
of the country. Nevertheless, the Al-Shura Council falls just shy of being a true 
harbinger of democracy. Providing the Council with more legislative authority and 
allowing members to be elected by Saudi citizens would bring the country closer to 
an ideal of a society governed within the framework of both democratic principles 
and spirituality in Islam.  
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Over the last two decades, Saudi Arabia has made small, incremental political 
and social changes to meet the growing demands for reform in the Kingdom. The 
country has faced both external and internal pressures to institute more democracy. 
For the most part, however, trying to introduce radical change would undermine the 
government’s legitimacy with its own citizens, no matter how welcoming a move 
towards a Western version of democracy might be viewed in the rest of the world.  
And considering that a democratic government is supposed to represent the wishes of 
its citizens, anything more than gradual change would be inappropriate for Saudi 
Arabia. Renewing its commitment to Islamic forms of governance and embracing the 
true spirit of those principles is the best way for the country to progress. In this way, 
its citizens can reap the benefits of fuller participation in the political process and the 
needs of most stakeholders within Saudi Arabia are more likely to be met.   
In reviewing the literature and recognising the characteristics of this unique 
country, the most appropriate process of constitutionalisation that would maintain 
stability and legitimacy in Saudi Arabia, whilst providing sufficient citizen 
participation in governance, would be to restructure the Al-Shura Council.  Members 
should be elected by the public and not appointed by the King, and the Council itself 
should act as a balance of power between the other sources of authority within the 
Saudi State. 
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Chapter Nine: Recommendations and Conclusion  
 
Saudi Arabia, like other nations in the Middle East, is confronting political, 
economic, social, and diplomatic challenges shaped by a new millennium. 
Additionally, information technologies, globalisation and the inability for the 
governments to control information and social networking has allowed outside 
influences to make an impact on the region’s various societies. Since the 1980s, with 
the increase in international trade, there has been a drive to politicise international 
commerce as seen when the Reagan administration tried to impose normative 
democratic principles on America’s “friends” and trading partners.805 When applying 
such standards on the Middle East, most people do not realise how non-uniform the 
different countries are, so the complexity of the region is often greatly 
underestimated. However, “If there is Ariadne’s thread leading through the labyrinth, 
it is the determination of these various countries to decide for themselves what is in 
their best interest, to set their own national goals and to cooperate among themselves 
only when they perceive it in their interest to do so.”806  
When under pressure, each nation will respond to demands from citizens in 
its own way. The way the reforms are developed and implemented will be shaped by 
the country’s history, culture and circumstances. Nevertheless, if constitutionalism is 
truly a force for change in the Middle East, as is claimed by many, certain 
fundamentals are required to drive that change in order for the governments to 
maintain legitimacy.  
Constitutionalism requires, at the very least, that government is legally 
limited in its powers. A government’s continuing legitimacy will depend on whether 
or not it is observing these limitations. Constitutionalisation, then, imposes legal 
restraints on government, which results in a balance between the power of the State 
and the power of the people. In a country like Saudi Arabia, where citizen 
participation is extremely limited, in order to institute some semblance of democratic 
reform, the process of representative deliberation needs to be visible to Saudi 
citizens. Democratic legitimacy requires at the very least that those who deliberate be 
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held accountable.
807
 The transparency of deliberation in policy-making is critical for 
maintaining legitimacy in government.  This is because laws or policies that are 
enacted without the support of citizens are often seen as unjustified; “The coercive 
powers of the State would be exercised against citizens on grounds they [the citizens] 
do not find reasonable or that they cannot as free and equal citizens endorse.”808 
It is reasonable, then, that when policies and laws are made through a 
deliberative process by representatives who are acting on behalf of the people, the 
process itself is seen as legitimate, so the outcomes are also accepted as legitimate. 
Political legitimacy is obtained when people recognise and accept the validity of the 
rules of the political system and the decisions of rulers. In a representative system, if 
the process of how policies and laws are developed is seen as legitimate, then policy-
makers will be in a position to act decisively on behalf of citizens without having to 
seek approval or using force for every decision.
809
 
Since the 1990s, Saudi Arabia has been promising its citizens that it will 
implement democratic reforms. Slowly but surely, it has been working to keep its 
promise. The promise was first manifested in the creation of the Basic Law of 
Governance in March, 1992. This was a first attempt to respond to the demand for 
more democratic governance in the country; while the Basic Law did offer some 
important changes, general citizen participation was still non-existent. Consequently, 
there have been continuing demands for more citizen participation in the political 
process, and recently, attention has been turned to the Al-Shura Council.  The Al-
Shura Council is the Islamic main governing authority that ensures policies and laws 
follow the principles of Islam. The Shura framework, however, only provides 
general, universal principles; the details of how they are applied are left open to 
interpretation by the various nations affected. This allows a great degree of 
flexibility, which makes Shura a progressive political system that can respond to the 
nation’s interests during any era. Allowing the Shura to be open and unspecified is 
considered an advantage because it can be adapted to the needs of the citizens at the 
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time. Currently, the needs of the citizens in Saudi Arabia are to participate in 
political decision-making.  
The role of the Al-Shura Council has profound significance in Arab culture 
and history. The Shura method of public consultation is associated with the ancient 
Arab tradition of the open Majlis or ‘Council.’ Shura guarantees that governance 
under Islam is guided by the consultation of others. In addition, by enlarging the role 
of the Al-Shura Council as a vehicle for citizen representation, Saudi Arabia is using 
basic Islamic precepts which are perceived as being more legitimate in forming 
governance in the country rather than one that appears to be mimicking Western 
democracy.  Some constitutional and legal scholars agree that legitimate democracy 
comes in many forms and there is therefore, no need for Muslims to simply follow 
non-Muslims models. 
810
 Indeed, secular systems are seen as illegitimate for most 
Muslims. This is because from the Islamic worldview, a separation of religion from 
politics can result in governance that lacks spirituality and moral guidance. Most 
Muslims would agree that a secularised government, then, often leads to abuse of 
power; the Baath Arab Socialist regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq is a good example 
of this fear coming to fruition. In the past 30 years, there has been a good deal of 
literature published on the relationship between Shura and democracy. While there 
are different perspectives as to Shura’s role in bringing Western-style democracy to 
Islam, there is common ground created between governments and intellectuals who 
consider Shura to be a process that legitimises the existing political structure.
811
 
The Saudi Arabian government has no intention of becoming a democracy, of 
course, but it has made promises to use more democratic practices. Using forms of 
governance that are sanctioned under Islam is the most reasonable choice for the 
country. Contrary to those who declare Islam and democracy are incompatible, the 
role of the Al-Shura Council could become an exemplary model of deliberative 
democracy at work in a modern society. The Saudi government has already made 
conciliatory gestures of good faith to add more democratic reforms by increasing the 
Al-Shura Council’s numbers to be more representative of the diversity in the country. 
Appointing both Shia members and women is a radical change for the Council, but 
one met with enthusiasm by most citizens. Still, although the reforms are an 
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important step in the right direction, most observers argue they have done little to 
change the patriarchal, clan-based structure of the governance system.
812
 This has 
raised concern about how much longer the Saudi population can be persuaded to 
accept and support a government which allows them so little participation.
813
 
However, although Saudi citizens make demands for reform, Saudi society has 
always been resistant to dramatic change; a more incremental approach would be 
more appropriate. Prince Talal has stated, “The majority in Saudi Arabia… prefer 
gradual steps towards a democratic life. If the citizens can express an opinion and 
take part in decisions in one way or another that is what is important… the structure 
of the Saudi system is different than other countries. There are customs here, and 
customs are stronger than laws.”814  
9.1 Recommendations for Constitutionalising the Al-Shura Council 
9.1.1 Electing Council Members 
At this time, citizens are not calling for a separation of authority between the 
Al-Shura Council and the King, but rather participation by being able to elect who 
becomes a member of Al-Shura. Indeed, the citizens of Saudi Arabia respect their 
leaders with deep devotion for the most part. This does not keep them from desiring 
more self-determination. The election of members to the Council will help to 
guarantee that the broad interests of all citizens are addressed more evenly because 
the people will choose who they believe will best represent their needs.  
Considering the purpose and intent of the Council is for its members to 
participate in deliberative consultation, the Council has the potential to meet one of 
the most important functions of a democracy – deliberative participation in decision-
making. Direct participation is not required as long as the Al-Shura Council members 
have been selected in a legitimate process. The members also need to be seen as 
serving the interests of the people rather than the King. As long as the King appoints 
the members, the legitimacy of the Council is in question, and will most likely be 
seen as an extension of the King’s will rather than an independent agency. One of the 
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arguments against elections was made by Prince Sultan, who said he worried that 
elections could result in the appointment of unfit members to the Council.  Currently 
the majority of Council members hold doctoral degrees.
815
 A way to overcome this 
concern is to have each district nominate candidates who have to meet minimal 
requirements, such as specific levels of education, experience and expertise in certain 
areas. Currently, Article 3 of the Al-Shura Council states that members of the 
Council are chosen from “amongst scholars and men of knowledge, expertise and 
specialization. Their rights, duties and all other affairs shall be defined by Royal 
Decree.”816 There is no reason why the same stipulations cannot be applied in the 
election of candidates. In this way, the people can choose by election from among 
some of the finest members of Saudi society.  
9.1.2 Transparency 
The minutes of the Council Meetings should be made available to the Saudi 
public for its review. Keeping in mind the requirements of legitimacy where 
deliberative legitimacy is usually measured by the quality of deliberation; does it for 
example provide an opportunity for free open debate and do the results of such 
deliberation match the expectations of an independent standard?
817
 Publishing the 
minutes of meetings would make the deliberative process open to the public and the 
quality of the deliberation would be open to evaluation; this would provide more 
accountability to governance and decision-making, so Saudi citizens can judge for 
themselves if their interests are being fully served.  
9.1.3 Increasing the Legislative Power of the Al-Shura Council 
Currently, the Al-Shura Council is mainly an advisory body, presenting its 
opinion on policies of the State referred by the Prime Minister. They discuss the 
monarchy’s plan for economic and social development, study and interpret laws and 
regulations, and then make suggestions it feels are necessary. While the Al-Shura 
Council does have important influence as an advisory Council, it does not have the 
authority to pass legislation independently. It can initiate legislation, but the King 
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will have the final say in the event that the majority cannot agree on an issue. As 
outlined in Article 31 of Majlis Al-Shura law:  
 
Council resolutions shall be adopted by majority as set 
forth in Article 16 of the Law of the Shura Council.  In case a 
majority vote is not attained, the topic shall be rescheduled for 
voting in the following session. In the event the topic does not 
win the necessary majority in this session, the Issue shall be 
brought before the King along with any relevant study as well as 
the results of the voting in both sessions.
818
 
 
The Al-Shura Council also acts as an advisory body to the Council of 
Ministers. The Council of Ministers has the final authority to make decisions about 
laws and for financial, executive and administrative policies. Its resolutions are non-
binding unless agreed upon by a majority vote. In case of a tie, the prime minister 
has the deciding vote. Like the Al-Shura Council, the Council of Ministers is 
appointed by the King, so the Ministers are seen as an extension of the King’s will. 
The Council of Ministers has more power than the Al-Shura Council.  This is 
because the Al-Shura Council is more representative of Saudi citizens than the 
Council of Ministers. Allowing the Al-Shura Council more legislative authority 
would establish more of a balance of power between regime rule and the will of the 
people. The Council of Ministers is more of an administrative body, working for the 
efficient and just functioning of the government, while the Al-Shura Council is a 
representative body, working to serve the needs of the people it represents. Granting 
the Al-Shura Council more authority would not be challenged. The Council is 
already highly regarded by the community, and it is therefore, likely that its decisions 
would be accepted as appropriate and legitimate.  
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9.2 Conclusion  
These three measures would be effective in beginning the process of 
constitutionalising Saudi Arabian governance. Because the Al-Shura Council is 
highly revered, and not associated with Western institutions, it is much more likely 
that the Saudi stakeholders will welcome the reforms rather than condemn them. 
Currently, the Council is seen as an important forum for introducing future reforms, 
so it is by far the best vehicle for introducing more democracy in the Kingdom. 
Change needs to be gradual in Saudi society, as dissention is more likely to occur 
when tightly-held customs, traditions and sacred values are being threatened. 
However, Saudi citizens do want more political participation in government.  The 
redesigning of the Al-Shura Council into a true representative consultative Council 
would satisfy some of the rising demands for a more open and responsive 
government. Once these changes are made, it is quite likely that other changes will 
follow, including voting rights for more sectors of society.  
The purpose of this research project has been to examine the factors which 
have led to the need for Saudi Arabia to reform its Al-Shura Council law.  It has 
analysed the external environment that is being impacted by the forces of global 
constitutionalism and has considered the need for governments to act legitimately in 
order to be accepted as legitimate or face failure. This has lead to an exploration of 
issues of legitimacy and the need for reform in the Arabian Gulf in general. 
Normative processes have been creating pressure for change in the international 
arena, and Saudi Arabia is not exempt from these influences. The research has set the 
stage for evaluating Islam’s compatibility with democracy by introducing the ideas 
of deliberative democracy and erga omnes. In addition, it has emphasised the 
growing importance of human rights and their central role in the urgency related to 
constitutionalisation at the international level. The study has outlined the structure of 
governance that is currently in place in Saudi Arabia and elaborates concepts of 
constitutionalism, albeit from an Islamic perspective. The research has taken an in-
depth look at the practice of Shura: its history and significance in Islam, the absence 
of a formalised pattern in its application and its evolution in Saudi Arabia.  Finally 
this study sets forth the argument being developed on why Saudi should reform its 
Al-Shura Council law. 
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If no new reforms are implemented in the near future, it is likely that the 
long-held legitimacy of the regime could be called into question. Currently, the 
regime still has a lot of influence and most citizens do not want a change in 
monarchy family rule. They seek a less oppressive, more responsive, more 
democratic government. The three measures suggested here to reform the 
government would be a good balance between radical reform and reform which is 
too slow in its progress. With more participation, transparency, and legislative 
authority, the Al-Shura Council can act as a true deliberative organisation. Its role 
would be to represent the needs of Saudi citizens, where the Council and the Saudi 
government would be working for the common good: the only truly legitimate role 
the government should hold. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 
WITHIN THE SAUDI KINGDOM 
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
None of the below rights have been signed 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
aiming at the abolition of the death penalty 
PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RACE, RELIGION, 
OR BELIEF; AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES 
None of the below rights have been signed 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women:  
Ratified: 07 Oct 2000 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: 
Not signed 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime: Signed: 12 Dec 2000 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crime Preamble, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime: Signed: 10 Dec 2002 
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime: Signed: 10 Dec 2002 
SLAVERY AND SLAVERY-LIKE PRACTICES 
Slavery Convention: Not signed 
Protocol amending the Slavery Convention: Not signed 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions 
and Practices Similar to Slavery: Accession: 5 Jul 1973 
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the 
Prostitution of Others: Not signed 
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PROTECTION FROM TORTURE, ILL-TREATMENT AND DISAPPEARANCE 
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment: Not signed 
Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment: Not signed 
Protocol No. 2 to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment of Punishment: Not signed 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment: Accession: 23 Sep 1997 
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 
Convention on the Rights of the Child: Accession: 25 Feb 1996 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of 
children in armed conflicts: Not signed 
Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the 
Worst Forms of Child Labour: Ratification: 8 Oct 2001 
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
None of the below rights have been signed 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention 
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention 
EMPLOYMENT AND FORCED LABOUR 
Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour: Ratification: 15 Jun 1978 
Equal Remuneration Convention: Ratification: 15 Jun 1978 
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention: Ratification: 15 Jun 1978 
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention: Ratification: 15 Jun 1978 
Employment Policy Convention: Not signed 
Convention concerning Occupational Safety and Health and the Working Environment:  
Not signed 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families: Not signed 
EDUCATION 
Convention against Discrimination in Education: Ratified 
REFUGEES AND ASYLUM 
None of the below rights have been signed 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 
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NATIONALITY, STATELESSNESS, AND THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS 
None of the below rights have been signed 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 
WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, GENOCIDE, AND 
TERRORISM 
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humanity: Not signed 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide:  
Ratification: 13 Jul 1950 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Not signed 
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field: Ratification and Accession on: 18 May 1963 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea: Ratification and Accession on: 18 May 
1963 
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War:  
Ratification and Accession on: 18 May 1963 
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War: 
Ratification and Accession on: 18 May 1963 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I): 
Ratification and Accession on: 21 Aug 1987 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims on Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II): 
Ratification and Accession on: 28 Nov 2001 
TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages: Accession: 8 Jan 1991 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing: Not signed 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism: 
Signed: 29 Nov 2001 
International Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft: 
Ratification and Accession on: 14 Jun 1974 
International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
International Protected Persons: Not signed 
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U.N. ACTIVITIES AND EMPLOYEES 
None of the below rights have been signed 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel 
REGIONAL CONVENTIONS 
None of the below rights have been signed 
[European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
Protocol No.2 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
Protocol No.3 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
Protocol No.4 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
Protocol No.5 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
Protocol No.6 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
Protocol No.7 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
Protocol No. 8 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
Protocol No. 9 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
Protocol No. 10 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
Protocol No. 11 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
Protocol No. 12 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment 
Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
Protocol No. 2 to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment of Punishment 
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AFRICAN REGIONAL CONVENTIONS 
No ratification information available. 
African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights  
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa  
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights  
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child  
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APPENDIX II 
 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
  
  
Date Monitoring 
Body 
ICERD  International Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Racial Discrimination  
21 Dec 
1965 
CERD 
ICCPR  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  16 Dec 
1966 
CCPR 
ICESCR  International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights  
16 Dec 
1966 
CESCR 
CEDAW  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women  
18 Dec 
1979 
CEDAW  
CAT  Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment  
10 Dec 
1984 
CAT  
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child 20 Nov 
1989 
CRC 
ICMW  International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families  
18 Dec 
1990 
CMW  
CPED International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
20 Dec 
2006 
CED 
CRPD  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities  13 Dec 
2006 
CRPD  
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Date Monitoring 
Body 
ICESCR 
- OP  
Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights  
10 Dec 
2008 
CESCR 
ICCPR-
OP1  
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights  
16 Dec 
1966 
CCPR 
ICCPR-
OP2  
Second Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the 
abolition of the death penalty 
15 Dec 
1989 
CCPR 
OP-
CEDAW  
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women  
10 Dec 
1999 
CEDAW  
OP-
CRC-
AC  
Optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the   Child on the involvement of children in armed 
conflict 
25 May 
2000 
CRC 
OP-
CRC-SC  
Optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and 
child pornography 
25 May 
2000 
CRC 
OP-CAT  Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 
18 Dec 
2002 
SPT  
OP-
CRPD  
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities  
12 Dec 
2006 
CRPD  
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